Risk pricing practices in finance, insurance and construction

A review of current risk pricing practices in the financial, insurance and construction sectors is conducted through a comprehensive literature review. The purpose was to inform a study on risk and price in the tendering processes of contractors: specifically, how contractors take account of risk when they are calculating their bids for construction work. The reference to mainstream literature was in view of construction management research as a field of application rather than a fundamental academic discipline. Analytical models are used for risk pricing in the financial sector. Certain mathematical laws and principles of insurance are used to price risk in the insurance sector. construction contractors and practitioners are described to traditionally price allowances for project risk using mechanisms such as intuition and experience. Project risk analysis models have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used because of problems practitioners face when confronted with them. A discussion of practices across the three sectors shows that the construction industry does not approach risk according to the sophisticated mechanisms of the two other sectors. This is not a poor situation in itself. However, knowledge transfer from finance and insurance can help construction practitioners. But also, formal risk models for contractors should be informed by the commercial exigencies and unique characteristics of the construction sector.

Towards the "cult of the equity"? Insurance companies and the interwar capital market

This article examines the ways in which insurance companies modified their investment policies during the interwar years, arguing that this period marked the start of the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ investment practice. Economic and financial conditions raised considerable doubts regarding the suitability of traditional insurance investments, while competitive conditions forced insurance offices to seek higher-yielding assets. These pressures led to a considerable increase in the proportion of new investment devoted to corporate securities, including ordinary shares. Meanwhile new insurance investment philosophies began to be advocated, which accorded both legitimacy and importance to the role of ordinary shares in insurance portfolios.

The impact of uncertain precipitation data on insurance loss estimates using a flood catastrophe model

Catastrophe risk models used by the insurance industry are likely subject to significant uncertainty, but due to their proprietary nature and strict licensing conditions they are not available for experimentation. In addition, even if such experiments were conducted, these would not be repeatable by other researchers because commercial confidentiality issues prevent the details of proprietary catastrophe model structures from being described in public domain documents. However, such experimentation is urgently required to improve decision making in both insurance and reinsurance markets. In this paper we therefore construct our own catastrophe risk model for flooding in Dublin, Ireland, in order to assess the impact of typical precipitation data uncertainty on loss predictions. As we consider only a city region rather than a whole territory and have access to detailed data and computing resources typically unavailable to industry modellers, our model is significantly more detailed than most commercial products. The model consists of four components, a stochastic rainfall module, a hydrological and hydraulic flood hazard module, a vulnerability module, and a financial loss module. Using these we undertake a series of simulations to test the impact of driving the stochastic event generator with four different rainfall data sets: ground gauge data, gauge-corrected rainfall radar, meteorological reanalysis data (European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts Reanalysis-Interim; ERA-Interim) and a satellite rainfall product (The Climate Prediction Center morphing method; CMORPH). Catastrophe models are unusual because they use the upper three components of the modelling chain to generate a large synthetic database of unobserved and severe loss-driving events for which estimated losses are calculated. We find the loss estimates to be more sensitive to uncertainties propagated from the driving precipitation data sets than to other uncertainties in the hazard and vulnerability modules, suggesting that the range of uncertainty within catastrophe model structures may be greater than commonly believed.

Exploiting satellite-based rainfall for weather index insurance: the challenges of spatial and temporal aggregation

Lack of access to insurance exacerbates the impact of climate variability on smallholder famers in Africa. Unlike traditional insurance, which compensates proven agricultural losses, weather index insurance (WII) pays out in the event that a weather index is breached. In principle, WII could be provided to farmers throughout Africa. There are two data-related hurdles to this. First, most farmers do not live close enough to a rain gauge with sufficiently long record of observations. Second, mismatches between weather indices and yield may expose farmers to uncompensated losses, and insurers to unfair payouts – a phenomenon known as basis risk. In essence, basis risk results from complexities in the progression from meteorological drought (rainfall deficit) to agricultural drought (low soil moisture). In this study, we use a land-surface model to describe the transition from meteorological to agricultural drought. We demonstrate that spatial and temporal aggregation of rainfall results in a clearer link with soil moisture, and hence a reduction in basis risk. We then use an advanced statistical method to show how optimal aggregation of satellite-based rainfall estimates can reduce basis risk, enabling remotely sensed data to be utilized robustly for WII.

The use of remotely sensed rainfall for managing drought risk: a case study of weather index insurance in Zambia

Remotely sensed rainfall is increasingly being used to manage climate-related risk in gauge sparse regions. Applications based on such data must make maximal use of the skill of the methodology in order to avoid doing harm by providing misleading information. This is especially challenging in regions, such as Africa, which lack gauge data for validation. In this study, we show how calibrated ensembles of equally likely rainfall can be used to infer uncertainty in remotely sensed rainfall estimates, and subsequently in assessment of drought. We illustrate the methodology through a case study of weather index insurance (WII) in Zambia. Unlike traditional insurance, which compensates proven agricultural losses, WII pays out in the event that a weather index is breached. As remotely sensed rainfall is used to extend WII schemes to large numbers of farmers, it is crucial to ensure that the indices being insured are skillful representations of local environmental conditions. In our study we drive a land surface model with rainfall ensembles, in order to demonstrate how aggregation of rainfall estimates in space and time results in a clearer link with soil moisture, and hence a truer representation of agricultural drought. Although our study focuses on agricultural insurance, the methodological principles for application design are widely applicable in Africa and elsewhere.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.