The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.

Neuroelectromagnetic correlates of perceptual closure processes

Perceptual closure refers to the coherent perception of an object under circumstances when the visual information is incomplete. Although the perceptual closure index observed in electroencephalography reflects that an object has been recognized, the full spatiotemporal dynamics of cortical source activity underlying perceptual closure processing remain unknown so far. To address this question, we recorded magnetoencephalographic activity in 15 subjects (11 females) during a visual closure task and performed beamforming over a sequence of successive short time windows to localize high-frequency gamma-band activity (60–100 Hz). Two-tone images of human faces (Mooney faces) were used to examine perceptual closure. Event-related fields exhibited a magnetic closure index between 250 and 325 ms. Time-frequency analyses revealed sustained high-frequency gamma-band activity associated with the processing of Mooney stimuli; closure-related gamma-band activity was observed between 200 and 300 ms over occipitotemporal channels. Time-resolved source reconstruction revealed an early (0–200 ms) coactivation of caudal inferior temporal gyrus (cITG) and regions in posterior parietal cortex (PPC). At the time of perceptual closure (200–400 ms), the activation in cITG extended to the fusiform gyrus, if a face was perceived. Our data provide the first electrophysiological evidence that perceptual closure for Mooney faces starts with an interaction between areas related to processing of three-dimensional structure from shading cues (cITG) and areas associated with the activation of long-term memory templates (PPC). Later, at the moment of perceptual closure, inferior temporal cortex areas specialized for the perceived object are activated, i.e., the fusiform gyrus related to face processing for Mooney stimuli.

The Effects of Emotions and Distraction on Attention During a Perceptual Task

According to the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, positive emotions broaden while negative emotions narrow thought-action repertoires. These processes reflect changes in attentional scope, which is the focus of this research. The present study tested the hypothesis that participants in negative mood would be better able to focus on a target figure and separate it from its context in a perceptual task, and would also be better able to focus on the task amid a distracting environment than participants in a positive mood. An undergraduate sample of 77 participants watched video clips selected to induce either fear or amusement, and completed an Embedded Figures Test either in a quiet setting or in a noisy setting. A higher-order ANOVA revealed that Mood had a marginally significant effect on task performance, F(1, 73) = 3.94, p = .051, and that Distraction, F(1, 72) = 4.61, p = .035 and the Mood x Distraction interaction, F(1, 73) = 9.12, p = .003 did significantly affect task performance. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the effect of the distraction manipulation was greater for participants in a negative mood than it was for participants in a positive mood. The author suggests future directions to clarify the relationship between emotions, attentional scope, and susceptibility to environmental distraction.

Perceptual Learning via Modification of Cortical Top-Down Signals

The primary visual cortex (V1) is pre-wired to facilitate the extraction of behaviorally important visual features. Collinear edge detectors in V1, for instance, mutually enhance each other to improve the perception of lines against a noisy background. The same pre-wiring that facilitates line extraction, however, is detrimental when subjects have to discriminate the brightness of different line segments. How is it possible to improve in one task by unsupervised practicing, without getting worse in the other task? The classical view of perceptual learning is that practicing modulates the feedforward input stream through synaptic modifications onto or within V1. However, any rewiring of V1 would deteriorate other perceptual abilities different from the trained one. We propose a general neuronal model showing that perceptual learning can modulate top-down input to V1 in a task-specific way while feedforward and lateral pathways remain intact. Consistent with biological data, the model explains how context-dependent brightness discrimination is improved by a top-down recruitment of recurrent inhibition and a top-down induced increase of the neuronal gain within V1. Both the top-down modulation of inhibition and of neuronal gain are suggested to be universal features of cortical microcircuits which enable perceptual learning.

Incidental task sequence learning: perceptual rather than conceptual?

In four experiments we investigated whether incidental task sequence learning occurs when no instructional task cues are available (i.e. with univalent stimuli). We manipulated task sequence by presenting three simple binary-choice tasks (colour, form or letter case decisions) in regular repeated or random order. Participants were required to use the same two response keys for each of the tasks. We manipulated response sequence by ordering the stimuli so as to produce either a regular or a random order of left versus right-hand key presses. When sequencing in both, or either, separate stream (i.e. task sequence and/or response sequence) was changed to random, only those participants who had processed both sequences together showed evidence of sequence learning in terms of significant response time disruption (Experiments 1-3). This effect disappeared when the sequences were uncorrelated (Experiment 4). The results indicate that only the correlated integration of task sequence and response sequence produced a reliable incidental learning effect. As this effect depends on the predictable ordering of stimulus categories, it suggests that task sequence learning is perceptual rather than conceptual in nature.

The neurophysiological time pattern of illusionary visual perceptual transitions: a simultaneous EEG and fMRI study

Several divergent cortical mechanisms generating multistability in visual perception have been suggested. Here, we investigated the neurophysiologic time pattern of multistable perceptual changes by means of a simultaneous recording with electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Volunteers responded to the subjective perception of a sudden change between stable patterns of illusionary motion (multistable transition) during a stroboscopic paradigm. We found a global deceleration of the EEG frequency prior to a transition and an occipital-accentuated acceleration after a transition, as obtained by low-resolution electromagnetic tomography analysis (LORETA) analysis. A decrease in BOLD response was found in the prefrontal cortex before, and an increase after the transitions was observed in the right anterior insula, the MT/V5 regions and the SMA. The thalamus and left superior temporal gyrus showed a pattern of decrease before and increase after transitions. No such temporal course was found in the control condition. The multimodal approach of data acquisition allows us to argue that the top-down control of illusionary visual perception depends on selective attention, and that a diminution of vigilance reduces selective attention. These are necessary conditions to allow for the occurrence of a perception discontinuity in absence of a physical change of the stimulus.

EEG signs of vigilance fluctuations preceding perceptual flips in multistable illusionary motion

This EEG study was performed to clarify the time course of brain electrical events and possible vigilance changes associated with perceptual flips during multistable perception. 13 healthy subjects (28.5 3.8 years) were recorded with a 21-channel digital EEG during a stroboscopic alternative motion paradigm implying illusionary motion with ambiguous direction. Perceptual flips were preceded by a significant decrease of EEG frequencies, and followed by a significant frequency increase with a trend to overshoot. EEG slowing is a reliable sign of vigilance decrease and can be related to thalamic deactivation. This is consistent with a recent fMRI study, which showed thalamic deactivation associated with perceptual flips. The study added important chronological information about this phenomenon and allows the conclusion that reduced vigilance facilitates perceptual discontinuities during multistable perception.