An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Measurement Errors Should Always Be Incorporated in Phylogenetic Comparative Analysis

The evolution of continuous traits is the central component of comparative analyses in phylogenetics, and the comparison of alternative models of trait evolution has greatly improved our understanding of the mechanisms driving phenotypic differentiation. Several factors influence the comparison of models, and we explore the effects of random errors in trait measurement on the accuracy of model selection. We simulate trait data under a Brownian motion model (BM) and introduce different magnitudes of random measurement error. We then evaluate the resulting statistical support for this model against two alternative models: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) and accelerating/decelerating rates (ACDC). Our analyses show that even small measurement errors (10%) consistently bias model selection towards erroneous rejection of BM in favour of more parameter-rich models (most frequently the OU model). Fortunately, methods that explicitly incorporate measurement errors in phylogenetic analyses considerably improve the accuracy of model selection. Our results call for caution in interpreting the results of model selection in comparative analyses, especially when complex models garner only modest additional support. Importantly, as measurement errors occur in most trait data sets, we suggest that estimation of measurement errors should always be performed during comparative analysis to reduce chances of misidentification of evolutionary processes.

Placentation in species of phylogenetic importance: the Afrotheria.

Afrotheria, one of four mammalian superorders, comprises elephants, sea cows, hyraxes, aardvark, elephant shrews, tenrecs and golden moles. Their placentas either form an equatorial band or are discoid in shape. The interhemal region, separating fetal and maternal blood, is endotheliochorial in elephants, aardvark and possibly the sea cows, but hemochorial in the remaining orders. There is a secondary epitheliochorial placenta in elephant shrews while a similar structure in tenrecs erodes maternal tissues. Specialized hemophagous regions are a striking characteristic of some of these placentas yet absent in hyraxes, elephant shrews, and golden moles. It is possible that the common ancestor of the Afrotheria had an endotheliochorial placenta. Establishment of a hemochorial condition, as seen in rock hyraxes, elephant shrews, tenrecs, and golden moles, would be a more recent development. The elephant, manatee, and aardvark all have circumferential placentas. Thus the formation of a discoid placenta with a more or less extensive secondary placenta in elephant shrews and tenrecs would also be a derived state.

Plant functional and phylogenetic turnover correlate with climate and land use in the Western Swiss Alps

Understanding the relative importance of historical and environmental processes in the structure and composition of communities is one of the longest quests in ecological research. Increasingly, researchers are relying on the functional and phylogenetic β-diversity of natural communities to provide concise explanations on the mechanistic basis of community assembly and the drivers of trait variation among species. The present study investigated how plant functional and phylogenetic β-diversity change along key environmental and spatial gradients in the Western Swiss Alps. Methods Using the quadratic diversity measure based on six functional traits: specific leaf area (SLA), leaf dry matter content (LDMC), plant height (H), leaf carbon content (C), leaf nitrogen content (N), and leaf carbon to nitrogen content (C/N) alongside a species-resolved phylogenetic tree, we relate variations in climate, spatial geographic, land use and soil gradients to plant functional and phylogenetic turnover in mountain communities of the Western Swiss Alps. Important findings Our study highlights two main points. First, climate and land use factors play an important role in mountain plant community turnover. Second, the overlap between plant functional and phylogenetic turnover along these gradients correlates with the low phylogenetic signal in traits, suggesting that in mountain landscapes, trait lability is likely an important factor in driving plant community assembly. Overall, we demonstrate the importance of climate and land use factors in plant functional and phylogenetic community turnover, and provide valuable complementary insights into understanding patterns of β-diversity along several ecological gradients.

Isolation of a novel monkey adenovirus reveals a new phylogenetic clade in the evolutionary history of simian adenoviruses

Adenoviruses of primates include human (HAdV) and simian (SAdV) isolates classified into 8 species (Human Adenovirus A to G, and Simian Adenovirus A). In this study, a novel adenovirus was isolated from a colony of cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and subcultured in VERO cells. Its complete genome was purified and a region encompassing the hexon gene, the protease gene, the DNA binding protein (DBP) and the 100 kDa protein was amplified by PCR and sequenced by primer walking. Sequence analysis of these four genes showed that the new isolate had 80% identity to other primate adenoviruses and lacked recombination events. The study of the evolutionary relationships of this new monkey AdV based on the combined sequences of the four genes supported a close relationship to SAdV-3 and SAdV-6, lineages isolated from Rhesus monkeys. The clade formed by these three types is separated from the remaining clades and establishes a novel branch that is related to species HAdV-A, F and G. However, the genetic distance corresponding to the newly isolated monkey AdV considerably differs from these as to belong to a new, not yet established species. Results presented here widen our knowledge on SAdV and represents an important contribution to the understanding of the evolutionary history of primate adenoviruses.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game