'Leaving Nothing to Chance'?: Joint Tenancies, The 'Right' of Survivorship and Unilateral Severance

The joint tenancy with its inherent right of survivorship is the most prevalent form of co-ownership in the common law world today. Most couples will be joint tenants of a family home, while relations (such as siblings) who purchase property together may opt for this arrangement. Inter vivos acquisitions aside, the huge intergenerational transfer of wealth within families on death can result in a joint tenancy, and it may also be a convenient estate planning device. The fact that property automatically vests in the surviving joint tenants on death is the reason why many people choose this form of co-ownership. However, there is one serious disadvantage. A joint tenancy is an inflexible form of landholding where relationships sour or family circumstances change over time, and co-owners want their respective `shares' of the property to pass to someone else on death. Where consensual severance is not possible, one joint tenant can sever unilaterally. The latter mechanism is vital in terms of giving effect to the wishes of the severing joint tenant, especially in situations of discord or a breakdown in relations with their fellow co-owners. However, unilateral severance also has serious implications for the non-severing joint tenant(s) who expected to inherit property through survivorship, and can impact significantly on ownership of the home and other family property. This article looks at unilateral severance as a means of subverting the right of survivorship. The focus is on personal and inter-family relationships, and the various legal issues and policy considerations associated with unilateral severance across the common law jurisdictions of Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It assesses the various methods of effecting unilateral severance and proposes specific measures, as well as considering novel arguments for preventing unilateral severance based on contractual agreements to the contrary and proprietary estoppel.

Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups

This research rests on the assumption that individual differences approaches to prejudice benefit from all integration of intergroup factors. Following Duckitt (2001), we assumed that two prominent individual differences variables, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), would differentially predict majority members' levels of ethnic prejudice depending on specific factors of the intergroup context: RWA as all index of motivational concerns about social cohesion, stability and security should drive prejudice against outgroups perceived as socially threatening, and SDO as an index of concerns about ingroup superiority and dominance should predict prejudice against outgroups perceived as potential competitors for power-status. Across two studies (Ns = 82, 176), using between-participants and within-participants experimental designs, the effects of RWA on prejudice were particularly powerful when the outgroup was manipulated to be socially threatening, but the effects of SDO on prejudice appeared not to increase when the outgroup was manipulated to be competitive. In Study 2, presenting the outgroup as having low status also increased the effect of RWA, but not the effect of SDO. These results support the differential prediction assumption for RWA, but not for SDO. Implications for the conceptualisation of RWA and SDO are discussed. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

On How to Build a Positive Understanding of the Child’s Right to Freedom of Expression

This article looks at the child’s right to freedom of expression under UN treaties. It defines the legal basis, the scope and the extent of the child’s right and it compares it with the adult’s right to freedom of expression. It argues that freedom of expression has both a developmental and an autonomy aspect, and that Article 12 UNCRC does a better job at encapsulating the child’s right than Article 13. It concludes that the child’s right is very much based on the positive obligations of the state, to the difference of traditional international law on freedom of expression.