Higher education in nursing: the faculty work process in different institutional contexts

Objective To analyze the characteristics of faculty work in nursing higher education. Method An exploratory qualitative study with a theoretical-methodological framework of dialectical and historical materialism. The faculty work process was adopted as the analytical category, grounded on conceptions of work and professionalism. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 24 faculty members from three higher education institutions in the city of São Paulo, classified according to the typology of institutional contexts. Results The faculty members at these higher education institutions are a heterogeneous group, under different working conditions. Intensification and precarious conditions of the faculty work is common to all three contexts, although there are important distinctions in the practices related to teaching, research and extension. Conclusion Faculty professionalization can be the starting point for analyzing and coping with such a distinct reality of faculty work and practice.


‘Poverty…, of course we have it…’ Notes for the analysis of an institutional

Based on testimonies by Cape Verdean individuals with different social condition and institutional responsibility on one hand and, on the other hand, on the consideration of the historical burden and the policies adopted after the independence, this article is focused on the creation of a social conscience about poverty and the manifestations of micro-violence through the action of institutions and NGOs committed in the eradication of poverty and prevention of behaviors potentially generating and perpetuating micro-violence and social exclusion. The political environment and the perception of an involvement of Cape Verdeans in a common destiny are deemed crucial to the achievement of these purposes.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

RIC Program Summary Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; 401 (a) Employer Match Plan, 2005

This Plan is intended to be a qualified plan within the meaning of Code Section 401(a), a plan within the meaning of Code Section 401(a), and a governmental plan within the meaning of Code Section 414(d). This Plan may be referred to as “The State of Iowa’s 401(a) Employer Match Plan”, which is one of two plans that comprise the Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC).

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; 457 Employee Contribution Plan, 2005

This Plan is intended to satisfy the requirements for an “eligible deferred compensation plan” under Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time, and all other applicable provisions of law and the regulations issued thereunder. This Plan may be referred to as “The State of Iowa’s 457 Employee Contribution Plan”, which is one of two plans that comprise the Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC).

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; Enrollment Brouchure, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; Fund Fees Comparison, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Statement of Inventment Policy for the Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Investment Provider Comparison Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

RIC Plan Summary Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Institutional constraints on organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships

We study the effect of organizational choice and institutions on the performance ofSpanish car dealerships. Using outlet-level data from 1994, we find that verticallyintegrateddealerships showed substantially lower labor productivity, higher labor costs andlower profitability than franchised ones. Despite these gaps in performance, no verticallyintegratedoutlet was separated until 1994, yet the few outlets that were eventuallyseparated systematically improved their performance. We argue that the conversion ofintegrated outlets into franchised ones involved significant transaction costs, due to aninstitutional environment favoring permanent, highly-unionized employment relations. Inline with this argument, we find that the observed separations occurred in distributionnetworks that underwent marked reductions in worker unionization rates, following thelegalization of temporary labor contracts.