The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71

Methodology for studying the numerical speed of sound in finite differences schemes

The space and time discretization inherent to all FDTD schemesintroduce non-physical dispersion errors, i.e. deviations ofthe speed of sound from the theoretical value predicted bythe governing Euler differential equations. A generalmethodologyfor computing this dispersion error via straightforwardnumerical simulations of the FDTD schemes is presented.The method is shown to provide remarkable accuraciesof the order of 1/1000 in a wide variety of twodimensionalfinite difference schemes.

Entre a dominação simbólica e a emancipação política no Ensino Superior em Enfermagem: Between symbolic domination and political emancipation

Nesta reflexão, problematizamos a atividade de cuidar e de ensinar a cuidar em enfermagem e, para tanto, vamos tomar por base alguns conceitos sobre a dominação e o poder simbólicos de Pierre Bourdieu. Nosso pressuposto foi pensar a saúde como um constituinte fundamental para a produção da nossa existência sobre a Terra. A educação, neste texto, é abordada, tendo por referência as ideias de Pedro Demo, entendidas como uma construtora de sujeitos políticos e bem mais amplas que o manejo do conhecimento formal. A educação é a base primeira sobre a qual se constrói a autonomia humana e, assim, permite a constante ampliação das oportunidades para o exercício da cidadania, qualificando a nossa existência cotidiana. No contexto acadêmico, no qual se cruzam a saúde, a educação e a enfermagem, o trabalho docente competente, crítico e, sobretudo, reflexivo, pode se tornar uma práxis altamente instituinte.

Finite sample nonparametric tests for linear regressions

We introduce several exact nonparametric tests for finite sample multivariatelinear regressions, and compare their powers. This fills an important gap inthe literature where the only known nonparametric tests are either asymptotic,or assume one covariate only.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

Modeling complex wells with the multi-scale finite-volume method

In this paper, an extension of the multi-scale finite-volume (MSFV) method is devised, which allows to Simulate flow and transport in reservoirs with complex well configurations. The new framework fits nicely into the data Structure of the original MSFV method,and has the important property that large patches covering the whole well are not required. For each well. an additional degree of freedom is introduced. While the treatment of pressure-constraint wells is trivial (the well-bore reference pressure is explicitly specified), additional equations have to be solved to obtain the unknown well-bore pressure of rate-constraint wells. Numerical Simulations of test cases with multiple complex wells demonstrate the ability of the new algorithm to capture the interference between the various wells and the reservoir accurately. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.