Factors Affecting Knowledge Sharing in Strategic Alliances: The Role of Knowledge Sharing as Strategic Control Behavior among Multinational Enterprises

International strategic alliances (ISAs) have become increasingly important for the stability, growth, and long-term viability of modern business organizations. Alliance partnerships as inter-firm cooperative ventures represent an influential mechanism for asserting corporate strategic control among autonomous multinational enterprises. These different cooperative arrangements are made of equity investments or contractually-based partnerships. Different alliance forms represent different approaches that partner firms adopt to control their mutual dependence on the alliance and on other partners. Earlier research shows that the partner characteristics could provide an explanation for alliance strategic behavior and see alliances as alternative forms to markets or hierarchies for addressing specific strategic needs linked to partners’ characteristics and their subsequent strategic motives. These characteristics of the partners’ and subsequent strategic motives are analyzed as knowledge sharing factors and how these influence inter-firm control in alliances within the context of the focal-firm STMicroelectronics and its alliance partners Nokia, Ericsson and IBM. This study underline that as contracts are incomplete, they are therefore required to maintain mutual dependence based control mechanisms in addition to a contract. For example, mutual dependence based control mechanisms could be joint financial investments and the building of an ownership structure between the parties (e.g., JVs). However, the present study clarifies that subsequent inter-firm control is also exercised through inter-firm knowledge sharing. The present study contributes by presenting a dynamic interplay between competitive and cooperative rent seeking behavior. Such coopetition behavior describes the firm's strategic orientation to achieve a dynamic balance between competitive and cooperative strategies. This balance is seen in knowledge sharing based cooperation and competition behavior. Thus this study clarifies coopetition strategies by introducing the role of inter-firm cooperation and the competitive nature of knowledge sharing. Simultaneous cooperative and competitive behavior is also seen as synergetic rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, this study extends the perspective of previous studies on competitive and cooperative seeking behavior.

Modeling urban traffic planning thro' strategic decisions- A case from Bangalore, India

This paper deals with reducing the waiting times of vehicles at the traffic junctions by synchronizing the traffic signals. Strategies are suggested for betterment of the situation at different time intervals of the day, thus ensuring smooth flow of traffic. The concept of single way systems are also analyzed. The situation is simulated in Witness 2003 Simulation package using various conventions. The average waiting times are reduced by providing an optimal combination for the traffic signal timer. Different signal times are provided for different times of the day, thereby further reducing the average waiting times at specific junctions/roads according to the experienced demands.

Dynamic mechanism design for markets with strategic resources

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies

Many networks such as social networks and organizational networks in global companies consist of self-interested agents. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in important tasks such as information diffusion and information extraction. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a stable network having that topology. We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model of recursive network formation and a utility model that captures many key features. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge as pairwise stable networks, wherein no node wants to delete any of its links and no two nodes would want to create a link between them.

Mechanism design for cost optimal PAC learning in the presence of strategic noisy annotators

We consider the problem of Probably Ap-proximate Correct (PAC) learning of a bi-nary classifier from noisy labeled exam-ples acquired from multiple annotators(each characterized by a respective clas-sification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all the annotators. For this scenario, we derive sample complexity bound for the Mini-mum Disagreement Algorithm (MDA) on the number of labeled examples to be ob-tained from each annotator. Next, we consider the incomplete information sce-nario, where each annotator is strategic and holds the respective noise rate as a private information. For this scenario, we design a cost optimal procurement auc-tion mechanism along the lines of Myer-son’s optimal auction design framework in a non-trivial manner. This mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility property,thereby facilitating the learner to elicit true noise rates of all the annotators.

Strategic Marketing and Innovation Performance of Indian MSMEs

Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) is an integral part of the Indian industrial sector. The distinctive features of MSMEs are less capital investment and high labour absorption which has created unprecedented importance to this sector. As per the Development Commissioner of MSME, the sector has the credit of being the second highest in employment in India, which stands next to agricultural sector. The MSMEs are very much needed in efficiently allocating the enormous labour supply and scarce capital by implementing labour intensive production processes. Associated with this high growth rates, MSMEs are also facing a number of problems like sub-optimal scale of operation, technological obsolescence, supply chain inefficiencies, increasing domestic and global competition, fund shortages, change in manufacturing & marketing strategies, turbulent and uncertain market scenario. To survive with such issues and compete with large and global enterprises, MSMEs need to adopt innovative approaches in their regular business operations. Among the manufacturing sectors, we find that they are unable to focus themselves in the present competition. This paper presents a brief literature of work done in MSMEs, Innovation and Strategic marketing with reference to Indian manufacturing firms.

Interaction between a strategic mass media firm and a government

Resumen: Este artículo intenta teorizar acerca de la dinámica entre los medios masivos de comunicación y los gobiernos de los países latinoamericanos. Si bien en la última década los gobiernos atacaron públicamente a los medios de comunicación, se afirma que no se dio por las razones que dicen, sino más bien por asuntos económicos. Por lo tanto, se ha diseñado un modelo utilizando el método de “principal” vs “incumbente”, donde se alcanzará un equilibrio de Nash perfecto en subjuegos. Además de esto, se realiza un repaso por la literatura conocida, y concluye señalando las fortalezas y debilidades del modelo propuesto.