The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Mutations of the myeloid transcription factor CEBPA are not associated with the blast crisis of chronic myeloid leukaemia

The transcription factor CEBPA is crucial for normal myeloid differentiation. CEBPA gene mutations have been reported in patients with acute myeloid leukaemia. The inevitable evolution of chronic myeloid leukaemia (CML) in chronic phase (CP) to a fatal blast crisis (BC) is assumed to result from the acquisition of additional genetic changes in the leukaemic clone. Gain of CEBPA mutations might represent a key event causing the differentiation block observed in myeloid CML-BC, but not in CML-CP. Here, no CEBPA mutation in 95 CML-BC patients was found, suggesting a limited role, if any, of CEBPA mutations in this disorder.

The Effect of the Asian Financial Crisis on the Performance of Korean Nationwide Banks

The Asian financial crisis spread its effect quickly across a number of countries. Korea faced serious problems in her financial and corporate sectors. This paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The performance of Korean nationwide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Among other standard findings, equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. The Asian crisis did not affect the normal rules of good bank management. The government, however, directly intervened in the banking sector on a large scale to limit the scope of the crisis in the Korean economy.

Malaboch or notes from my diary on the Boer Campaign of 1894 against the Chief Malaboch of Blaauwberg, district Zoutpansberg which is app. a synopsis of the Johannesburg crisis of 1896

by Colin Rae

The role of ATM in the cell cycle control of V(D)J recombination

Lymphocyte development requires the assembly of diversified antigen receptor complexes generated by the genetically programmed V(D)J recombination event. Because germline DNA is cut, introducing potentially dangerous double-stranded breaks (DSBs) and rearranged prior to repair, its activity is limited to the non-cycling stages of the cell cycle, G0/G1. The potential involvement of a key mediator, Ataxia Telangiectasia Mutated or ATM, in the DNA damage response (DDR) and cell cycle checkpoints has been implicated in recombination, but its role is not fully understood. Thymic lymphomas from ATM deficient mice contain clonal chromosomal translocations involving the T-cell antigen receptor (TCR). A previous report found ATM and its downstream target p53 associated with V(D)J intermediates, suggesting the DDR senses recombination. In this study, we sought to understand the role of ATM in V(D)J recombination. Developing thymocytes from ATM deficient mice were analyzed according to the cell cycle to detect V(D)J intermediates. Examination of all TCR loci in the non-cycling (G0/G1) and cycling (S/G2/M) fractions revealed the persistence of intermediates in ATM deficient thymocytes, contrary to the wild-type in which intermediates are found only during G0/G1. Further analysis found no defect in end-joining of intermediates, nor were they detected in developed T-cells. Based upon the presence of persisting intermediates, the recombination initiating nuclease Rag-2 was examined; strict regulation limits it to G 0/G1. Rag-2 regulation was not affected by an ATM deficiency as Rag-2 expression remained contained within G0/G 1, indicating recombination is not continuous. To determine if an ATM deficiency affects recognition of V(D)J breaks, sites of recombination identified by a TCR locus or Rag expression were analyzed according to co-localization with a DDR factor phosphorylated immediately after DNA damage, phosphorylated H2AX (γH2AX). No differences in co-localization were found between the wild-type and ATM deficiency, demonstrating ATM deficient lymphocytes retain the ability to recognize DSBs. Together, these results suggest ATM is necessary in the cell cycle regulation of recombination but not essential for the identification of V(D)J breaks. ATM ensures the containment of intermediates within G0/G1 and maintains genomic stability of developing lymphocytes, emphasizing its fundamental role in preventing tumorigenesis.^