Soviet Union, East and South Asia.

"800859 (545432) 4-87."

Asia.

Relief shown by shading and spot heights. Depths shown by shading.

Africa.

Relief shown by shading and spot heights. Depths shown by shading.

Algeria and Tunisia physical regions.

"26379 ; 1-58."

Sudan : administrative and railroads.

" 563809756." on verso.

Implications for the Department of Defense and military operations of proposals to reorganize the United States intelligence community : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, August 16 and 17, 2004.

Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.

Hezbollah and Taliban - hybrid adversaries in contemporary conflicts? : views on an adversary from the United States Armed Forces perspective

The experiences of the United States Armed Forces of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War resulted a new term to surface called “hybrid warfare”. It was to describe the complexity of today’s battlefield. The term “hy-brid warfare” was never officially defined nor is it today. The updated version of the US ARMY Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Change 1) from February 22, 2011, introduced and defined “hybrid threat” and thus opened the discussion for hybrid adversary. In this thesis a model is introduced according to which any organization, group or an ad-versary can be examined and evaluated to see whether it qualifies as a hybrid adversary. It is demonstrated by the example of Hezbollah, which is recognized as the best example of an organization utilizing “hybrid warfare” and subsequently categorizing as a hybrid adver-sary. The model will be tested with Afghan Taliban to see whether both the model works and Taliban qualifies as a hybrid adversary or not. According to the model used in this thesis, it is concluded that Taliban does not meet the standards of a hybrid adversary, but with acquisition of standoff weapons it would quickly qualify as one. The model proved to work, and it could be used as a tool by intelligence of-ficers for estimating the threat levels of any group or identifying those groups that are al-ready or are about to develop into a hybrid adversary.

A participação da United States Agency for international development (USAID) na reforma da universidade brasileira na década de 1960

O presente estudo propôs-se investigar de que forma os acordos assinados com a USAID sobre ensino superior no Brasil fizeram parte da estratégia dos Estados Unidos de construção de regimes internacionais mais amplos que deveriam sustentar a ordem mundial depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial. A hipótese central é a de que esses acordos estavam relacionados com a estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento econômico e social que tinha, de um lado, a noção de que o desenvolvimento poderia ser planejado e implementado pelos governos e, de outro, uma visão de segurança internacional em que a promoção do desenvolvimento era entendida como fator essencial. Para a realização do estudo foram realizadas análise documental e entrevistas com pessoas que, de várias formas, estiveram ligadas às ações da USAID no ensino superior brasileiro na década de 1960, em especial ao caso de cooperação técnica com a Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Os dados levantados pelo estudo permitiram confirmar em larga medida a hipótese levantada inicialmente, mas mostraram também que a questão é bem mais complexa. Os acordos da USAID sobre ensino superior no Brasil fizeram parte da estratégia de construção de regimes internacionais, mas representaram apenas uma etapa de um amplo programa de cooperação científica e tecnológica iniciada muito antes.

A United States Information Agency e sua ação no Brasil de 1953 a 1964

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

U.S. arms control and disarmament agency 1984 annual report : message from the president of the United States transmitting the 24th annual...

At head of title: 99th Congress, 1st session. Joint committee print.

United States A.I.D. mission to Guatemala, Agency for International Development : telephone directory.

"Personel list and telephone directory"--Leaf [1].

Nomination of Robert B. Pirie, Jr. : hearing before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on the nomination of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, April 6, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.