Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

When in peril, retrench: Testing the portfolio channel of contagion

One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countriesis through the impact that past gains and losses may have on investors risk aversion and behavior. This paper presents a stylized model illustrating how heterogeneous changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio allocation decisions and stock prices. Our empirical findings suggest that when funds returns are below average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In so doing, funds tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were overweight , increasing their exposure to countries in which they were underweight. Based on this insight, the paper constructs an index of financial interdependence which reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds. The index helps in explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries. Moreover, a comparison of this interdependence measure to indices of trade or commercial bank linkages indicates that our index can improve predictions about which countries are more likely to be affected by contagion from crisis centers.

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.

La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

Portfolio choice beyond the traditional approach

This paper surveys asset allocation methods that extend the traditional approach. An important feature of the the traditional approach is that measures the risk and return tradeoff in terms of mean and variance of final wealth. However, there are also other important features that are not always made explicit in terms of investor s wealth, information, and horizon: The investor makes a single portfolio choice based only on the mean and variance of her final financial wealth and she knows the relevant parameters in that computation. First, the paper describes traditional portfolio choice based on four basic assumptions, while the rest of the sections extend those assumptions. Each section will describe the corresponding equilibrium implications in terms of portfolio advice and asset pricing.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

Insurance and safety after September 11, 2001: Coming to grips with the costs and threats of terrorism

This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction tothe concepts of risk and insurance. Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:a potential loss, and the chance of that loss being realized. People can,however, transfer risk to insurance companies against the payment ofso-called premiums. In practice, however, one needs accurate assessmentsof both losses and probabilities to judge whether premiums are appropriate.For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life insurance); however,it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such as actsof terrorism. It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, peopleare able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life. Butwhen people lack experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism),risk can only be assessed through imagination. Not surprisingly, insurancecompanies demand high prices when risks are poorly understood. In particular,the cost of insurance against possible acts of terrorism soared afterSeptember 11. How should people approach risk after the events of that day?Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of terrorists andother disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the root causes of such antisocial movements. It is, therefore, suggested thatprograms addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and socialinequalities may be more effective premiums for reducing the risk ofterrosrtism than has been recognized to date.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.