Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Fair and efficient student placement with couples

We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Forming efficient networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Exploration of the visual system : Part 2. In vivo analysis methods : virtual-reality optomotor system, fundus examination and fluorescent angiography

The mouse has emerged as an animal model for many diseases. At IRO, we have used this animal to understand the development of many eye diseases and treatment of some of them. Precise evaluation of vision is a prerequisite for both these approaches. In this unit we describe three ways to measure vision: testing the optokinetic response, and evaluating the fundus by direct observation and by fluorescent angiography.

Efficient knowledge retrieval to calibrate input variables in forest fire prediction

Forest fires are a serious threat to humans and nature from an ecological, social and economic point of view. Predicting their behaviour by simulation still delivers unreliable results and remains a challenging task. Latest approaches try to calibrate input variables, often tainted with imprecision, using optimisation techniques like Genetic Algorithms. To converge faster towards fitter solutions, the GA is guided with knowledge obtained from historical or synthetical fires. We developed a robust and efficient knowledge storage and retrieval method. Nearest neighbour search is applied to find the fire configuration from knowledge base most similar to the current configuration. Therefore, a distance measure was elaborated and implemented in several ways. Experiments show the performance of the different implementations regarding occupied storage and retrieval time with overly satisfactory results.

Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?

The implementation of public programs to support business R&D projects requires the establishment of a selection process. This selection process faces various difficulties, which include the measurement of the impact of the R&D projects as well as selection process optimization among projects with multiple, and sometimes incomparable, performance indicators. To this end, public agencies generally use the peer review method, which, while presenting some advantages, also demonstrates significant drawbacks. Private firms, on the other hand, tend toward more quantitative methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in their pursuit of R&D investment optimization. In this paper, the performance of a public agency peer review method of project selection is compared with an alternative DEA method.

Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study

During the last two decades there has been an increase in using dynamic tariffs for billing household electricity consumption. This has questioned the suitability of traditional pricing schemes, such as two-part tariffs, since they contribute to create marked peak and offpeak demands. The aim of this paper is to assess if two-part tariffs are an efficient pricing scheme using Spanish household electricity microdata. An ordered probit model with instrumental variables on the determinants of power level choice and non-paramentric spline regressions on the electricity price distribution will allow us to distinguish between the tariff structure choice and the simultaneous demand decisions. We conclude that electricity consumption and dwellings’ and individuals’ characteristics are key determinants of the fixed charge paid by Spanish households Finally, the results point to the inefficiency of the two-part tariff as those consumers who consume more electricity pay a lower price than the others.

Exploration des expériences et des besoins des patients diabétiques et des professionnels de la santé du canton de Vaud: Programme cantonal Diabète Vaud

Dans le cadre de l'élaboration du Programme cantonal Diabète du canton de Vaud, nous avons mis en place une étude qualitative visant à connaître l'opinion des divers acteurs du système de santé du canton, sur la prise en charge actuelle du diabète et le développement du Programme cantonal Diabète. Nous avons recruté des patients diabétiques et des professionnels de la santé dans le but d'organiser huit focus-groupes (entretiens de groupe) : un focus-groupe de patients diabétiques et un focus-groupe de professionnels de la santé, dans chacune des quatre régions sanitaires du canton de Vaud. [Auteurs, p. 5]

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].