O genocídio como problema internacional contemporâneo : um estudo do caso sudanês

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 2016.

La protección social de las familias monoparentales en la ciudad de Bogotá 1991 -2015: una realidad más allá de la ley

Con el paso y las transformaciones sociales, políticas y legales que implica una constituyente, en este caso la del 91, que daba nacimiento a la constitución del mismo año, se originó además una transición hacia un Estado social de derecho, pluriétnico y laico, el cual planteaba un discurso de diversidad e inclusión de la diferencia en diferentes aspectos de la vida social. Sin embargo, en el caso de la familia, esta constitución no representó cambios respecto al discurso estructura y funciones en la sociedad, pues perpetuaba el discurso familista, de una única forma legítima de familia: la nuclear patriarcal, implicando una falta de reconocimiento de la diversidad familiar en Colombia y provocando a su vez una afectación en la atención y protección social de las familias no reconocidas en Colombia. Tal es el caso de las familias monoparentales, cuya estructura no se corresponde a este discurso ideal de familia y gracias a su falta de reconocimiento tanto legal como social, la atención y protección social que reciben por parte del Estado, a través de las instituciones públicas de protección familiar, es parcializada a las jefaturas monoparentales femeninas, al igual de estigmatizadas. Pese a esto, desde 2013, ante la actual coyuntura de reivindicaciones sociales que buscan el reconocimiento de la diversidad de la familia en el país, han surgido mecanismos legales por parte de la corte constitucional, así como nuevas políticas de familia tanto a nivel nacional, como local, que están haciendo sus primeros acercamientos a lo que es la diversidad familiar y a cómo incluir y proteger a las familias. A lo largo del contacto con las instituciones públicas de protección familiar, donde se mostraron nuevas alternativas y avances que aunque representativos, aun no son suficientes, persistiendo la invisibilización tanto social como legal y una protección social parcializada de las familias monoparentales.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Constitutional legitimacy : an international ill and gap in the literature?

The central argument of this work is that “democratic constitutional legitimacy”[2] probably does not currently exist in the politics of any country internationally. This inherent problem in constitutionalism is an endemic governance problem most citizenries should be dealing with, only that we are not in a large extent doing so and haven’t been historically. This position was ascertained using a form of Beck and Grande’s (2010) cosmopolitan methodology in my doctoral thesis (which we shall return to). It is argued that every constitution is in need of considerable rethinking so as to bring its statutes in line with the interests of the plurality of individuals it oversees. Finally, this work attempts to show that research in this area of democratic constitutional legitimacy is lacking in the literature as only a few scholars presently engage the issue (namely Simone Chambers).

Environmental constitutional reform in the developing world : shifting the perspective of international law?

In recent years a growing number of states have chosen to recognise environmental issues in their national constitutions. Some have added declarations about the value of the environment, some have sought to restrict or regulate government’s ability to take action which would potentially harm the environment, while others have proclaimed that citizens possess a right to an environment of a particular quality. A survey of these constitutional provisions reveals that the majority of reform in this area has come from developing states, including a number of states which have been designated as among the least developed countries in the world. The increasing focus on constitutional environmental rights appears to represent a shift in the attitude of developing and emerging economies, which could in turn be influential in setting the tone of the environmental rights debate more broadly, with potential to shape the future development of international law in the area. This chapter examines constitutional environmental rights in an attempt to determine whether consistent state practice can in fact be identified in this area which might form the basis of an emerging norm. It will also analyse some of the potential contributing factors to the proliferation of a constitutional right to a good environment among developing states, and the implications for the development of customary international law.

Developments in court to court communications in International insolvency cases

As business increasingly operates on a global basis, courts are called upon more often to adjudicate insolvency cases with international connections. The financial collapse of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc (‘Lehman Holdings’) provides a recent example where courts across many jurisdictions were called upon to determine issues arising from a multistate insolvent enterprise. Lehman Holdings filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States on 15 September 2008. Lehman Brothers was the fourth largest investment bank in America and the largest company ever to file for bankruptcy in the United States. However the effects of its collapse were felt worldwide, including within Australia.

The High Court of Australia and the Marlboro Man: The Battle Over the Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products

In 2012, the High Court of Australia handed down a landmark decision on the plain packaging of tobacco products. This chapter considers the historic ruling in the case of JT International SA v Commonwealth; British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd v Commonwealth. This chapter explores several themes in the decision. First, it highlights the historical work by the High Court of Australia on the role of health regulation, the use of health warnings, and tobacco control. Second, the chapter considers the High Court of Australia's view that intellectual property law promotes the public interest.Third, it explores the High Court of Australia’s analysis of the constitutional law on acquisition of property on just terms. Finally, this chapter contends that the High Court of Australia's ruling on plain packaging of tobacco products will spark an 'Olive Revolution' — and will encourage superior courts and policy-makers to follow suit.

An analytical study revisiting debate on interpretation of Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice

Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) is today generally seen as a direction to the significant sources of international law, which the world court must consider in resolving disputes; however, the list is not exhaustive nor encompasses all the formal and material sources of the international legal system. Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ was written ninety years ago in a different world, a question is under debate in many states, whether or not sources mentioned in Article 38 of the statute are compatible with needs of 21st century ? In recent decade, many new actors come on the stage which have transformed international law and now it is not only governs relations among states but also covers many International Organizations. Article 38(2) does refer to the other possible sources but does not define them. Moreover, law is a set of rules that citizens must follow to regulate peace and order in society. These laws are binding on both the individual and the state on a domestic and international level. Do states regard this particular rule as a rule of international law? The modern legal system of states is in the form of a specified and well organized set of rules, regulating affairs of different organs of a state. States also need a body of rules for their intercourse with each other. These sets of rules among states are called “International Law.” This article examines international law, its foundation and sources. It considers whether international conventions and treaties can be the only way states can considerably create international law, or there is a need for clarity about the sources of international law. Article is divided into two parts, the first one deals with sources of international law discussed in Article 38 of the statute of International Court of Justice whereas the second one discusses the material and formal sources of law, which still need reorganization as sources of law.

Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination : The Approach of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo

[EN] On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence from Serbia. The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a category which to date is widely debated by the international community, but supported in that case by a respectable number of the United Nation member states. A great many legal issues have been raised by the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. This opinion was eagerly awaited by legal scholars due to both its possible effects and the scope of its principles outside the context of decolonization in what it could constitute of new approach to the international scenario for the twenty-first century. The ICJ stated that the declaration of independence was in accordance with international law if it was not prohibited. The answer turned on whether or not international law prohibited the declaration of independence, without ever examining whether an entity seeking secession is entitled with a positive right to secede and if so, under which circumstances. The basic issue can be summarised as whether or not we are facing a new course in the interpretation of certain classical categories of international law: the principle of territorial integrity, statehood, sovereignty, recognition, the right to external self-determination, etc. In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and how it operates ; secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that principle in relation to the interior of the State, and ask ourselves how international law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Lastly, we shall deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity in the specific case of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end with a series of general conclusions. This study aims, definitely, to contribute to the theoretical debate on the challenges to the traditional certainties of international law in this area.

Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes

The International Court of Justice has issued its long-awaited decision in the suit filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro with respect to the 1992–1995 war. The decision confirms the factual and legal determinations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ruling that genocide was committed during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 but that the conflict as a whole was not genocidal in nature. The Court held that Serbia had failed in its duty to prevent genocide in Srebrenica, although—because, the Court said, there was no certainty that it could have succeeded in preventing the genocide—no damages were awarded. The judgment provides a strong and authoritative statement of the general duty upon states to prevent genocide that dovetails well with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.