947 resultados para Labor contracts
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This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers reputational capital.
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OBJECTIVE: To compare the adverse neonatal and maternal outcomes after medically indicated and elective labor induction. Both induction groups were also compared to women with spontaneous onset of labor. METHOD: Retrospective cohort study of 13 971 women with live, cephalic singleton pregnancies who delivered at term (from 1997 to 2007). Adverse maternal and neonatal outcomes were compared between women who underwent an induction of labor in the presence and absence of standard medical indications. RESULTS: Among 5090 patients with induced labor, 2059 (40.5%) underwent elective labor inductions, defined as inductions without any medical or obstetrical indication. Risks of cesarean or instrumental delivery, postpartum hemorrhage >500 ml, prolonged maternal hospitalization >6 days, Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, arterial umbilical cord pH<7.1, admission in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and prolonged NICU hospitalization >7 days were similar between nulliparous who underwent elective and medical labor induction. Similar results were obtained for multiparous. All the above mentioned risks, but the Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, were significantly increased after induction in comparison to spontaneous labor. CONCLUSION: Elective induction of labor carries similar obstetrical and neonatal risks as a medically indicated labor induction. Thus, elective induction of labor should be strongly discouraged.
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In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.
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Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.
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Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seenin a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losingtheir jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increasethe reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,exactly at a time that public finances are suffering from a large drop in contributions.Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpectedwealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, butthat has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and householdlevel data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claimingdecisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty facedby individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikinglyhigh proportion of individuals who claim benefits exactly at the Early RetirementAge, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal RetirementAge. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employmentuncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the effects of negative wealth shocks on thelabor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explainwhy early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retirementpenalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, andwhy labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in themidst of the worse employment crisis in decades.
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Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.
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Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.
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The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
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The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
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The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
Resumo:
The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.
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We document three changes in postwar US macroeconomic dynamics: (i) theprocyclicality of labor productivity has vanished, (ii) the relative volatility of employment has risen, and (iii) the relative (and absolute) volatility of the real wagehas risen. We propose an explanation for all three changes that is based on a common source: a decline in labor market frictions. We develop a simple model withlabor market frictions, variable effort, and endogenous wage rigidities to illustratethe mechanisms underlying our explanation. We show that the reduction in frictionsmay also have contributed to the observed decline in output volatility.
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Cet article présente les résultats de la revue systématique: Singata M, Tranmer J, Gyte GM. Restricting oral fluid and food intake during labour. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010 Jan 20;(1):CD003930. PMID: 20091553.