Flow-R, a model for susceptibility mapping of debris flows and other gravitational hazards at a regional scale

The development of susceptibility maps for debris flows is of primary importance due to population pressure in hazardous zones. However, hazard assessment by processbased modelling at a regional scale is difficult due to the complex nature of the phenomenon, the variability of local controlling factors, and the uncertainty in modelling parameters. A regional assessment must consider a simplified approach that is not highly parameter dependant and that can provide zonation with minimum data requirements. A distributed empirical model has thus been developed for regional susceptibility assessments using essentially a digital elevation model (DEM). The model is called Flow-R for Flow path assessment of gravitational hazards at a Regional scale (available free of charge under www.flow-r.org) and has been successfully applied to different case studies in various countries with variable data quality. It provides a substantial basis for a preliminary susceptibility assessment at a regional scale. The model was also found relevant to assess other natural hazards such as rockfall, snow avalanches and floods. The model allows for automatic source area delineation, given user criteria, and for the assessment of the propagation extent based on various spreading algorithms and simple frictional laws.We developed a new spreading algorithm, an improved version of Holmgren's direction algorithm, that is less sensitive to small variations of the DEM and that is avoiding over-channelization, and so produces more realistic extents. The choices of the datasets and the algorithms are open to the user, which makes it compliant for various applications and dataset availability. Amongst the possible datasets, the DEM is the only one that is really needed for both the source area delineation and the propagation assessment; its quality is of major importance for the results accuracy. We consider a 10m DEM resolution as a good compromise between processing time and quality of results. However, valuable results have still been obtained on the basis of lower quality DEMs with 25m resolution.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

A theory of optimal random crackdowns

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effectof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.

The genetical theory of social behaviour.

We survey the population genetic basis of social evolution, using a logically consistent set of arguments to cover a wide range of biological scenarios. We start by reconsidering Hamilton's (Hamilton 1964 J. Theoret. Biol. 7, 1-16 (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)) results for selection on a social trait under the assumptions of additive gene action, weak selection and constant environment and demography. This yields a prediction for the direction of allele frequency change in terms of phenotypic costs and benefits and genealogical concepts of relatedness, which holds for any frequency of the trait in the population, and provides the foundation for further developments and extensions. We then allow for any type of gene interaction within and between individuals, strong selection and fluctuating environments and demography, which may depend on the evolving trait itself. We reach three conclusions pertaining to selection on social behaviours under broad conditions. (i) Selection can be understood by focusing on a one-generation change in mean allele frequency, a computation which underpins the utility of reproductive value weights; (ii) in large populations under the assumptions of additive gene action and weak selection, this change is of constant sign for any allele frequency and is predicted by a phenotypic selection gradient; (iii) under the assumptions of trait substitution sequences, such phenotypic selection gradients suffice to characterize long-term multi-dimensional stochastic evolution, with almost no knowledge about the genetic details underlying the coevolving traits. Having such simple results about the effect of selection regardless of population structure and type of social interactions can help to delineate the common features of distinct biological processes. Finally, we clarify some persistent divergences within social evolution theory, with respect to exactness, synergies, maximization, dynamic sufficiency and the role of genetic arguments.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

An economic theory of church strictness

This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Wh-constructions in cape verdean creole: extensions of the copy theory of movement

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A Walrasian theory of commodity money: Paradoxical results

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.