Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to Deal With Credit Card Offers, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to Deal With Credit Card Offers

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Get Your FREE Credit Reports, June 2006

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Get Your FREE Credit Reports

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division

French version validation of the psychotic symptom rating scales (PSYRATS) for outpatients with persistent psychotic symptoms.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Most scales that assess the presence and severity of psychotic symptoms often measure a broad range of experiences and behaviours, something that restricts the detailed measurement of specific symptoms such as delusions or hallucinations. The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS) is a clinical assessment tool that focuses on the detailed measurement of these core symptoms. The goal of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of the French version of the PSYRATS. METHODS: A sample of 103 outpatients suffering from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders and presenting persistent psychotic symptoms over the previous three months was assessed using the PSYRATS. Seventy-five sample participants were also assessed with the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). RESULTS: ICCs were superior to .90 for all items of the PSYRATS. Factor analysis replicated the factorial structure of the original version of the delusions scale. Similar to previous replications, the factor structure of the hallucinations scale was partially replicated. Convergent validity indicated that some specific PSYRATS items do not correlate with the PANSS delusions or hallucinations. The distress items of the PSYRATS are negatively correlated with the grandiosity scale of the PANSS. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study are limited by the relatively small sample size as well as the selection of participants with persistent symptoms. The French version of the PSYRATS partially replicates previously published results. Differences in factor structure of the hallucinations scale might be explained by greater variability of its elements. The future development of the scale should take into account the presence of grandiosity in order to better capture details of the psychotic experience.

Iowa Credit Union Division, Strategic Plan, 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Credit Union Division including, goals and mission.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.