Absent Witnesses and the U.K. Supreme Court: Judicial Deference as Judicial Dialogue?

This article analyses the position of absent witness evidence under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 after significant European and domestic case law on the topic. It argues that flexibility in the hearsay regime under the 2003 Act and a permissive approach by appellate courts has increased the potential for fair trial violations in recent years. Moreover, the UK Supreme Court decision in R v Horncastle preserves domestic courts’ authority to determine the meaning of European rights and selectively defer to Parliament. This area of the law demonstrates the scope that the domestic system retains for divergence from European standards.

Propensity to Apply for Judicial Office under the new Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments System::A qualitative study for the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission October

The study of representation and participation in the judiciary is hardly novel. There have been substantial studies in a number of countries – often these have preceded the setting up of judicial appointment commissions – which have looked at the continuing problem of female representation in judicial posts. Prior to the setting up of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission a study carried out by Dermot Feenan for the Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland also looked into this topic and produced a large number of recommendations. What differs from the Feenan project, in this project, has been the number of individuals consulted in interviews and focus groups. This has allowed us to provide a detailed qualitative attitudinal perspective to enhance the questionnaire study undertaken as Stage 1 in this research project. Further, we have carried out this study after many of the recommendations made in previous research have been implemented.
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Our interviews and focus groups covered a broad range of individuals – solicitors outwith and within Belfast (private and public service), barristers in private practice and public service and also barristers no longer in practice. We also sought responses from student lawyers. In total there were 71 respondents, with a typical interview/focus group length of 60 minutes. The group included candidates who had little interest in applying for judicial office, those who might consider this in future, and candidates who had applied for one or more judicial posts and who may or may not consider reapplication. We did not seek the views of successful candidates for judicial posts under the new NIJAC process.
The timing of this project, with interviews and focus groups held between December 2007 and March 2008, offers an early perspective on the whether the creation of a NI Judicial Appointments Commission has affected, and if so, in what way, the decision to apply for a judicial post. Generally, we found that there was a significant impact upon attitudes to judicial application which had arisen from the creation of NIJAC and that this was more positive than negative.

Judicial Rehabilitation and the ‘Clean Bill of Health’ in Criminal Justice.

Drawing on an important survey of European and Australian policies toward ‘judicial rehabilitation,’ this article makes the following arguments. First, the rehabilitation movement should return to the origins of the word ‘rehabilitation’ and focus at least as much on efforts to remove and relieve ex-prisoner stigma as on treatment and reform efforts. There will be no ‘rehabilitation revolution’ without this. Second, these efforts should involve active, not passive redemption. Rehabilitation processes that require almost a decade or more of ‘crime-free’ behaviour before forgiving an individual for his or her crimes are just and fair, but they miss the point of rehabilitation. Policies should encourage, support and facilitate good behaviour and not just reward it in retrospect. Third, rehabilitation should not just be done, but be ‘seen to be done,’ ideally in a ritualised format. This sends an important message to the individual and wider society. Finally, I argue that it may be better to forgive than forget past crimes. That is, rather than burying past crimes as if they never happened, states should instead acknowledge and formally recognise that people can change, that good people can do bad things, and that all individuals should be able to move on from past convictions.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.