The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

Rethinking the external dimension of the European Energy Policy. OSW Report, January 2011

The external dimension of the EU Energy Policy, the question about the challenges regarding the effectiveness of the actions in this field and the search for innovative solutions are now one of the key-issues being raised during European energy policy discussions. The European Commission brought up the issue in the "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy" and questions about the most important directions, goals and tools of the external energy policy are the subject of public consultations announced in December 2010 by DG Energy (the final effect of the consultation and the EC’s work in this field is to be published by in 2011). The external dimension of the EU’s energy policy is also set to be one of the priorities of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2011.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

The Services Dimension of TTIP. Paper No. 6 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ and CEPS Special Report No. 106, 8 May 2015

This CEPS Special Report examines the main facets of the debate about TTIP and services. First, it looks at the political and economic context and the various alternatives in terms of political support, stressing that only a partnership that ensures substantial economic gains will attract the support of the top policy-makers. Second, the paper makes the point that large economic gains in services require deep discussions on regulatory issues, and third, such discussions cannot rely on the negotiating techniques normally used for goods. There is thus a need to adopt a new approach, based on the mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations enforced in the services concerned, preceded by a mutual evaluation to grant such equivalence – all measures to be carried out by the regulatory bodies concerned, not by trade negotiators. This new game is a complex one but it has huge side benefits: it induces each TTIP partner to review the quality of their own regulations; it is at ease with the notion of a ‘living’ (evolving) agreement; and it can easily be open to third countries. All these benefits should reassure a general public that is fearful of a hastily baked deal.

Iranian-Saudi tensions: the energy dimension. EPC Policy Brief, 9 February 2016

Following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr, the deep rooted rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia entered a new phase in January 2016. While the main objective for both countries still is regional hegemony, the Iranian-Saudi competition takes many different forms and shapes, and also extends into the field of energy. In this Policy Brief, David Ramin Jalilvand gives a detailed analysis of the energy-related aspects of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and its possible consequences for Europe’s energy market; both countries hold giant hydrocarbon reserves, so European energy will probably be affected by their competition in several regards; increased oil supplies will be available for the European market, while the cycle of low oil prices will be prolonged. According to Jalilvand, this is a mixed blessing; Europe’s energy import bill will be reduced, but its indigenous production will suffer, while Russia’s role in European natural gas will only continue to grow.

Particel size distribution and microstructures of sediments from ODP Leg 205 sites (Table 1)

Ocean Drilling Program Legs 170 and 205 offshore Costa Rica provide structural observations which support a new model for the geometry and deformation response to the seismic cycle of the frontal sedimentary prism and decollement. The model is based on drillcore, thin section, and electron microscope observations. The decollement damage zone is a few tens of meters in width, it develops mainly within the frontal prism. A clear cm-thick fault core is observed 1.6 km from the trench. The lower boundary of the fault core is coincident with the lithological boundary between the frontal prism and the hemipelagic and pelagic sediment of the Cocos plate. Breccia clast distributions in the upper portion of the decollement damage zone were studied through fractal analysis. This analysis shows that the fractal dimension changes with brecciated fragment size, implying that deformation was not accommodated by self-similar fracturing. A higher fractal dimensionality correlates with smaller particle size, which indicates that different or additional grain-size reduction processes operated during shearing. The co-existence of two distinct fracturing processes is also confirmed by microscopic analysis in which extension fracturing in the upper part of the damage zone farthest from the fault core is frequent, while both extension and shear fracturing occur approaching the fault core. The coexistence of extensional and shear fracturing seems to be best explained by fluid pressure variations in response to variations of the compressional regime during the seismic cycle. During the co-seismic event, sub-horizontal compression and fluid pressure increase, triggering shear fracturing and fluid expulsion. Fractures migrate upward with fluids, contributing to the asymmetric shape of the decollement, while slip propagates. In the inter-seismic interval the frontal prismrelaxes and fluid pressure drops. The frontal prismgoes into diffuse extension during the intervalwhen plate convergence is accommodated by creep along the ductile fault core. The fault core is typically a barrier to deformation, which is explained by its weak, but impermeable, nature. The localized development of a damage zone beneath the fault core is characterized by shear fracturing that appears as the result of local strengthening of the detachment.