Ignacy Koschembahr-Łyskowski: profesor Uniwersytetu Fryburskiego (1895-1900)

Ignacy Koschembahr-Łyskowski: a professor at the University of Fribourg (1895-1900) Ignacy Koschembahr-Łyskowski (1864-1945) was a Polish legal scholar researching into Roman and Private laws; one of the drafters of Polish unified Private Law in the Interwar era. After having obtained his PhD in Berlin in 1888 and postdoctoral degree in Breslau in 1894, he moved to Fribourg (Switzerland), where he stayed 5 years (1895-1900) as a professor for Roman law. Koschembahr-Łyskowski wrote there his fundamental works on the methodology of Roman law (1898) and its usefulness for modernity, as well as about the codification of Swiss Private Law (1899), demonstrating the usefulness of the Roman law experience for modern legislation. An overview of his works shows a surprising topicality of his ideas. The survey concentrates on his teaching in Fribourg as well as his writings, and is based on many newly discovered documents from the local archives, that have never been published before.

Una profesión insólita y lucrativa : la captatio testamenti

El presente trabajo se propone: 1. Determinar las distintas formas de testar que adoptó el derecho romano, a lo largo de su evolución histórica. 2. Caracterizar la captatio testamenti, una profesión insólita y lucrativa cuya existencia se constata ya en la Roma republicana, a través del testimonio de Plauto en el Miles gloriosus y que se difundió notablemente durante los primeros siglos del Imperio, en los que se convirtió en un medio de progreso social. 3. Analizar esta actividad desde diferentes perspectivas de acuerdo con los tipos humanos que participan en ella: los captatores testamentorum o heredipetae y los testatores. El corpus trabajado abarca a Plauto (Miles gloriosus), Horacio (Sátira 2,5), Séneca (De beneficiis y Epist. 95), Marcial (Epigramas), Petronio (Satiricón), Juvenal (Sátira 12), Plinio el Viejo (Hist. Natural), Plinio el Joven (Epist. 2, 20).

A individualização da medida cautelar pessoal no processo penal brasileiro

O sistema de medidas cautelares pessoais no processo penal brasileiro não mais gravita em torno da prisão preventiva, uma vez que o legislador instituiu um rol de medidas cautelares menos gravosas, a ela alternativas. Nesse contexto, como deve orientar-se a escolha judicial da medida a ser aplicada ao caso concreto? A constitucional idade de qualquer intervenção no direito fundamental de liberdade depende, essencialmente, de sua fundamentação constitucional, que é controlada a partir da proporcionalidade. A proporcional idade, portanto, é a pedra angular do sistema de medidas cautelares pessoais. A decisão que impõe uma medida cautelar pessoal jamais pode resultar de uma intuição individual misteriosa, senão de um procedimento cognoscitivo estruturado e comprovável de maneira intersubjetiva. Daí a importância da investigação da existência de um direito fundamental do imputado à individualização da medida cautelar pessoal, para afastar qualquer discricionariedade judicial na sua escolha. O objetivo do presente trabalho, portanto, é propor um método racional, baseado no exame da proporcionalidade, para controle intersubjetivo da justificação da decisão judicial que, no processo penal, imponha uma medida cautelar pessoal.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Finding Onesimus: Recovering the Story of a First-Century Fugitive Slave

Author: Ryan Lokkesmoe Title: Finding Onesimus: Recovering the Story of a First-Century Fugitive Slave Advisor: Pamela Eisenbaum Degree Date: August 2015 ABSTRACT This dissertation is an investigation into the experience of a first-century fugitive slave named Onesimus, who is known to us primarily through Paul’s letter to Philemon (Phlm) in the New Testament. Within this broader purpose, this project challenges a popular historical theory for Onesimus’ flight, the so-called Amicus Domini theory. This is the theory that Onesimus fled his master Philemon with the premeditated intention of seeking out the Apostle Paul as a peacemaker in a conflict Onesimus was having with Philemon. The Amicus Domini theory is accepted by many scholars, though rarely discussed in detail or examined critically. The goal of this project is to offer a more probable historical reconstruction of Onesimus’ flight – one that takes better stock of the available evidence (historical, textual, archaeological, legal, and rhetorical). This project is rooted in the sub-discipline of the Historical Critical method, though rhetorical analysis is applied as well. This study offers a translation and commentary of Phlm, as well as an examination of Paul’s rhetoric in the letter. Other sources that specifically mention Onesimus are also investigated, e.g. Colossians, ancient Christian commentators, and the subscriptions in the manuscripts. The project also examines slavery in the Ancient Mediterranean world with a view toward understanding what most slaves experienced, and especially fugitive slaves. Roman law of slavery is also discussed, as well as the estimated travel times and cost of Onesimus’ journey (whether from Colossae to Rome, Caesarea Maritima, or Ephesus). There are many factors that are problematic for the Amicus Domini theory, e.g. the duration of Onesimus’ journey, the financial cost to Philemon, and the fact that the documents typically used to support the Amicus Domini theory (Pliny’s letters to Sabinianus and the writings of Roman jurists) do not comport with the data in Phlm. This dissertation offers a modified theory for Onesimus’ predicament: Amicus Domini Ex Post Facto. Onesimus did not leave Philemon intending to seek out Paul and reconcile with Philemon, but he eventually decided to seek help long after the fact. This historical reconstruction makes better sense of the evidence, and provides a clearer view of what Onesimus faced during his flight.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Nuevas aportaciones a la expulsión de los jesuitas. La Pesquisa reservada de Córdoba

El Consejo Extraordinario de Castilla motivó la expulsión de los Jesuitas conforme al auto del fiscal Campomanes. La conspiración basada en la divulgación de panfletos y otra serie de pasquines fue utilizada como prueba para instruir un proceso criminal, no exento de aspectos controvertidos. La Pesquisa secreta realizada en Córdoba fue parte de la documentación conservada en distintos archivos sobre el proceso previo a la expulsión. Este trabajo es una nueva aproximación al procedimiento criminal seguido contra los miembros de la Compañía de Jesús en Córdoba, y a las averiguaciones realizadas en relación con las normas del derecho procesal de la época.

Instrucciones a los jueces de paz y municipales /

"Instrucciones dirigidas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a los jueces de paz y jueces municipales para unificar los procedimientos y práctica de las primeras diligencias en materia criminal."

Revision of titles 18 and 28 of the United States code. : Hearings, E, Eightieth Congress, first session, on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055.

Hearing held Mar. 7, 1947.

Training guide for hate crime data collection : Uniform Crime Reporting.

Shipping list no.: 2004-0278-P.

The criminalization of domestic violence : promises and limits /

"January 1996."

Discours de M. Berthelot prononcée à la Chambre d'assemblée lors de la seconde lecture du bill de M. Vallières pour la publicité de l'hypothèque.

"Extraite [sic] de la Gazette de Québec."

Theophili paraphrasis Justiniani Institutionum : secundum versionem latinam /

Mode of access: Internet.

Improving the administration of justice by authorizing the Judicial Conference of the United States to establish institutes and joint councils on sentencing, to provide additional methods of sentencing ... : report [to accompany H.J. Res. 424]

Submitted by Mr. Willis, and ordered to be printed, June 23, 1958.

Les lois religieuses des empereurs romains de Constantin à Théodose II (312-438).

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.