Lack of Critical Slowing Down Suggests that Financial Meltdowns Are Not Critical Transitions, yet Rising Variability Could Signal Systemic Risk

Complex systems inspired analysis suggests a hypothesis that financial meltdowns are abrupt critical transitions that occur when the system reaches a tipping point. Theoretical and empirical studies on climatic and ecological dynamical systems have shown that approach to tipping points is preceded by a generic phenomenon called critical slowing down, i.e. an increasingly slow response of the system to perturbations. Therefore, it has been suggested that critical slowing down may be used as an early warning signal of imminent critical transitions. Whether financial markets exhibit critical slowing down prior to meltdowns remains unclear. Here, our analysis reveals that three major US (Dow Jones Index, S&P 500 and NASDAQ) and two European markets (DAX and FTSE) did not exhibit critical slowing down prior to major financial crashes over the last century. However, all markets showed strong trends of rising variability, quantified by time series variance and spectral function at low frequencies, prior to crashes. These results suggest that financial crashes are not critical transitions that occur in the vicinity of a tipping point. Using a simple model, we argue that financial crashes are likely to be stochastic transitions which can occur even when the system is far away from the tipping point. Specifically, we show that a gradually increasing strength of stochastic perturbations may have caused to abrupt transitions in the financial markets. Broadly, our results highlight the importance of stochastically driven abrupt transitions in real world scenarios. Our study offers rising variability as a precursor of financial meltdowns albeit with a limitation that they may signal false alarms.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Financial x-ray

An over view of the financial x-ray service. JL

Report on Knowledge Exchange workshop Price of keeping knowledge: financial streams for digital preservation

In contrast to cost modeling activities, the pricing of services must be simple and transparent. Calculating and thus knowing price structures, would not only help identify the level of detail required for cost modeling of individual instititutions, but also help develop a ”public” market for services as well as clarify the division of task and the modeling of funding and revenue streams for data preservation of public institutions. This workshop has built on the results from the workshop ”The Costs and Benefits of Keeping Knowledge” which took place 11 June 2012 in Copenhagen. This expert workshop aimed at: •Identifying ways for data repositories to abstract from their complicated cost structures and arrive at one transparent pricing structure which can be aligned with available and plausible funding schemes. Those repositories will probably need a stable institutional funding stream for data management and preservation. Are there any estimates for this, absolute or as percentage of overall cost? Part of the revenue will probably have to come through data management fees upon ingest. How could that be priced? Per dataset, per GB or as a percentage of research cost? Will it be necessary to charge access prices, as they contradict the open science paradigm? •What are the price components for pricing individual services, which prices are currently being paid e.g. to commercial providers? What are the description and conditions of the service(s) delivered and guaranteed? •What types of risks are inherent in these pricing schemes? •How can services and prices be defined in an all-inclusive and simple manner, so as to enable researchers to apply for specific amount when asking for funding of data-intensive projects?Please

Financial analysis of small-scale fish farming enterprises to alleviate poverty in homestead

This paper focuses on the financial analysis involved in setting up of fish farming on a small-scale in a homestead. About 0.5 acres of land was used for the construction of pond which as a stock of Clarias spp/ Heterobranchus spp and Tilapia spp at the ratio of one to three for a period of 12 months. The land/land development cost is N26,500.00, pond construction cost, N35,700.00, equipment cost, N2,650.00 and stock/Input requirement cost N155,727.00 while the revenue from sales is N376,000.00. A cash flow analysis is also calculated for the fish farm, which is N155,423.00 for first year cash flow, and appropriate profit/mosses were calculated for five-year production cycle of N1,036,515.00 million. At the end appreciable profit is realized from the enterprises. This type of enterprises is viable for small-scale farmers to practices and adopted for financial support for their family

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

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Estimation of growth and financial analysis through the application of Ipil ipil (Leucaena leucocephala) leaf meal as supplements to soybean and fish meal in the diet of juvenile monosex tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus)

Among plant protein ingredients,ipil ipil (Leucaena leucocephala) leafmeal (ILLM) is considered the most nutritive plant protein source after soybean meal in aquatic feeds. That was proven in a 21-day experiment conducted to assess the response of juvenile Monosex Nile tilapia Oreochromis niloticus with four iso-nitrogenous formulated diets: One control diet was formulated based on fishmeal, one on soybean meal and one on rice bran, ipil ipil leafmeal was also included in experimental diets.

Financial Futures Markets and Their Impact on the Real Economy in Middle and Low Income Countries

This project analyses the influence of the futures market on middle and low income countries. In it, I attempt to show that investments made by large investment funds in this market, as well as by certain pension plans, bring major consequences whose effects are more evident in less developed countries. The cornerstones of the work are as follows; to attempt to see the existing relationship between the commodity futures market and its underlying assets; analysing products such as wheat, rice and corn in-depth, because these are the most basic foodstuffs at a global level; to determine how an increase in trading in these markets can affect the lives of people in the poorest countries; to analyse investor concern regarding the consequences that their investments may have. Throughout the project we will see how large speculators use production forecasting models to determine the shortage of a commodity in order to take a position in the futures market to profit from it. In addition we will see how an increase in trading in this market causes an increase in the price of the underlying asset in the spot market. As for investor concern, I can say it is negligible, but the idea of running pension plans or investment funds that follow some social criteria has been welcomed by those interviewed, which makes me think that different legislation is possible. This legislation will only come into existence if it is demanded by the people. A fact that now becomes complicated because without a minimum financial basis, they cannot even know how the large investment funds trade with hunger in the world. The day when most people understand how large speculators profit from famine will be the day to put pressure on governments to begin to put limits on speculation. This makes financial awareness necessary in order to achieve a curb in excessive speculation.

Company financial performance: Does board size matter? Case of the EUROSTOXX50 index

[EN] This study analyzes the relationship between board size and economic-financial performance in a sample of European firms that constitute the EUROSTOXX50 Index. Based on previous literature, resource dependency and agency theories, and considering regulation developed by the OECD and European Union on the normative of corporate governance for each country in the sample, the authors propose the hypotheses of both positive linear and quadratic relationships between the researched parameters. Using ROA as a benchmark of financial performance and the number of members of the board as measurement of the board size, two OLS estimations are performed. To confirm the robustness of the results the empirical study is tested with two other similar financial ratios, ROE and Tobin s Q. Due to the absence of significant results, an additional factor, firm size, is employed in order to check if it affects firm performance. Delving further into the nature of this relationship, it is revealed that there exists a strong and negative relation between firm size and financial performance. Consequently, it can be asseverated that the generic recommendation one size fits all cannot be applied in this case; which conforms to the Recommendations of the European Union that dissuade using generic models for all countries.