Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Strategic Plan, 2006-2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Homeland Security and Emergency Management, goals and mission.

Migration across Spanish provinces: Evidence from the social security records (1978-1992)

This paper uses Social Security records to study internal migrationin Spain. This is the first paper that uses this data source, whichhas some advantages with respect to existing data sources: it includesonly job-seeking migrants and it allows to identify temporary migration. Within the framework of an extended gravity model, we estimate a Generalized Negative Binomial regression on gross migration flows between provinces. We quantify the effect of local labor market imbalances on workers' mobility and discuss the equilibrating role of internal migration in Spain. Our main results show that the effect of employment opportunities have changed after 1984; migrants seem to be more responsive to economic conditions but, consistently with previous studies for the Spanish labor market, the migration response to wage differentials is wrongly signed. Our analysis also confirms the larger internal mobility of highly qualified workers.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

Life-time redistribution effects of the Spanish public pension system

The paper analyses the inter and intragenerational redistribution effects ofthe public pensions system in Spain. This is achieved by first comparing the expected present value of life-time income transfers (PVT) and internalrates of return (IRR) of different population cohorts. Secondly, we study the intragenerational aspects of the Spanish public pensions by calculating PVTs the IRRs for workers of different categories, grouped by earnings, gender and marital status.The results obtained show the nature of the important intergenerational effects of the Social Security System in Spain. The oldest 1935 cohort clearlybenefits in relation to the youngest 1965 cohort. This is basically due to thegap between current wages and the contribution bases established in the 60s and 70s in Spain during the early stages of the Social Security System, and to the worsening shortfall in Social Security funding, combined with the longer of life expectancy.In addition, intragenerational effects exist by income levels. For contributors who pay between the minimum and the maximum allowable contribution bases, net transfers and rates of return are higher in actuarial terms for high incomecontributors. The social security `dealï is again more profitable for highincome individuals since they contribute at the maximum basis, with respect tolow income contributors at the minimum basis. This is due to the late entry and a higher survival rate for high income contributors.The system tends to favour women, given that they generally live longer than men and this factor is only partially offset by their lower wages. Married males, given the fact that they have longer life expectancy and leave a pension to their spouse, obtain higher present net transfers too than do single contributors.We close the paper with some comments on the slight impact and moderate effects of proposals for Social Security reform and on how these may change the previously observed redistribution effects.

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Work motivation and pro-social behavior in the delivery of public services : theoretical and empirical insights

This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to study the work motivation of employees in the delivery of public services. The questioning on work motivation in public services in not new but it becomes central for governments which are now facing unprecedented public debts. The objective of this research is twofold : First, we want to see if the work motivation of employees in public services is a continuum (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations cannot coexist) or a bi-dimensional construct (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously). The research in public administration literature has focused on the concept of public service motivation, and considered motivation to be uni-dimensional (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). However, no study has yet tackled both types of motivation, the intrinsic and extrinsic ones, in the same time. This dissertation proposes, in Part I, a theoretical assessment and an empirical test of a global work motivational structure, by using a self-constructed Swiss dataset with employees from three public services, the education sector, the security sector and the public administrative services sector. Our findings suggest that work motivation in public services in not uni-dimensional but bi-dimensional, the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously and can be positively correlated (Amabile et al. 1994). Our findings show that intrinsic motivation is as important as extrinsic motivation, thus, the assumption that employees in public services are less attracted by extrinsic rewards is not confirmed for this sample. Other important finding concerns the public service motivation concept, which, as theoretically predicted, represents the major motivational dimension of employees in the delivery of public services. Second, the theory of public service motivation makes the assumption that employees in public services engage in activities that go beyond their self-interest, but never uses this construct as a determinant for their pro-social behavior. In the same time, several studies (Gregg et al. 2011 and Georgellis et al. 2011) bring evidence about the pro-social behavior of employees in public services. However, they do not identify which type of motivation is at the origin of this behavior, they only make the assumption of an intrinsically motivated behavior. We analyze the pro-social behavior of employees in public services and use the public service motivation as determinant of their pro-social behavior. We add other determinants highlighted by the theory of pro-social behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), by Le Grand (2003) and by fit theories (Besley and Ghatak 2005). We test these determinants on Part II and identify for each sector of activity the positive or the negative impact on pro-social behavior of Swiss employees. Contrary to expectations, we find, for this sample, that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors have a positive impact on pro-social behavior, no crowding-out effect is identified in this sample. We confirm the hypothesis of Le Grand (2003) about the positive impact of the opportunity cost on pro-social behavior. Our results suggest a mix of action-oriented altruism and out-put oriented altruism of employees in public services. These results are relevant when designing incentives schemes for employees in the delivery of public services.

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The purpose of the Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency Management for Local Officials is to provide you with information regarding this system. Inside, you will learn about local and state emergency management and homeland security; the phases of homeland security and emergency management; hazards that affect the state; comprehensive planning requirements; emergency declarations; available state and federal assistance; and other important topics that will help you become more versed in homeland security and emergency management in Iowa.