Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Survey on batch-to-batch variation in spray paints: a collaborative study

This study represents the most extensive analysis of batch-to-batch variations in spray paint samples to date. The survey was performed as a collaborative project of the ENFSI (European Network of Forensic Science Institutes) Paint and Glass Working Group (EPG) and involved 11 laboratories. Several studies have already shown that paint samples of similar color but from different manufacturers can usually be differentiated using an appropriate analytical sequence. The discrimination of paints from the same manufacturer and color (batch-to-batch variations) is of great interest and these data are seldom found in the literature. This survey concerns the analysis of batches from different color groups (white, papaya (special shade of orange), red and black) with a wide range of analytical techniques and leads to the following conclusions. Colored batch samples are more likely to be differentiated since their pigment composition is more complex (pigment mixtures, added pigments) and therefore subject to variations. These variations may occur during the paint production but may also occur when checking the paint shade in quality control processes. For these samples, techniques aimed at color/pigment(s) characterization (optical microscopy, microspectrophotometry (MSP), Raman spectroscopy) provide better discrimination than techniques aimed at the organic (binder) or inorganic composition (fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) or elemental analysis (SEM - scanning electron microscopy and XRF - X-ray fluorescence)). White samples contain mainly titanium dioxide as a pigment and the main differentiation is based on the binder composition (Csingle bondH stretches) detected either by FTIR or Raman. The inorganic composition (elemental analysis) also provides some discrimination. Black samples contain mainly carbon black as a pigment and are problematic with most of the spectroscopic techniques. In this case, pyrolysis-GC/MS represents the best technique to detect differences. Globally, Py-GC/MS may show a high potential of discrimination on all samples but the results are highly dependent on the specific instrumental conditions used. Finally, the discrimination of samples when data was interpreted visually as compared to statistically using principal component analysis (PCA) yielded very similar results. PCA increases sensitivity and could perform better on specific samples, but one first has to ensure that all non-informative variation (baseline deviation) is eliminated by applying correct pre-treatments. Statistical treatments can be used on a large data set and, when combined with an expert's opinion, will provide more objective criteria for decision making.

Testing calibrated general equilibrium models

This paper illustrates the philosophy which forms the basis of calibrationexercises in general equilibrium macroeconomic models and the details of theprocedure, the advantages and the disadvantages of the approach, with particularreference to the issue of testing ``false'' economic models. We provide anoverview of the most recent simulation--based approaches to the testing problemand compare them to standard econometric methods used to test the fit of non--lineardynamic general equilibrium models. We illustrate how simulation--based techniques can be used to formally evaluate the fit of a calibrated modelto the data and obtain ideas on how to improve the model design using a standardproblem in the international real business cycle literature, i.e. whether amodel with complete financial markets and no restrictions to capital mobility is able to reproduce the second order properties of aggregate savingand aggregate investment in an open economy.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Batch effect confounding leads to strong bias in performance estimates obtained by cross-validation.

BACKGROUND: With the large amount of biological data that is currently publicly available, many investigators combine multiple data sets to increase the sample size and potentially also the power of their analyses. However, technical differences ("batch effects") as well as differences in sample composition between the data sets may significantly affect the ability to draw generalizable conclusions from such studies. FOCUS: The current study focuses on the construction of classifiers, and the use of cross-validation to estimate their performance. In particular, we investigate the impact of batch effects and differences in sample composition between batches on the accuracy of the classification performance estimate obtained via cross-validation. The focus on estimation bias is a main difference compared to previous studies, which have mostly focused on the predictive performance and how it relates to the presence of batch effects. DATA: We work on simulated data sets. To have realistic intensity distributions, we use real gene expression data as the basis for our simulation. Random samples from this expression matrix are selected and assigned to group 1 (e.g., 'control') or group 2 (e.g., 'treated'). We introduce batch effects and select some features to be differentially expressed between the two groups. We consider several scenarios for our study, most importantly different levels of confounding between groups and batch effects. METHODS: We focus on well-known classifiers: logistic regression, Support Vector Machines (SVM), k-nearest neighbors (kNN) and Random Forests (RF). Feature selection is performed with the Wilcoxon test or the lasso. Parameter tuning and feature selection, as well as the estimation of the prediction performance of each classifier, is performed within a nested cross-validation scheme. The estimated classification performance is then compared to what is obtained when applying the classifier to independent data.