839 resultados para Financial accelerator
Resumo:
A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based hardware accelerator for multi-conductor parasitic capacitance extraction, using Method of Moments (MoM), is presented in this paper. Due to the prohibitive cost of solving a dense algebraic system formed by MoM, linear complexity fast solver algorithms have been developed in the past to expedite the matrix-vector product computation in a Krylov sub-space based iterative solver framework. However, as the number of conductors in a system increases leading to a corresponding increase in the number of right-hand-side (RHS) vectors, the computational cost for multiple matrix-vector products present a time bottleneck, especially for ill-conditioned system matrices. In this work, an FPGA based hardware implementation is proposed to parallelize the iterative matrix solution for multiple RHS vectors in a low-rank compression based fast solver scheme. The method is applied to accelerate electrostatic parasitic capacitance extraction of multiple conductors in a Ball Grid Array (BGA) package. Speed-ups up to 13x over equivalent software implementation on an Intel Core i5 processor for dense matrix-vector products and 12x for QR compressed matrix-vector products is achieved using a Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA on Xilinx's ML605 board.
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Complex systems inspired analysis suggests a hypothesis that financial meltdowns are abrupt critical transitions that occur when the system reaches a tipping point. Theoretical and empirical studies on climatic and ecological dynamical systems have shown that approach to tipping points is preceded by a generic phenomenon called critical slowing down, i.e. an increasingly slow response of the system to perturbations. Therefore, it has been suggested that critical slowing down may be used as an early warning signal of imminent critical transitions. Whether financial markets exhibit critical slowing down prior to meltdowns remains unclear. Here, our analysis reveals that three major US (Dow Jones Index, S&P 500 and NASDAQ) and two European markets (DAX and FTSE) did not exhibit critical slowing down prior to major financial crashes over the last century. However, all markets showed strong trends of rising variability, quantified by time series variance and spectral function at low frequencies, prior to crashes. These results suggest that financial crashes are not critical transitions that occur in the vicinity of a tipping point. Using a simple model, we argue that financial crashes are likely to be stochastic transitions which can occur even when the system is far away from the tipping point. Specifically, we show that a gradually increasing strength of stochastic perturbations may have caused to abrupt transitions in the financial markets. Broadly, our results highlight the importance of stochastically driven abrupt transitions in real world scenarios. Our study offers rising variability as a precursor of financial meltdowns albeit with a limitation that they may signal false alarms.
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This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.
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An over view of the financial x-ray service. JL
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In contrast to cost modeling activities, the pricing of services must be simple and transparent. Calculating and thus knowing price structures, would not only help identify the level of detail required for cost modeling of individual instititutions, but also help develop a ”public” market for services as well as clarify the division of task and the modeling of funding and revenue streams for data preservation of public institutions. This workshop has built on the results from the workshop ”The Costs and Benefits of Keeping Knowledge” which took place 11 June 2012 in Copenhagen. This expert workshop aimed at: •Identifying ways for data repositories to abstract from their complicated cost structures and arrive at one transparent pricing structure which can be aligned with available and plausible funding schemes. Those repositories will probably need a stable institutional funding stream for data management and preservation. Are there any estimates for this, absolute or as percentage of overall cost? Part of the revenue will probably have to come through data management fees upon ingest. How could that be priced? Per dataset, per GB or as a percentage of research cost? Will it be necessary to charge access prices, as they contradict the open science paradigm? •What are the price components for pricing individual services, which prices are currently being paid e.g. to commercial providers? What are the description and conditions of the service(s) delivered and guaranteed? •What types of risks are inherent in these pricing schemes? •How can services and prices be defined in an all-inclusive and simple manner, so as to enable researchers to apply for specific amount when asking for funding of data-intensive projects?Please
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This paper focuses on the financial analysis involved in setting up of fish farming on a small-scale in a homestead. About 0.5 acres of land was used for the construction of pond which as a stock of Clarias spp/ Heterobranchus spp and Tilapia spp at the ratio of one to three for a period of 12 months. The land/land development cost is N26,500.00, pond construction cost, N35,700.00, equipment cost, N2,650.00 and stock/Input requirement cost N155,727.00 while the revenue from sales is N376,000.00. A cash flow analysis is also calculated for the fish farm, which is N155,423.00 for first year cash flow, and appropriate profit/mosses were calculated for five-year production cycle of N1,036,515.00 million. At the end appreciable profit is realized from the enterprises. This type of enterprises is viable for small-scale farmers to practices and adopted for financial support for their family
Resumo:
This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.
Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.
Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.
The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.
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25 p.