On boundary value problems for Willmore surfaces and Hartree-Fock theory of pseudo-relativistic atoms

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, kumulative Habil.-Schr., 2011

Robust learning in safety-related domains : machine learning methods for solving safety-related application problems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2009

Optimization-based solutions to constrained trajectory-tracking and path-following problems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2012

Algorithmic assistance to the optimization process in vehicle routing problems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2013

City Outdoor Lighting System Control. Problems and Prospects

This review describes current problems, trends and prospects of the quasi-automatic light control system. The lighting systems of million cities.

Befristete Arbeitsverträge : Ein praxisorientierter Leitfaden

This master thesis explains fixed-term contracts in practice. To illustrate this point, examples are provided for better understanding. It will be discussed at both the fixed-term with an objective reason and without objective reason. The second variant is also called moderate Expiration Calendar. Not only the benefits and advantages for the employer are enumerated, but also the special challenges and problems that may arise. Particularly with regard to the prohibition of previous employment.This thesis presents the interests fo employers and companies. The central research question is: What are the possibilities of limitation and there is the prohibition of previous employment unconstitutional? A special attention is given to the contractual formulation examples of limited contracts. It deals exclusively with applicable German and European law. A comparison with previous case-law does not take place in this master thesis.

A Lance didelphid molar, with comments on the problems of the Lance therians / William D. Turnbull --

v.10:no.36(1960)

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.