Contract between John Cronyn and Nelson Forsyth, December 16, 1854.

John Cronyn (1827-1898) emigrated to Canada from Ireland in 1837. He studied medicine at the University of Toronto, but was not granted his degree upon completion of the requirements. He refused to take the test oaths meant to exclude Catholics from the profession and was not granted his degree until several years later, when the discriminatory laws were rescinded. In 1850, he married Elizabeth Willoughby of Toronto. They settled in Fort Erie and he established a successful medical practice there. He was active in the community, serving as Superintendent of schools and one term as Reeve. In 1859 he relocated to Buffalo and continued to practice medicine there. Cronyn was instrumental in the establishment of a medical department at Niagara University, where he was a professor and president of faculty. Nelson Forsyth was the son of William Forsyth (1771-1841), a prominent businessman in Niagara who owned and operated the Pavilion Hotel (later known as Forsyth’s Inn). Nelson was also a businessman and lived in Fort Erie with his wife Archange Warren.

Printed Blank of Incomplete Indenture

Printed Blank of incomplete indenture. Only the first line is filled in with the name Simon McGillivray. No other details are included except the date, Dec. 3, 1829.

Contract signed by Robert Duffin of Grantham Township

Contract signed by Robert Duffin of the Township of Grantham Labourers to break stone for the proposed road from Queenston to St. Davids, 1838.

Memorandum of material furnished for superstructure on the line of the Port Dalhousie Thorold Railway by contract

Memorandum of material furnished for superstructure on the line of the Port Dalhousie Thorold Railway by contract. This document includes: Bills of timber, memorandums of planking, fencing, ties, track laying, masonry and bolts and spikes. There are also diagrams of culverts. One of the pages is loose and the outer pages are somewhat discoloured (32 pages, handwritten and bound with ribbon, n.d.

Second copy of the memorandum respecting differences between the approximate and final estimate but this one has “memorandum of extras of Brown and McDonall contract” written on the outer page

Second copy of the memorandum respecting differences between the approximate and final estimate but this one has “memorandum of extras of Brown and McDonall contract” written on the outer page (3 pages, handwritten), n.d.

Memo to the warden and councilors for the County of Welland in council assembled regarding the contract of Edward Henderson

Memo to the warden and councilors for the County of Welland in council assembled regarding the contract of Edward Henderson. The terms of the contract have not been exceeded. This note is not signed, n.d.

Incomplete indenture of Joseph Kingsmill, regarding 4 acres of land

Incomplete indenture of Joseph Kingsmill, regarding 4 acres of land. This is not made out to anyone, nor signed to anyone and most of the writing is illegible, n.d.

The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

The Economics Of Civil Law Contract And Of Good Faith

Prepared for the Symposium in honour of Michael J. Trebilcock, 1-2 October 2009, in Toronto

The Civil Law Of Contract

Cet article sera publié dans Ghent Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Gerrit De Geest (General Editor), 2nd edition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010.

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.