Simon Chesterman, One Nation Under Surveillance – A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty

Oxford University Press 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-958037-8

The Jewish marriage contract : a study in the status of the woman in Jewish law

by Louis M. Epstein

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.

Conformance monitoring, contract of objectives, tube in the sky

Ponencia invitada sobre asignacion y gestion de losts en el curso de verano de la UPM Research in Decisión Support Systems for future Air Traffic Management

Zero-G Gauging systems. CONTRACT No 17/8/4

Various systems for measuring propellant content in spacecrafts under weightlessness conditions are reviewed. The cavity resonator method is found to be the most suitable measurement; technique. This method is analyzed in detail. A determination of errors intrinsec to the method is carried out.

Assessment of irrigators’ preferences for different water supply risk management tools: option contract and insurance.

Irrigators face the risk of not having enough water to meet their crops’ demand. There are different mechanisms to cope with this risk, including water markets (option contracts) or insurance. A farmer will purchase them when the expected utility change derived from the tool is positive. This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the farmer’s expected utility under two different option contracts, a drought insurance and a combination of an option contract and the insurance. We analyze the conditions that determine farmer’s reference for one instrument or the other and perform a numerical application that is relevant for a Spanish region.

Contract for the great College, 6 May 1813

This is a contract signed between Loammi Baldwin, acting on behalf of the President and Fellows of Harvard College, and Josiah Moore, Esquire; John Walton, Housewright; Thomas Mason, Housewright; Samuel Mason, Housewright; and Joseph Holmes, Housewright, for the construction of University Hall. The agreement was witnessed by William Jenison and Josiah Nottage.

Contract for finding all materials and finishing interior of University Hall, signed copy, 1 February 1814

This is a contract signed between Loammi Baldwin, acting on behalf of the President and Fellows of Harvard College, and Josiah Moore, John Walton, Thomas Mason, Samuel Mason, and Joseph Holmes for completing the dining rooms and chapel of University Hall. The agreement was witnessed by Abraham Edwards and Thomas Edwards.

Contract for finding all materials and finishing interior of University Hall, 1 February 1814

Draft of the official signed copy of the contract in Box 1, Folder 42. This copy is written in a different hand and contains several struck through phrases.