Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Behavior of triatomines (Hemiptera, Reduviidae) vectors of Chagas' disease. II. Influence of feeding, lighting and time of day on the number of mating, mating speed and duration of copulation of Panstrongylus megistus (Burm, 1835) under laboratory conditions

To determine in influence of feeding, lighting and time of day on the copulating behavior of Panstrongylus megistus, 480 insect pairs were divided into four groups of 120 each and tested in the following respective situations: without food deprivation (F.D.), with five days of F.D., with ten days of F.D., and with 20 days of F. D. The tests were performed between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00a.m. and 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., with light (700-1400 lux) and in the dark (1.4-2.8 lux) and behavior was recorded by the time sampling technique. Mating spped (MS) and duration of copulation (DC) were also calculated for each situation. The maximum frequency of copulation was observed after five days of F.D., at night, in the dark (n = 16), and the minimum was observed for recently-fed pairs, at night, with light (n = 4). Males approached females more often than females approached males. MS was lowest in pairs with twenty days of F.D., at night, with light (X = 23.0 ± 16.0 minutes), and highest in recently-fed pairs, during the day, with light (X = 2.9 ± 2.5 minutes). DC was shortest in recently-fed insects, during the day, in the dark (X = 23.5 ± 6.7 minutes), and longest in recently-fed animals, at night, in the dark (X = 38.3 ± 6.9 minutes).

The study of insect blood-feeding behaviour: 1. Feeding equipment, physical and endogenous factors, dose effect analysis, and diet destination

Experimental techniques that we have found useful during our studies of insect blood-feeding behaviour are reviewed. Some of the principal findings resulting from these techniques are discussed. Where directly applicable, the work of others is included, but no complete review of the subject has been attempted.

The study of insect blood-feeding behaviour: 2. Recording techniques and the use of flow charts

This paper continues a discussion of approaches and methodologies we have used in our studies of feeding in haematophagous insects. Described are techniques for directly monitoring behaviour: electrical recording of feeding behaviour via resistance changes in the food canal, optical methods for monitoring mouthpart activity, and a computer technique for behavioural event recording. Also described is the use of "flow charts" or "decision diagrams" to model interrelated sequences of behaviours.

Evaluation of Chagas' disease transmission through breast-feeding

On hundred milk or colostrum samples from 78 mothers with chronic Chagas' disease were parasitologically studied for Trypanosoma cruzi infection by means of direct examination and inoculation of mice. The mice were submitted to direct bllod examination three times a week. At the end of 45 days, xenodiagnosis and indirect immunofluorescent test (IFAT) for T. cruzi antibodies were carried out in the animals. No parasitized sample was observed even though five mothers had parasitemia at milk collection. In addition, 97 breast-fed children of chronic chagasic mothers, born free of infection, were tested for IgG antibodies to T. cruzi using IFAT. No case of T. cruzi infection was detected. The authors conclude that breast-feeding should not be avoided for children for chronic chagasic women. However, as these mothers had intermittent parasitemia, they should avoid nursing when there is nipple bleeding.

Productivity, Preferences and UIP deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (i) traded and non-traded sectors; (ii) financial market incompleteness; (iii) preference shocks; (iv) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (v) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.

Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features

Biological features and social preferences have been studied separately as factors influencing human strategic behaviour. We run two studies in order to explore the interplay between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social preferences may have some biological underpinnings. We use simple one-shot distribution experiments to attribute subjects one out of four types of social preferences: Self-interested (SI), Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). We then investigate whether these four groups display differences in their levels of facial Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA) and in proxies for exposure to testosterone during phoetal development and puberty. We observe that development-related biological features and social preferences are relatively independent. In the second study, we compare the relative weight of these two set of factors by studying how they affect subjects’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (UG). We find differences in offers made and rejection rates across the four social preference groups. The effect of social preferences is stronger than the effect of biological features even though the latter is significant. We also report a novel link between facial masculinity (a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty) and rejection rates in the UG. Our results suggest that biological features influence behaviour both directly and through their relation with the type of social preferences that individuals hold.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

A Case of Framing Effects: The Elicitation of Time Preferences.

We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same ‘truthful’ revelation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter: the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon.