To breathe or fight? Siamese fighting fish differ when facing a real opponent or mirror image

Displays are a feature of animal contest behaviour and have been interpreted as a means of gathering information on opponent fighting ability, as well as signalling aggressive motivation. In fish, contest displays often include frontal and lateral elements, which in the latter involves contestants showing their flanks to an opponent. Previous work in a range of fish species has demonstrated population-level lateralization of these displays, preferentially showing one side to their opponent. Mirrors are commonly used in place of a real opponent to study aggression in fish, yet they may disrupt the normal pattern of display behaviour. Here, using Siamese fighting fish, Betta splendens, we compare the aggressive behaviour of males to a mirror image and real opponent behind a transparent barrier. As this species is a facultative air-breather, we also quantify surface breathing, providing insights into underlying fight motivation. Consistent with previous work, we found evidence of population-level lateralization, with a bias to present the left side and use the left eye when facing a real opponent. Contrary to expectations, there were no differences in the aggressive displays to a mirror and real opponent, with positive correlations between the behaviour in the two scenarios. However, there were important differences in surface breathing, which was more frequent and of longer duration in the mirror treatment. The reasons for these differences are discussed in relation to the repertoire of contest behaviour and motivation when facing a real opponent.

The Impact of Global English in Xinjiang, China: Linguistic Capital and Identity Negotiation among the Ethnic Minority and Han Chinese Students

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-08

Standard Essential Patent in Telecommunication Standard: United States and China Comparison

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-08

Competition-related factors directly influence preferences for facial cues of dominance in allies

Alliance formation is a critical dimension of social intelligence in political, social and biological systems. As some allies may provide greater ‘leverage’ than others during social conflict, the cognitive architecture that supports alliance formation in humans may be shaped by recent experience, for example in light of the outcomes of violent or non-violent forms intrasexual competition. Here we used experimental priming techniques to explore this issue. Consistent with our predictions, while men’s preference for dominant allies strengthened following losses (compared to victories) in violent intrasexual contests, women’s preferences for dominant allies weakened following losses (compared to victories) in violent intrasexual contests. Our findings suggest that while men may prefer dominant (i.e. masculine) allies following losses in violent confrontation in order to facilitate successful resource competition, women may ‘tend and befriend’ following this scenario and seek support from prosocial (i.e. feminine) allies and/or avoid the potential costs of dominant allies as long-term social partners. Moreover, they demonstrate facultative responses to signals related to dominance in allies, which may shape sex differences in sociality in light of recent experience and suggest that intrasexual selection has shaped social intelligence in humans.

Keeping the Germans out of the straits: The five ottoman dreadnought thesis reconsidered

This article contests Sean McMeekin’s claims concerning Russian culpability for the First World War. McMeekin maintains that Ottoman rearmament, particularly the purchase of several battleships released onto the global arms market by South American states, threatened to create a situation where the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be outclassed by its Ottoman opposite number. Rather than waiting for this to happen, the tsarist regime chose to go to war. Yet, contrary to McMeekin’s claims, the Ottoman naval expansion never assumed threatening dimensions because the Porte was unable to purchase battleships from Chile or Argentina. As a result, it provided no incentive for Russia to go to war in 1914.