An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.

Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paperexplores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailingwholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demandrepresentations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include severalbehavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theorypredictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not underfictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding,and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number ofbids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulationassumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, andidentify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

Quantitative comparison of simulations of seismic wave propagation in heterogeneous poro-elastic media involving fluid-solid interfaces and in equivalent visco-elastic solids

There is increasing evidence to suggest that the presence of mesoscopic heterogeneities constitutes the predominant attenuation mechanism at seismic frequencies. As a consequence, centimeter-scale perturbations of the subsurface physical properties should be taken into account for seismic modeling whenever detailed and accurate responses of the target structures are desired. This is, however, computationally prohibitive since extremely small grid spacings would be necessary. A convenient way to circumvent this problem is to use an upscaling procedure to replace the heterogeneous porous media by equivalent visco-elastic solids. In this work, we solve Biot's equations of motion to perform numerical simulations of seismic wave propagation through porous media containing mesoscopic heterogeneities. We then use an upscaling procedure to replace the heterogeneous poro-elastic regions by homogeneous equivalent visco-elastic solids and repeat the simulations using visco-elastic equations of motion. We find that, despite the equivalent attenuation behavior of the heterogeneous poro-elastic medium and the equivalent visco-elastic solid, the seismograms may differ due to diverging boundary conditions at fluid-solid interfaces, where there exist additional options for the poro-elastic case. In particular, we observe that the seismograms agree for closed-pore boundary conditions, but differ significantly for open-pore boundary conditions. This is an interesting result, which has potentially important implications for wave-equation-based algorithms in exploration geophysics involving fluid-solid interfaces, such as, for example, wave field decomposition.

Hydrologic Simulations of the Maquoketa River Watershed Using SWAT Working Paper 09-WP 49,June 2009

This paper describes the application of the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model to the Maquoketa River watershed, located in northeast Iowa. The inputs to the model were obtained from the Environmental Protection Agency’s geographic information/database system called Better Assessment Science Integrating Point and Nonpoint Sources (BASINS). Climatic data from six weather stations located in and around the watershed, and measured streamflow data from a U.S. Geological Survey gage station at the watershed outlet were used in the sensitivity analysis of SWAT model parameters as well as its calibration and validation for watershed hydrology and streamflow. A sensitivity analysis was performed using an influence coefficient method to evaluate surface runoff and base flow variations in response to changes in model input hydrologic parameters. The curve number, evaporation compensation factor, and soil available water capacity were found to be the most sensitive parameters among eight selected parameters when applying SWAT to the Maquoketa River watershed. Model calibration, facilitated by the sensitivity analysis, was performed for the period 1988 through 1993, and validation was performed for 1982 through 1987. The model performance was evaluated by well-established statistical methods and was found to explain at least 86% and 69% of the variability in the measured stream flow data for the calibration and validation periods, respectively. This initial hydrologic modeling analysis will facilitate future applications of SWAT to the Maquoketa River watershed for various watershed analysis, including water quality.

Simulations of action of DNA topoisomerases to investigate boundaries and shapes of spaces of knots.

The configuration space available to randomly cyclized polymers is divided into subspaces accessible to individual knot types. A phantom chain utilized in numerical simulations of polymers can explore all subspaces, whereas a real closed chain forming a figure-of-eight knot, for example, is confined to a subspace corresponding to this knot type only. One can conceptually compare the assembly of configuration spaces of various knot types to a complex foam where individual cells delimit the configuration space available to a given knot type. Neighboring cells in the foam harbor knots that can be converted into each other by just one intersegmental passage. Such a segment-segment passage occurring at the level of knotted configurations corresponds to a passage through the interface between neighboring cells in the foamy knot space. Using a DNA topoisomerase-inspired simulation approach we characterize here the effective interface area between neighboring knot spaces as well as the surface-to-volume ratio of individual knot spaces. These results provide a reference system required for better understanding mechanisms of action of various DNA topoisomerases.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition