Corporate governance and finance in Poland and Russia

This book provides a comparative analysis of the emerging corporate control structures in the transition economies. It details characteristics of corporate governance in the two largest transition economies: Russia and Poland. It explores what kind of ownership structures are emerging in these two countries and to what degree they are they path-dependent and conditional on the initial choice of privatisation methods - fast ownership transfer through the mass privatisation programme and loans-for-equity scheme in Russia, and a more 'organic' growth of the new private sector in Poland. It examines the directions of the subsequent, post-privatisation, secondary ownership flows in both countries and the impact of the government on corporations, implied both by the residual shareholding of the state and by its regulatory and administrative actions.

Corporate governance, managers' independence, exporting and performance of firms in transition economies

Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary this paper employs Bayesian structural equation modeling to examine interrelationships between corporate governance, managers' independence from owners in terms of strategic decision-making, exporting and performance. It is found that managers' independence is positively associated with firms' financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of managers' independence is contingent on the firm's corporate governance parameters: it is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm's board. We interpret these results as an indication that (i) risk averse, concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm's internationalization and performance, (ii) board participation of foreign stakeholders, on the other hand, enhances the firm's export orientation and performance by encouraging executives' decision-making autonomy.

Executive remuneration, financial performance and corporate governance in UK and Spanish listed firms

This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

Corporate governance and accounting conservatism:evidence from the banking industry

Research Question/Issue: In this paper, we empirically investigate whether US listed commercial banks with effective corporate governance structures engage in higher levels of conservative financial accounting and reporting. Research Findings/Insights: Using both market- and accrual-based measures of conservatism and both composite and disaggregated governance indices, we document convincing evidence that well-governed banks engage in significantly higher levels of conditional conservatism in their financial reporting practices. For example, we find that banks with effective governance structures, particularly those with effective board and audit governance structures, recognize loan loss provisions that are larger relative to changes in nonperforming loans compared to their counterparts with ineffective governance structures. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the extant literature on the relationship between corporate governance and quality of accounting information by providing evidence that banks with effective governance structures practice higher levels of accounting conservatism. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings of this study would be useful to US bank regulators/supervisors in improving the existing regulatory framework by focusing on accounting conservatism as a complement to corporate governance in mitigating the opaqueness and intense information asymmetry that plague banks.

Corporate governance and the central factors influencing the roles of public and private sector board directors in the United Kingdom

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Corporate governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. listed companies

This study is an examination of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The research examines the significance of several corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics as potential determinants of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. Our primary analysis provides evidence of a significant association between timely corporate internet reporting and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board independence. Our findings provide evidence that boards with less cross directorships, more experience in terms of the average age of directors, and lower length in service for executive directors provide more timely corporate internet reporting. We find that board independence is negatively associated with timely corporate internet reporting. Follow-up analysis provides additional evidence of a significant association between the timeliness of corporate internet reporting and board experience. The evidence indicates that role duality and block ownership are associated with less timely corporate internet reporting. Our findings also reveal strengths and weaknesses in the Internet reporting of U.K. listed companies. Companies need to voluntarily focus on improving the timeliness dimension of their corporate internet reporting so that the EU and U.K. accounting regulators do not replace recommendations with regulations. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Empirical studies of corporate governance in China

The thesis aims to provide empirical studies towards Chinese corporate governance. Since China initially established its stock exchange system in the 1990s, it has gone through different stages of changes to become a more market-oriented system. Extensive studies have been conducted in Chinese corporate governance, however, many were theoretical discussion focusing on the early stages and there‘s a general lack of empirical analysis. This paper provides three empirical analysis of the Chinese corporate governance: the overall market discipline efficiency, the impact of capital structure on agency costs, the status of 2005- 2006 reform that substantially modified ownership structure of Chinese listed firms and separated ownership and control of listed firms. The three empirical studies were selected to reflect four key issues that need answering: the first empirical study, using event study to detect market discipline on a collective level. This study filled a gap in the Chinese stock market literature for being the first one ever using cross-market data to test market discipline. The second empirical study endeavoured to contribute to the existing corporate governance literature regarding capital structure and agency costs. Two conclusions can be made through this study: 1) for Chinese listed firms, higher gearing means higher asset turnover ratios and ROE, i.e. more debts seem to reduce agency costs; 2) concentration level of shares appears to be irrelevant with company performance, controlling shareholders didn‘t seem to commit to the improvement of corporate assets utilization or contribute to reducing agency costs. This study addressed a key issue in Chinese corporate governance since the state has significant shareholding in most big listed companies. The discussion of corporate governance in the Chinese context would be completely meaningless without discussing the state‘s role in corporate governance, given that about 2/3 of the almost all shares were non-circulating shares controlled by the state before the 2005-2006 overhaul ownership reform. The third study focused on the 2005-2006 reform of ownership of Chinese listed firms. By collecting large-scale data covering all 64 groups of Chinese listed companies went through the reform by the end of 2006 (accounting for about 97.86% and 96.76% of the total market value of Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) respectively), a comprehensive study about the ownership reform was conducted. This would be first and most comprehensive empirical study in this area. The study of separated ownership and control of listed firm is the first study conducted using the ultimate ownership concept in Chinese context.

Related party transactions, corporate governance and accounting quality in Greece

Related Party Transactions (RPTs) have been considered recently in research as a phenomenon which is associated with several financial scandals, shareholder’s wealth expropriation and is used for earnings management (EM) purposes by the reporting entity. This study aimed to: (i) assess the extent of EM and RPTs i Greece; (ii) investigate the association between RPTs and EM; (iii) investigate the association between corporate governance and EM; (iv) investigate the association between corporate governance and RPTs; and (v) investigate the impact of RPTs on Accounting Quality. Greece was selected for this study as it provides a special context due to poor investor protection, high levels of EM and unhealthy financial reporting environment where wealth extraction and EM are more likely. This study examines the relationship between earnings management and RPTs for the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Moreover, it examines the association between earnings management and corporate governance activities. The results show a negative and significant relationship between EM and RPTs. This finding does not support the conclusion that RPTs are necessarily conducted to mask fraud or the extraction of firm resources. The results show that firms audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms are associated with less EM. Additionally, the study investigates the relationship between RPTs and accounting quality. The findings show that that there is no significant difference in accounting quality between RPTs firms and non-RPTs firms. This study contributes to the EM, accounting quality and corporate governance literatures. This research suggests recommendations for researchers, data providers and policy makers on ways to reduce the problems associated with RPTs.

Rotating the boards:corporate governance

Can companies resolve groupthink issues and improve their performance by turning over their boards more often, ask Mark Rogers and Amir Satvat.

International risk management:systems, internal control and corporate governance

This book is very practical in its international usefulness (because current risk practice and understanding is not equal across international boundaries). For example, an accountant in Belgium would want to know what the governance regulations are in that country and what the risk issues are that he/she needs to be aware of. This book covers the international aspect of risk management systems, risk and governance, and risk and accounting. In doing so the book covers topics such as: internal control and corporate governance; risk management systems; integrating risk into performance management systems; risk and audit; governance structures; risk management of pensions; pension scheme risks e.g. hedging derivatives, longevity bonds etc; risk reporting; and the role of the accountant in risk management. There are the case studies through out the book which illustrate by way of concrete practical examples the major themes contained in the book. The book includes highly topical areas such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act and pension risk management.