Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Prevalence of alcohol-impaired drivers based on random breath tests in a roadside survey

Sobriety checkpoints are not usually randomly located by traffic authorities. As such, information provided by non-random alcohol tests cannot be used to infer the characteristics of the general driving population. In this paper a case study is presented in which the prevalence of alcohol-impaired driving is estimated for the general population of drivers. A stratified probabilistic sample was designed to represent vehicles circulating in non-urban areas of Catalonia (Spain), a region characterized by its complex transportation network and dense traffic around the metropolis of Barcelona. Random breath alcohol concentration tests were performed during spring 2012 on 7,596 drivers. The estimated prevalence of alcohol-impaired drivers was 1.29%, which is roughly a third of the rate obtained in non-random tests. Higher rates were found on weekends (1.90% on Saturdays, 4.29% on Sundays) and especially at night. The rate is higher for men (1.45%) than for women (0.64%) and the percentage of positive outcomes shows an increasing pattern with age. In vehicles with two occupants, the proportion of alcohol-impaired drivers is estimated at 2.62%, but when the driver was alone the rate drops to 0.84%, which might reflect the socialization of drinking habits. The results are compared with outcomes in previous surveys, showing a decreasing trend in the prevalence of alcohol-impaired drivers over time.

A theory of optimal random crackdowns

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effectof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.

On the closed-form approximation of short-time random strike options

In this paper we propose a general technique to develop first and second order closed-form approximation formulas for short-time options withrandom strikes. Our method is based on Malliavin calculus techniques andallows us to obtain simple closed-form approximation formulas dependingon the derivative operator. The numerical analysis shows that these formulas are extremely accurate and improve some previous approaches ontwo-assets and three-assets spread options as Kirk's formula or the decomposition mehod presented in Alòs, Eydeland and Laurence (2011).

Signal search analysis server.

Signal search analysis is a general method to discover and characterize sequence motifs that are positionally correlated with a functional site (e.g. a transcription or translation start site). The method has played an instrumental role in the analysis of eukaryotic promoter elements. The signal search analysis server provides access to four different computer programs as well as to a large number of precompiled functional site collections. The programs offered allow: (i) the identification of non-random sequence regions under evolutionary constraint; (ii) the detection of consensus sequence-based motifs that are over- or under-represented at a particular distance from a functional site; (iii) the analysis of the positional distribution of a consensus sequence- or weight matrix-based sequence motif around a functional site; and (iv) the optimization of a weight matrix description of a locally over-represented sequence motif. These programs can be accessed at: http://www.isrec.isb-sib.ch/ssa/.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Constant coefficient tests for random coefficient regression

Random coefficient regression models have been applied in differentfields and they constitute a unifying setup for many statisticalproblems. The nonparametric study of this model started with Beranand Hall (1992) and it has become a fruitful framework. In thispaper we propose and study statistics for testing a basic hypothesisconcerning this model: the constancy of coefficients. The asymptoticbehavior of the statistics is investigated and bootstrapapproximations are used in order to determine the critical values ofthe test statistics. A simulation study illustrates the performanceof the proposals.

General preferences for consumption goods in the random matching model of commodity money

This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money byKiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy ischaracterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing aparticular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences suchthat they want to consume any good with some probability. The resultsdepend crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each goodand the probability with which different agents want to consume eachgood. KW and other related models are shown to be parameterizations ofthis more general one.

Is confidence in decisions related to feedback? Evidence-and lack of evidence-from random samples of real-world managerial behavior?

Confidence in decision making is an important dimension of managerialbehavior. However, what is the relation between confidence, on the onehand, and the fact of receiving or expecting to receive feedback ondecisions taken, on the other hand? To explore this and related issuesin the context of everyday decision making, use was made of the ESM(Experience Sampling Method) to sample decisions taken by undergraduatesand business executives. For several days, participants received 4 or 5SMS messages daily (on their mobile telephones) at random moments at whichpoint they completed brief questionnaires about their current decisionmaking activities. Issues considered here include differences between thetypes of decisions faced by the two groups, their structure, feedback(received and expected), and confidence in decisions taken as well as inthe validity of feedback. No relation was found between confidence indecisions and whether participants received or expected to receivefeedback on those decisions. In addition, although participants areclearly aware that feedback can provide both confirming and disconfirming evidence, their ability to specify appropriatefeedback is imperfect. Finally, difficulties experienced inusing the ESM are discussed as are possibilities for further researchusing this methodology.

On the performance of small-area estimators: Fixed vs. random area parameters

Most methods for small-area estimation are based on composite estimators derived from design- or model-based methods. A composite estimator is a linear combination of a direct and an indirect estimator with weights that usually depend on unknown parameters which need to be estimated. Although model-based small-area estimators are usually based on random-effects models, the assumption of fixed effects is at face value more appropriate.Model-based estimators are justified by the assumption of random (interchangeable) area effects; in practice, however, areas are not interchangeable. In the present paper we empirically assess the quality of several small-area estimators in the setting in which the area effects are treated as fixed. We consider two settings: one that draws samples from a theoretical population, and another that draws samples from an empirical population of a labor force register maintained by the National Institute of Social Security (NISS) of Catalonia. We distinguish two types of composite estimators: a) those that use weights that involve area specific estimates of bias and variance; and, b) those that use weights that involve a common variance and a common squared bias estimate for all the areas. We assess their precision and discuss alternatives to optimizing composite estimation in applications.

How important are tobacco prices in the propensity to start and quit smoking? An analysis of smoking histories from the Spanish National Health Survey

This paper analyses the effect of tobacco prices on the propensity tostart and quit smoking using a pool of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 editionsof the Spanish National Health Surveys. The estimates for severalparametric models of the hazard rate for starting and quitting suggestthat i) The public health measures applied as of 1992 have had asignificative effect on both reducing the hazard of starting andincreasing the hazard of quitting, ii) Prices have a very weak effect onthe hazard of starting in the male population and no significant effectin the female population, iii) The price floor of cigarrettes, proxiedby the average price of a pack of black cigarrettes, has a significanteffect on the quitting hazard which is robust across specifications andapplies to both men and women. The implied price elasticity of the timeup to quitting is situated around -1.4.