Certificate for One Share of Capital Stock in the Lincoln County Greater Production Company

Certificate for 1 share of capital stock in the Lincoln County Greater Production Company to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Jan. 20, 1919.

Certificate for One Share of Capital Stock in St. Catharines Lawn Bowling Club

Certificate for 1 share of capital stock in St. Catharines Lawn Bowling Club to executors of the estate of Hamilton K. Woodruff, Dec. 23, 1933.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding 1 share of the Long Point Company transferred from Alexander McInnes and 2 shares transferred from E.C. Clark

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from John I. Mackenzie regarding 1 share of the Long Point Company transferred from Alexander McInnes and 2 shares transferred from E.C. Clark. The shares were transferred to John I Mackenzie, Sept. 6, 1870.

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting share

Letter to Louis Cabot from S.D. Woodruff regarding Long Point shooting shares. Jan. 14, 1886.

Letter (typed) from the H.H. Warner Co. to S.D. Woodruff which was enclosed with a payment of $2,500.00 for the shooting share transferred to Mr. Warner

Letter (typed) from the H.H. Warner Co. to S.D. Woodruff which was enclosed with a payment of $2,500.00 for the shooting share transferred to Mr. Warner. The letter also requests that Mr. Woodruff send a note explaining the general customs of the club, May 21, 1886.

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Predictability Of Share Prices In India: A Study Of The Applicability Of Technical Analysis

In spite of the far longed practices of technical analysis by many participants in Indian stock market, none have arrived at the exact position of technical analysis as a tool for foretelling share prices. There is no evidence supporting that one has established its definite role in predicting the behaviour of share price and also to see the extent of validity (how far reliable) of technical tools in Indian stock market. The problem is the vacuum in the arena of securities market analysis where an unrecognised tool is practised, i.e., whether to hold on to technical analysis or to drop it. Again, as already stated in this chapter, its validity need not continue forever. It may become futile as happened in developed markets. Continuous practice of a tool, which is valid only during discontinuous times is also an error. The efficacy of different market phenomena in terms of their ability to foretell the extent and direction of the price movements and reliability thereof remain as not yet proved in. This requires further study in this area so that this controversy may be settled. A solution to the problem requires enquiring and establishing the applicability of technical analysis, if any, there is in the Indian stock market. The study has the following two broad objectives for the purpose of confirming the applicability, if any, of technical analysis in the Indian stock market. The first objective is to ascertain the current validity of ‘traditional holding with respect to patterns’ and the second objective is to ascertain the ‘consistent superiority’, if any, of technical indicators over non-signal strategies in return generation. The study analyses the five patterns, which are widely known and commonly found in publications. They are: (1) Symmetrical Triangles, (2) Rising Wedges, (3) Falling Wedges, (4) Head and Shoulders Top and (5) Head and Shoulders Bottom.

Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions

The scientific community has been suffering from peer review for decades. This process (also called refereeing) subjects an author's scientific work or ideas to the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal is to get authors to meet their discipline's standards and thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards that haven't undergone peer review are often regarded with suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields. However, peer review, although universally used, has many drawbacks. We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific currency the author likely bid to have it published. If the bid correctly reflects the paper's quality, the author is rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the author loses this currency. We argue that citations are an appropriate currency for all scientists. We believe that citation auctions encourage scientists to better control their submissions' quality. It also inspire them to prepare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions could have the power to greatly improve scientific research

Citation auctions as a method to improve selection of scientific papers

This paper describes the basis of citation auctions as a new approach to selecting scientific papers for publication. Our main idea is to use an auction for selecting papers for publication through - differently from the state of the art - bids that consist of the number of citations that a scientist expects to receive if the paper is published. Hence, a citation auction is the selection process itself, and no reviewers are involved. The benefits of the proposed approach are two-fold. First, the cost of refereeing will be either totally eliminated or significantly reduced, because the process of citation auction does not need prior understanding of the paper's content to judge the quality of its contribution. Additionally, the method will not prejudge the content of the paper, so it will increase the openness of publications to new ideas. Second, scientists will be much more committed to the quality of their papers, paying close attention to distributing and explaining their papers in detail to maximize the number of citations that the paper receives. Sample analyses of the number of citations collected in papers published in years 1999-2004 for one journal, and in years 2003-2005 for a series of conferences (in a totally different discipline), via Google scholar, are provided. Finally, a simple simulation of an auction is given to outline the behaviour of the citation auction approach

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