Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Features of IP rights enforcement in Korea and China

This report examines recent updates to the regulation and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights in Korea and China, in particular patent rights including invention, utility, and design rights. This paper also discusses some features and issues of the actual IP enforcement situation in those countries in comparison with Japan.

Theoretical Analysis of the No-Slip Boundary Condition Enforcement in SPH Methods

The aim of the present work is to provide an in-depth analysis of the most representative mirroring techniques used in SPH to enforce boundary conditions (BC) along solid profiles. We specifically refer to dummy particles, ghost particles, and Takeda et al. [Prog. Theor. Phys. 92 (1994), 939] boundary integrals. The analysis has been carried out by studying the convergence of the first- and second-order differential operators as the smoothing length (that is, the characteristic length on which relies the SPH interpolation) decreases. These differential operators are of fundamental importance for the computation of the viscous drag and the viscous/diffusive terms in the momentum and energy equations. It has been proved that close to the boundaries some of the mirroring techniques leads to intrinsic inaccuracies in the convergence of the differential operators. A consistent formulation has been derived starting from Takeda et al. boundary integrals (see the above reference). This original formulation allows implementing no-slip boundary conditions consistently in many practical applications as viscous flows and diffusion problems.

On the non-slip boundary condition enforcement in SPH methods.

The implementation of boundary conditions is one of the points where the SPH methodology still has some work to do. The aim of the present work is to provide an in-depth analysis of the most representative mirroring techniques used in SPH to enforce boundary conditions (BC) along solid profiles. We specifically refer to dummy particles, ghost particles, and Takeda et al. [1] boundary integrals. A Pouseuille flow has been used as a example to gradually evaluate the accuracy of the different implementations. Our goal is to test the behavior of the second-order differential operator with the proposed boundary extensions when the smoothing length h and other dicretization parameters as dx/h tend simultaneously to zero. First, using a smoothed continuous approximation of the unidirectional Pouseuille problem, the evolution of the velocity profile has been studied focusing on the values of the velocity and the viscous shear at the boundaries, where the exact solution should be approximated as h decreases. Second, to evaluate the impact of the discretization of the problem, an Eulerian SPH discrete version of the former problem has been implemented and similar results have been monitored. Finally, for the sake of completeness, a 2D Lagrangian SPH implementation of the problem has been also studied to compare the consequences of the particle movement

Back in Blue: The Successful Reintegration of Combat Veteran Law Enforcement Officers.

In the past ten plus years, several million national guard and reserve component military personnel have been deployed in support of the global war on terrorism. Tens of thousands of those personnel also serve as full-time law enforcement officers in police and sheriff's offices around the country. Life as a law enforcement officer is tough enough, but when combined with the psychological baggage brought on by months of war, reintegrating into civilian life and the role of a law enforcement officer can be extremely difficult. This article discusses a reintegration program specifically for law enforcement agencies that is designed to promote long-term psychological and social health in combat veteran officers. The program's costs are offset by the many assets (leadership, tactical training, etc.) these men and women bring to the department. By committing to the long-term successful reintegration of these individuals, departments enhance their own forces and improve community safety.

Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law. Research Papers in Law, 4/2004

From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.

Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law. Research Paper in Law 08/2013, December

The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.

Enforcement in the EU Single Market. CEPS Paperbacks. October 2012

Enforcement of and compliance with laws and regulations in the single market of the European Union are not only legally necessary, but also of crucial economic importance for business, consumers and the EU economy at large. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the current EU enforcement landscape and its functioning. The classical infringement route via the Court of Justice of the European Union remains critical as a last resort, but it is increasingly seen as very slow and costly. The new emphasis relies heavily on a range of pre-infringement as well as preventive initiatives that prevent new technical barriers from arising. They also tend to be far less costly and more rapid, informal and effective in pursuing a properly functioning internal market. These improvements are welcome news for the single market, yet EU enforcement still has problems to solve, for example in the area of public procurement.