Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Horowitz’s Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the SDLP, 1970-79

Donald Horowitz's theory of ethnic conflict suggests that a political party operating in a deeply divided society can be effected by a centrifugal pull even when it is not subject to formal electoral competition. This idea can be applied to Northern Ireland's SDLP in the 1970s, when the party faced no credible electoral rival within its primary political constituency. Doing so helps to explain why the SDLP failed in its original objective of mobilizing a cross-community constituency, and instead became what Horowitz terms an “ethnically based party,” representing the interests of only one side of the political divide in Northern Ireland.

Do environmental and task characteristics matter in the control of externalized local public services? Unveiling the relevance of party characteristics and citizens’ offstage voice

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms adopted by cities to control the provision of externalized public services and to explore the determinants of such control choices.

Design/methodology/approach: The paper presents the results of a multiple case study based on the experiences of three cities and three public services (transport, solid waste collection and home care services for the elderly), where control mechanisms and their possible antecedents were analyzed.

Findings: The results show that the control models found in the cases analyzed do not correspond to the "pure" patterns described in the private sector literature and that the factors identified by management control contributions do not seem to be exhaustive in explaining the configuration of control systems in the public sector. While environmental and task characteristics only partially explain the adoption of certain configurations of control, the features of the control systems seem to be rather influenced by variables that are related to party characteristics.

Originality/value: The paper shows that the combinations of control mechanisms are more multifaceted than those presented in the literature, and that the factors identified in the private sector literature do not seem to explain comprehensively the configuration of control systems in the public sector. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited.