“Show me a bad kid and I’ll show you a lousy parent” : making parents responsible for youth crime in Australian and Canadian contexts

In this article we survey relevant international literature on the issue of parental liability and responsibility for the crimes of young offenders. In addition, as a starting point for needed cross-jurisdictional research, we focus on different approaches that have been taken to making parents responsible for youth crime in Australia and Canada. This comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian legislative and policy approaches is situated within a broader discussion of arguments about parental responsibility, the ‘punitive turn’ in youth justice, and cross-jurisdictional criminal justice policy transfer and convergence. One unexpected finding of our literature survey is the relatively sparse attention given to the issue of parental responsibility for youth crime in legal and criminological literature compared to the attention it receives in the media and popular-public culture. In Part I we examine the different views that have been articulated in the social science literature for and against parental responsibility laws, along with arguments that have been made about why such laws have been enacted in an increasing number of Western countries in recent years. In Part II, we situate our comparative study of Australian and Canadian legislative and policy approaches within a broader discussion of arguments about the ‘punitive turn’ in youth justice, responsibilisation, and cross-jurisdictional criminal justice policy transfer and convergence. In Part III, we identify and examine the scope of different parental responsibility laws that have been enacted in Australia and Canada; noting significant differences in the manner and extent to which parental responsibility laws and policies have been invoked as part of the solution to dealing with youth crime. In our concluding discussion, in Part IV, we try to speculate on some of the reasons for these differences and set an agenda for needed future research on the topic.

Juvenile justice in Queensland and Canada : new legislation reflecting new directions

Due to their similar colonial histories and common law heritage, Australia and Canada provide an ideal comparative context for examining legislation reflecting new directions in the field of juvenile justice. Toward this end, this article compares the revised juvenile justice legislation which came into force in Queensland and Canada in 2003 (Canada, Youth Criminal Justice Act, enacted on 19 February 2002 and proclaimed in force 1 April 2003; Queensland, Juvenile Justice Act, amended 2003). There are a series of questions that could be addressed including: How similar and how sweeping have been the legislative changes introduced in each jurisdiction?; What are likely to be some of the effects of the implementation of these new legislative regimes?; and, how well does the legislation enacted in either jurisdiction address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children who have been caught up in juvenile justice systems? This article addresses mainly the first of these questions, offering a systematic comparison of recent Queensland and Canadian legislative changes. Although, due to the recentness of these changes, there is no data available to assess long-term effects, anecdotal evidence and preliminary research findings from our comparative study are offered to provide a start at answering the second question. We also offer critical yet sympathetic comments on the ability of legislation to address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children caught up in juvenile justice systems. Specifically, we conclude that while more than simple legislative responses are required to address the difficulties faced by youth offenders, and especially overrepresented Indigenous young offenders, the amended Queensland and new Canadian legislation appear to provide some needed reforms that can be used to help address some of these fundamental difficulties.

Researching crime and violence: Untold stories from the field

Undertaking empirical research on crime and violence can be a tricky enterprise fraught with ethical, methodological, intellectual and legal implications. This chapter takes readers on a reflective journey through the qualitative methodologies I used to research sex work in Kings Cross, miscarriages of justice, female delinquency, sexual violence, and violence in rural and regional settings over a period of nearly 30 years. Reflecting on these experiences, the chapter explores and analyses the reality of doing qualitative field research, the role of the researcher, the politics of subjectivity, the exercise of power, and the ‘muddiness’ of the research process, which is often overlooked in sanitised accounts of the research process (Byrne-Armstrong, Higgs and Horsfall, 2001; Davies, 2000).

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Punitiveness and the criminalisation of the other : State wards, unlawful non-citizens and Indigenous youth

This paper explores the genealogies of bio-power that cut across punitive state interventions aimed at regulating or normalising several distinctive ‘problem’ or ‘suspect’ deviant populations, such as state wards, non-lawful citizens and Indigenous youth. It begins by making some general comments about the theoretical approach to bio-power taken in this paper. It then outlines the distinctive features of bio-power in Australia and how these intersected with the emergence of penal welfarism to govern the unruly, unchaste, unlawful, and the primitive. The paper draws on three examples to illustrate the argument – the gargantuan criminalisation rates of Aboriginal youth, the history of incarcerating state wards in state institutions, and the mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens and their children. The construction of Indigenous people as a dangerous presence, alongside the construction of the unruly neglected children of the colony — the larrikin descendants of convicts as necessitating special regimes of internal controls and institutions, found a counterpart in the racial and other exclusionary criteria operating through immigration controls for much of the twentieth century. In each case the problem child or population was expelled from the social body through forms of bio-power, rationalised as strengthening, protecting or purifying the Australian population.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Drawing the line : the legal status and treatment of the 17-year-old accused in Queensland

Seventeen year olds who come into contact with the police in Queensland are classified as adults and are not afforded the protections available under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA). As with any other adult, their offences are dealt with under a raft of legislative provisions including the Criminal Code 1889 (Qld) (the Code), the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA) and the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA). This article argues that this situation is unfair and contravenes international human rights agreements which Australia has ratified, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC). Article 1 of that Convention defines a child as a person under the age of 18. The youth offences legislation in Queensland only applies to those who have not yet turned 17. This article examines the effects of this anomaly in Queensland, focusing in particular on the pre-adjudication treatment of ‘17 year old adults’.

Problem-solving courts, therapeutic jurisprudence and the constitution : if two is company, is three a crowd?

Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most successful in administering an independent and impartial problem solving court.

Criminology, Crime and Politics Before and After 9/11

Criminologists have mostly followed the criminal law in adopting an apolitical concept of crime. They paid limited attention to both political crime and the political power to criminalise. The article traces efforts to redress this since the 1960s. It nevertheless remained a minority concern, mostly of critical criminology. Yet crime has been politicised in various ways by other developments, also examined in the article. The events of 9/11 have crowned the emergence of crime as a strategic security issue posing a challenge to criminology to engage with politically inspired crime and its control.

From Absence to Presence, from Silence to Voice: Victims in Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials

As much as victims have been absent in traditional and national criminal justice for a long time, they were invisible in transitional and international criminal justice after World War II. The Nuremberg Trials were dominated by the perpetrators, and documents were mainly used instead of victim testimony. Contemporaries shared the perspective that transitional justice, both international and national procedures should channel revenge by the victims and their families into the more peaceful venues of courts and legal procedures. Since then, victims have gained an ever more important role in transitional, post-conflict and international criminal justice. Non-judicial tribunals, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and international criminal courts and tribunals are relying on the testimony of victims and thus provide a prominent role for victims who often take centre stage in such procedures and trials. International criminal law and the human rights regime have provided victims with several routes to make themselves heard and fight against impunity. This paper tracks the road from absence to presence, and from invisibility to the visibility of victims during the second half of the last and the beginning of the present century. It shows in which ways their presence has shaped and changed transitional and international justice, and in particular how their absence or presence is linked to amnesties.