O livro Théorie des approximations numériques et du calcul abrégé de Agliberto Xavier

Pós-graduação em Educação Matemática - IGCE

Zur Inhaltsstruktur von Rechtsnormen: Modalitäten und Normtypen

Rechtsnormen als Texte – Versuch einer Zusammenführung von Rechtstheorie und Linguistik: Rechtstheoretiker sind sich zwar bewusst, dass Recht wesentlich Sprache ist; diese Voraussetzung wird aber in der konkreten Analyse von Rechtsnormen und ihrer Struktur nur selten systematisch berücksichtigt; zumeist wird von der konkreten sprachlichen Form abgesehen oder der einzelne Satz wird als formale Größe absolut gesetzt. Dazu werden auch meist wichtige Erkenntnisse der Linguistik kaum berücksichtigt, etwa grundlegende Differenzierungen wie jene zwischen Satz und Text bzw. Grammatik und Äußerung oder Ausdruck und Inhalt. Dieser Beitrag versucht, Rechtsnormen als geschriebene Texte sui generis, d. h. als sprachliche Objekte, ernst zu nehmen und aus einem textlinguistischen Blickwinkel zu betrachten, durchaus im Horizont der Rechtstheorie und deren Erkenntnisinteresse, und die grundlegenden Eigenschaften von Rechtsnormen aus dieser zweifachen Perspektive deutlicher zu klären, etwa in Bezug auf die innere Struktur von Rechtsnormen, auf eine Typologie von Rechtsnormen, die Bedeutung von einzelnen Normen, das Verhältnis von innerer Struktur und äusserer Form oder die Adressatenfrage.

Was hat Herr Chiarini in Angelegenheiten der europäischen Juden geleistet?: Eine freimüthige und unpartheiische Beleuchtung des Werkes: Théorie du judaisme ... par L.A. Chiarini, 2 tomes, Paris et Génèvre 1830

von I. M. Jost

Théorie du judai͏̈sme appliquée `a la reforme des Israélites de tous les pays de l'Europe, et servant en même temps d'ouvrage préparatoire `a la version du Thalmud de Babylone

par L. A. Chiarini

Une analyse des connecteurs pragmatiques fondée sur la théorie de la pertinence et son application au TALN

Dans cet article, nous proposons d’appliquer une analyse des connecteurs pragmatiques issue de la théorie de la pertinence au traitement automatique des langues naturelles (TALN). Nous commencerons par montrer les conséquences de l’application de la théorie de la pertinence sur l’étude des connecteurs, en prenant pour exemple les connecteurs de l’anglais. Dans un deuxième temps, nous exposerons les contraintes imposées par les limites actuelles du TALN. Enfin, nous proposerons un schéma d’étude des connecteurs pragmatiques pour le TALN ainsi qu’une esquisse d’application de cette méthode.

Entre théorie culturelle et poétique: enjeux d’une représentation dramaturgique des frontières

Inervention dans le cadre du séminaire «Pouvoir, DesExil, Convertibilité. La pensée à l’épreuve du conformisme, de l’incertitude, de la création», Séminaire co-organisé par Valeria Wagner, Université de Genève(UNIGE) et Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, Collège International de Philosophie (CIPh), Université de Genève et Théâtre du Loup, 23 avril 2015.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

La théorie sociale de la connaissance et la gestion du patrimoine documentaire à l’ère numérique

Les institutions de mémoire et de savoir (par exemple, les bibliothèques, les archives, les musées) font face à des défis importants dans leurs responsabilités d’assurer la pérennité du patrimoine documentaire à l’ère numérique. Citons la surabondance de l’information numérique, la possibilité de production, théoriquement illimitée, offerte aux individus comme aux groupes sociaux, les limites dans les capacités de stockage et de diffusion de l’information numérique qui sont à la disposition des institutions mandataires du patrimoine documentaire. De plus, il est apparu que les approches et les méthodes utilisées pour identifier, gérer, préserver et diffuser le patrimoine documentaire de la société canadienne dans un environnement analogique n’étaient transférables à un environnement numérique. Nous suggérons que la théorie sociale de la connaissance peut servir de base à une réflexion portant sur le développement d’une politique publique qui viserait à encadrer l’identification, la sélection, la gestion et la préservation du patrimoine documentaire d’une société à l'ère numérique. Nous définissons la problématique puis proposons des réponses à travers trois articles scientifiques. Les résultats indiquent que les connaissances et les pratiques professionnelles utilisées demeurent persistantes et limitent la formulation et l'application de nouveaux cadres théoriques, de politiques administratives et de techniques associés à l'identification et la sélection du patrimoine documentaire. Cette recherche propose un cadre conceptuel qui permet de développer des politiques publiques sur le patrimoine documentaire du Canada.