821 resultados para security policy model
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Russia and Turkey have, over the past two decades, developed a very constructive relationship across a wide variety of policy areas. Imperial rivals during much of the Cold War, both countries have since then found common interests in matters of energy, trade and even defence. Besides their growing interdependence, it is hard not to notice the similarities between the two leaders of these countries, especially when it comes to the conspiracy mind-set of blaming dissent at home on foreign meddling. But does this mean that Turkey is fundamentally realigning its foreign policy strategy, away from the EU and towards Russia? And is the EU facing the emergence of an “axis of the excluded”? Not so according to Dimitar Bechev. In this Policy Brief, he argues that the ties between Russia and Turkey are driven by pragmatism and realpolitik. Contentious issues – such as the war in Syria - may be insulated from areas of overlapping interest, but deeper examination shows the glue holding the two countries together – their energy interdependence – is slowly weakening. Bechev believes the EU should take advantage of this divergence and try to (re-)anchor Turkey to its own initiatives and policies.
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The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.
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Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.
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Summary. This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.
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This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.
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On 25 and 26 June 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) will convene to discuss the implementation of their Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013. A substantial and frank debate among EU leaders is urgently needed in order to forge a lasting and credible vision for CSDP.
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On 2 April in Lausanne, after months of intense negotiations, Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) agreed on a framework deal for the resolution of the nuclear dispute. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, issued a joint statement announcing that "solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" have been found. While differences remain on several issues, including the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and sanctions relief, the statement has nevertheless raised hopes that a final deal may be reached this summer. If accomplished, an agreement would bring an end to more than a decade of tensions between Iran and the international community. This would result in the lifting of several sanctions, which were adopted against Iran by the United Nations, the EU, and the US. Unsurprisingly therefore, Iran's economy and in particular its energy sector are now the subject of worldwide attention.
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This collective EU Diplomacy Paper on relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) consists of essays written by students of the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme at the College of Europe in the class on EU-NATO relations taught by Fulbright Professor Mark Sheetz in the academic year 2014-15. It seeks to provide a blueprint of what the near future of the transatlantic alliance and of the European security framework might look like. Special attention will be given to the possible effects of Finland joining NATO, Swedish-NATO relations, the question whether NATO should continue to exist at all, and finally the use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in relation with the transatlantic military alliance.
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No abstract.
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A guide to Security and Defence within the European Union and in the wider Europe, with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Commonwealth countries share their British social policy legacy in a variety of ways. Autstralia attempted to adopt the postwar new Fabian welfare state model at the very time when international economic circumstances undermined its Keynesian foundation. With Labor governments in power from 1983 to 1996, Australia diverged significantly from the neo-liberal reform path adopted in the United Kingdom. Australian governments looked increasingly to European social democracies for alternative social policy model In a manner anticipating the Third Way. the tendency was towards mixing neo-liberal economics with social democratic welfare. The Australian Third Way which resulted proved unstable. Current social reformers, the paper proposes, ought to revisit a neglected but characteristically British emphasis on the need for a measure of socialization of investment to underpin redistributive strategies.
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Australian foreign and security policy confronts a series of difficult challenges in coping with the emergence of an Islamic extremist threat in Southeast Asia. Australian policy makers are being drawn into unfamiliar linkages with moderate Islam, and into closer cooperation with Indonesia, the most populous Islamic nation in the world, in an attempt to offset Islamic extremists. Further, they must achieve those objectives at a time when important interests are at stake beyond Southeast Asia, when bipartisan agreement about the direction of foreign policy is waning, and when divisions over the appropriate trajectory of Australian security policy are intense. A delicacy almost unprecedented in Australian foreign policy will be required.