Significance of coil orientation for motor evoked potentials from nasalis muscle elicited by transcranial magnetic stimulation

OBJECTIVE: In transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex, the optimal orientation of the coil on the scalp is dependent on the muscle under investigation, but not yet known for facial muscles. METHODS: Using a figure-of-eight coil, we compared TMS induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from eight different coil orientations when recording from ipsi- and contralateral nasalis muscle. RESULTS: The MEPs from nasalis muscle revealed three components: The major ipsi- and contra-lateral middle latency responses of approximately 10 ms onset latency proved entirely dependent on voluntary pre-innervation. They were most easily obtained from a coil orientation with posterior inducing current direction, and in this respect resembled the intrinsic hand rather than the masseter muscles. Early short duration responses of around 6 ms onset latency were best elicited with an antero-lateral current direction and not pre-innervation dependent, and therefore most probably due to stimulation of the nerve roots. Late responses (>18 ms) could inconsistently be elicited with posterior coil orientations in pre-innervated condition. CONCLUSIONS: By using the appropriate coil orientation and both conditions relaxed and pre-innervated, cortically evoked MEP responses from nasalis muscle can reliably be separated from peripheral and reflex components and also from cross talk of masseter muscle activation.

Faces and emotions: brain electric field sources during covert emotional processing

Covert brain activity related to task-free, spontaneous (i.e. unrequested), emotional evaluation of human face images was analysed in 27-channel averaged event-related potential (ERP) map series recorded from 18 healthy subjects while observing random sequences of face images without further instructions. After recording, subjects self-rated each face image on a scale from “liked” to “disliked”. These ratings were used to dichotomize the face images into the affective evaluation categories of “liked” and “disliked” for each subject and the subjects into the affective attitudes of “philanthropists” and “misanthropists” (depending on their mean rating across images). Event-related map series were averaged for “liked” and “disliked” face images and for “philanthropists” and “misanthropists”. The spatial configuration (landscape) of the electric field maps was assessed numerically by the electric gravity center, a conservative estimate of the mean location of all intracerebral, active, electric sources. Differences in electric gravity center location indicate activity of different neuronal populations. The electric gravity center locations of all event-related maps were averaged over the entire stimulus-on time (450 ms). The mean electric gravity center for disliked faces was located (significant across subjects) more to the right and somewhat more posterior than for liked faces. Similar differences were found between the mean electric gravity centers of misanthropists (more right and posterior) and philanthropists. Our neurophysiological findings are in line with neuropsychological findings, revealing visual emotional processing to depend on affective evaluation category and affective attitude, and extending the conclusions to a paradigm without directed task.

Face-elicited ERPs and affective attitude: brain electric microstate and tomography analyses

Objectives: Although behavioral studies have demonstrated that normative affective traits modulate the processing of facial and emotionally charged stimuli, direct electrophysiological evidence for this modulation is still lacking. Methods: Event-related potential (ERP) data associated with personal, traitlike approach- or withdrawal-related attitude (assessed post-recording and 14 months later) were investigated in 18 subjects during task-free (i.e. unrequested, spontaneous) emotional evaluation of faces. Temporal and spatial aspects of 27 channel ERP were analyzed with microstate analysis and low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA), a new method to compute 3 dimensional cortical current density implemented in the Talairach brain atlas. Results: Microstate analysis showed group differences 132-196 and 196-272 ms poststimulus, with right-shifted electric gravity centers for subjects with negative affective attitude. During these (over subjects reliably identifiable) personality-modulated, face-elicited microstates, LORETA revealed activation of bilateral occipito-temporal regions, reportedly associated with facial configuration extraction processes. Negative compared to positive affective attitude showed higher activity right temporal; positive compared to negative attitude showed higher activity left temporo-parieto-occipital. Conclusions: These temporal and spatial aspects suggest that the subject groups differed in brain activity at early, automatic, stimulus-related face processing steps when structural face encoding (configuration extraction) occurs. In sum, the brain functional microstates associated with affect-related personality features modulate brain mechanisms during face processing already at early information processing stages.

Autonomic stress responses elicited by watching a live broadcast soccer game: a pilot study

Aim: Increased rates of hospitalization due to cardiovascular events have been reported during phases of World Soccer Championships (WSC). The purpose of this pilot study was to explore acute psychological and physiological effects of watching a live broadcast soccer game during the WSC 2006. Methods: Seven male supporters (age: M=24; SD=2.7) of the Swiss National Soccer Team watched a game of their team in a controlled laboratory setting. Heart rate (HR), heart rate variability (HRV), salivary cortisol, alpha-amylase (sAA), and testosterone concentrations, as well as several mood ratings were captured repeatedly before, during, and after the game. Results: Subjects reported feeling stressed, and HR and sAA activity showed an increase during the game. In contrast, HRV, cortisol and testosterone were unaffected. Conclusion: Watching a sports competition seems to specifically affect the sympathetic nervous system, which can be measured by sensitive electrocardiographic and salivary markers.

The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.

Form Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements

Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

Expressing and Amplifying Positive Emotions Facilitate Goal Attainment in Workplace Interactions

Expressing emotions has social functions; it provides information, affects social interactions, and shapes relationships with others. Expressing positive emotions could be a strategic tool for improving goal attainment during social interactions at work. Such effects have been found in research on social contagion, impression management, and emotion work. However, expressing emotions one does not feel entails the risk of being perceived as inauthentic. This risk may well be worth taking when the emotions felt are negative, as expressing negative emotions usually has negative effects. When experiencing positive emotions, however, expressing them authentically promises benefits, and the advantage of amplifying them is not so obvious. We postulated that expressing, and amplifying, positive emotions would foster goal attainment in social interactions at work, particularly when dealing with superiors. Analyses are based on 494 interactions involving the pursuit of a goal by 113 employes. Multilevel analyses, including polynomial analyses, show that authentic display of positive emotions supported goal attainment throughout. However, amplifying felt positive emotions promoted goal attainment only in interactions with superiors, but not with colleagues. Results are discussed with regard to the importance of hierarchy for detecting, and interpreting, signs of strategic display of positive emotions.

In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. We then outline an alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Emotions and Values

There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).