Dissecting the illegal ivory trade: an analysis of ivory seizures data

Reliable evidence of trends in the illegal ivory trade is important for informing decision making for elephants but it is difficult to obtain due to the covert nature of the trade. The Elephant Trade Information System, a global database of reported seizures of illegal ivory, holds the only extensive information on illicit trade available. However inherent biases in seizure data make it difficult to infer trends; countries differ in their ability to make and report seizures and these differences cannot be directly measured. We developed a new modelling framework to provide quantitative evidence on trends in the illegal ivory trade from seizures data. The framework used Bayesian hierarchical latent variable models to reduce bias in seizures data by identifying proxy variables that describe the variability in seizure and reporting rates between countries and over time. Models produced bias-adjusted smoothed estimates of relative trends in illegal ivory activity for raw and worked ivory in three weight classes. Activity is represented by two indicators describing the number of illegal ivory transactions--Transactions Index--and the total weight of illegal ivory transactions--Weights Index--at global, regional or national levels. Globally, activity was found to be rapidly increasing and at its highest level for 16 years, more than doubling from 2007 to 2011 and tripling from 1998 to 2011. Over 70% of the Transactions Index is from shipments of worked ivory weighing less than 10 kg and the rapid increase since 2007 is mainly due to increased consumption in China. Over 70% of the Weights Index is from shipments of raw ivory weighing at least 100 kg mainly moving from Central and East Africa to Southeast and East Asia. The results tie together recent findings on trends in poaching rates, declining populations and consumption and provide detailed evidence to inform international decision making on elephants.

Psychological contracts and independent sales contractors: an examination of the predictors of contractor-level outcomes

Over the past decade, the independent sales contractor (ISC) has emerged as both an important distribution channel and a management challenge. This study makes two contributions to this evolving field. First, it explores the interrelations of the psychological contract with sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy of ISCs, which have hitherto been largely unexplored. Second, it examines differences between high- and low-performing sales contractors on these linkages, due to findings in the literature that a small number of sales contractors often achieve a majority of sales. Based on survey data as well as 7 years of contractor-level data related to sales performance and voluntary turnover (n = 189), results indicate that psychological contract fulfilment and perceived dependency are important determinants of subsequent sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy, with significant differences reported between high- and low-performing ISCs. A notable finding pertinent for sales managers responsible for managing ISCs is that high-performing sales contractors are motivated by psychological contract fulfilment and a low perception of dependency, while low-performing sales contractors are more likely to act as advocates for the firm due to perceived dependency, but may concurrently engage in organisational advocacy as a means to leave the firm.

Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

Disrupting the market for illegal rhino horn and ivory

This paper considers methods for regulating the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, seen through the lens of compliance theories. It stresses the importance of the distinction between normative and instrumental motivations. It argues for a balanced set of strategies that include normative levers designed to change the behaviour of poachers, traffickers and consumers of these products. In particular it considers the options needed to achieve demand reduction in consumer countries, and those needed to provide incentives to local communities in producer countries to disengage from poaching.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Construction contracts: law and management. 5th edition

The fifth edition of this best-selling textbook has been thoroughly revised to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive coverage of the legislation, administration and management of construction contracts. It now includes comparison of working with JCT, NEC3 and FIDIC contracts, throughout. In line with new thinking in construction management research, this authoritative guide is essential reading for every construction undergraduate and is an extremely useful source of reference for practitioners.

Handling Mitigating Circumstances for Electronic Contracts

Electronic contracts are a means of representing agreed responsibilities and expected behaviour of autonomous agents acting on behalf of businesses. They can be used to regulate behaviour by providing negative consequences, penalties, where the responsibilities and expectations are not met, i.e. the contract is violated. However, long-term business relationships require some flexibility in the face of circumstances that do not conform to the assumptions of the contract, that is, mitigating circumstances. In this paper, we describe how contract parties can represent and enact policies on mitigating circumstances. As part of this, we require records of what has occurred within the system leading up to a violation: the provenance of the violation. We therefore bring together contract-based and provenance systems to solve the issue of mitigating circumstances.

Determining the Trustworthiness of New Electronic Contracts

Expressing contractual agreements electronically potentially allows agents to automatically perform functions surrounding contract use: establishment, fulfilment, renegotiation etc. For such automation to be used for real business concerns, there needs to be a high level of trust in the agent-based system. While there has been much research on simulating trust between agents, there are areas where such trust is harder to establish. In particular, contract proposals may come from parties that an agent has had no prior interaction with and, in competitive business-to-business environments, little reputation information may be available. In human practice, trust in a proposed contract is determined in part from the content of the proposal itself, and the similarity of the content to that of prior contracts, executed to varying degrees of success. In this paper, we argue that such analysis is also appropriate in automated systems, and to provide it we need systems to record salient details of prior contract use and algorithms for assessing proposals on their content. We use provenance technology to provide the former and detail algorithms for measuring contract success and similarity for the latter, applying them to an aerospace case study.

Electronic Business Contracts between Services

Electronic contracts mirror the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, and offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on service behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. Where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all, yet computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this chapter, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, and so on. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace aftermarket example.

Using Normative Markov Decision Processes for Evaluating Electronic Contracts: A Case Study in a Simulated Aerospace Aftermarket

Before signing electronic contracts, a rational agent should estimate the expected utilities of these contracts and calculate the violation risks related to them. In order to perform such pre-signing procedures, this agent has to be capable of computing a policy taking into account the norms and sanctions in the contracts. In relation to this, the contribution of this work is threefold. First, we present the Normative Markov Decision Process, an extension of the Markov Decision Process for explicitly representing norms. In order to illustrate the usage of our framework, we model an example in a simulated aerospace aftermarket. Second, we specify an algorithm for identifying the states of the process which characterize the violation of norms. Finally, we show how to compute policies with our framework and how to calculate the risk of violating the norms in the contracts by adopting a particular policy.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.