847 resultados para Common Law
Resumo:
The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.
Resumo:
This paper examines charity regulatory systems, including accounting standard setting, across five jurisdictions in varying stages of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, and identifies the challenges of this process. Design/methodology/approach Using a regulatory space approach, we rely on publicly available archival evidence from charity regulators and accounting standard setters in five common-law jurisdictions in advanced capitalist economies, all with vibrant charity sectors: United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Findings The study reveals the importance of co-operative interdependence and dialogue between charity regulators and accounting standard setters, indicating that jurisdictions with such inter-relationships will better manage the transition to IFRS. It also highlights the need for those jurisdictions with not-for-profit or charity-specific accounting standards to reconfigure those provisions as IFRSs are adopted. Research limitations/implications The study is limited to five jurisdictions, concentrating specifically on key charity regulators and accounting standard setters. Future research could widen the scope to other jurisdictions, or track changes in the jurisdictions longitudinally. Practical implications We provide a timely international perspective of charity regulation and accounting developments for regulators, accounting standard setters and charities, specifically of regulatory responses to IFRS adoption. Originality/value: The paper contributes fresh insights into the dynamics of charity accounting regulation in an international context by using regulatory space as an organising framework. While accounting regulation literature provides a rich interpretation of regulatory issues within the accounting arena, little attention has been paid to charity accounting regulation.
Resumo:
More than 10 years have passed since the High Court of Australia confirmed the recoverability of damages for the cost of raising a child, in the well-known decision in Cattanach v Melchior. Yet a number of aspects of the assessment of such “wrongful birth” damages had not been the subject of a comprehensive court ruling. The recent decision in Waller v James was widely anticipated as potentially providing a comprehensive discussion of the principles relevant to the assessment of damages in wrongful birth cases. However, given a finding on causation adverse to the plaintiffs, the trial judge held that it was unnecessary to determine the quantum of damages. Justice Hislop did, however, make some comments in relation to the assessment of damages. This article focuses mostly on the argued damages issues relating to the costs of raising the child and the trial judge’s comments regarding the same. The Waller v James claim was issued before the enactment of the Health Care Liability Act 2001 (NSW) and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Although the case was therefore decided according to the “common law”, as explained below, his Honour’s comments may be of relevance to more recent claims governed by the civil liability legislation in New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia.
Resumo:
Both at common law and under the various civil liability acts, in deciding liability for breach of duty, the plaintiff always bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation. For plaintiffs in medical negligence claims founded on negligent failure to provide sufficient information (informed consent cases), this onus involves persuading the court to make a favourable determination as to what a particular patient would have done (from a subjective perspective) in the hypothetical situation of the defendant not being negligent (that is, in the event that the medical practitioner had provided sufficient information to the patient)
Resumo:
The recent decision of Waller v James involved a claim by the plaintiff parents for damages for wrongful birth against the defendant doctor, Dr James, a gynaecologist with a practice in infertility and IVF procedures, who had been consulted by the plaintiffs. The second plaintiff, Mr Waller suffered an inherited anti-thrombin deficiency (ATD), a condition which results in a propensity for the blood to clot, at least in adults. Dr James subsequently recommended IVF treatment. The first plaintiff, Mrs Waller became pregnant after the first cycle of IVF treatment. Her son Keeden was born on 10 August 2000 with a genetic anti-thrombin deficiency. Keeden was released from hospital on 14 August 2000. However, he was brought back to the hospital the next day with cerebral thrombosis (CSVT). As a result of the thrombosis, he suffered permanent brain damage, cerebral palsy and related disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was in breach of contract and his common law duty of care to the plaintiffs in failing to inform them, or cause them to be informed, of the hereditary aspects of ATD. They further alleged that, had they been properly informed, they would not have proceeded to conceive a child using the male plaintiff’s sperm and therefore avoided the harm that had befallen them. The plaintiffs claimed damages to compensate them for their losses, including psychiatric and physical injuries and the costs of having, raising and caring for Keeden. The defendant was held to be not liable in negligence by Justice Hislop of the Supreme Court of New South Wales because a finding was made on medical causation which was adverse to the plaintiffs claim.
Resumo:
This thesis commences with the proposition that the first limb of the doctrine of privity causes injustice to third party beneficiaries in Malaysia, particularly in commercial contracts. The doctrine of privity has been the subject of criticism by the judiciary and academic commentators in common law jurisdictions, mainly directed at the first limb of the doctrine, whereby only parties to a contract can sue and be sued. The first limb prevents a third party from enforcing benefits conferred on them by those contracts thereby resulting in third parties suffering loss and injustice to those parties. In several common law countries, such as England, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, legislative reform of the doctrine has occurred. The legislative reform has abrogated to a significant extent the doctrine of privity in commercial contracts. Malaysia is a common law country, where the doctrine of privity is still applied to contracts. An analysis of Malaysian case law demonstrates that the most affected third party beneficiaries are those seeking to enforce insurance and construction contracts. While a small number of other third parties to commercial contracts, such as agreements to pay for work done, sale and purchase agreements and tenancy agreements are also affected, the detriment is not as significant. As a consequence, this thesis focuses primarily on the impact of the doctrine of privity on commercial contracts in the areas of insurance and construction in Malaysia The thesis aims to recommend appropriate reforms to address the injustices arising from the privity doctrine for third parties seeking to obtain the benefit of insurance and construction contracts, which may also benefit third parties to other types of commercial contracts. While the Malaysian insurance, consumer protection, negotiable instruments and agency laws allow third party beneficiaries to enforce benefits in contracts, the rights are found to be inadequate. As not all third parties seeking to enforce an insurance or construction contract can rely upon the legislation, the injustice arising from the doctrine of privity remains and needs to be addressed. To achieve this aim, a comparative analysis of the rights of third party beneficiaries under insurance and construction contracts in Malaysia, Australia and England is undertaken. The results of the analysis are used to identify appropriate elements for a legislative framework guided by the three essential criteria for effective law reform developed in the thesis. The three criteria are certainty, public interest and justice. The thesis recommends first the enactment of general legislation applicable to all commercial contracts including insurance contracts. Secondly, the thesis recommends specific targeted legislation to address the injustice faced by third party beneficiaries in construction contracts.
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This article examines the importance of the social evidence base in relation to the development of the law. It argues that there is a need for those lawyers who play a part in law reform (legislators and those involved in the law reform process) and for those who play a part in formulating policy-based common law rules (judges and practitioners) to know more about how facts are established in the social sciences. It argues that lawyers need sufficient knowledge and skills in order to be able to critically assess the facts and evidence base when examining new legislation and also when preparing, arguing and determining the outcomes of legal disputes. For this reason the article argues that lawyers need enhanced training in empirical methodologies in order to function effectively in modern legal contexts.
Resumo:
Under Australian law, a tenant complaining of nuisance caused by another tenant traditionally had no recourse to the lessor unless the lessor actively participated in the nuisance. A recent Queensland Court of Appeal decision, Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd, has found that a lessor who fails to take steps to control a tenant's nuisance may be liable to other tenants for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. This paper considers the recent decision in light of common law developments in Australia, England and the United States, including the American concept of constructive eviction.
Resumo:
The Promise of Law Reform the most comprehensive examination of the institutions and processes of law reform published in the common law world and provides a rich source of information, inspiration and ideas. It is an edited collection of 30 essays published to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Australian Law Reform Commission. The authors - law reform commissioners, judges, academics, politicians, government officials, and journalists - reflect the plurality of law reform styles and structures, within Australia and overseas. They cover the broad themes of the history, purpose and function of law reform; institutional design of law reform agencies; methodology and operations; how successful law reform should be assessed and judged; cooperation and mutual assistance; other law reform initiatives; and law reform in action.
Resumo:
INTRODUCTION CASES For a number of years, Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Frances Hannah and Anne Overell have compiled one to two page summaries of cases involving nonprofit organisations and published them on The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Developing Your Organisation (DYO) website.1 You can be alerted of new case summaries as they are posted to the DYO website by subscribing to the ACPNS RSS feed or the ACPNS twitter service.2 There were some very significant cases during 2013, such as Commissioner of Taxation v Cancer & Bowel Research Association (see case notes 2.8.2 and 2.8.11), The Hunger Project case which is under appeal, but could change the face of PBI jurisprudence (see case note 2.8.7) while Home Health Pty Ltd retained the PBI status quo but might have been different if appealed (see case note 2.8.8). For sheer interest there is nothing better in my 30 odd years of reading tax and charity judgements than case involving The Study and Prevention of Psychological Diseases Foundation Incorporated (see case note 2.1.1). It even rivals some of the more bizarre cases from the US jurisdiction of which St Joseph Abbey v Castille (case note 2.10.9) is certainly ‘dead centre’. A set of cases which stand out for attention are those involving New Zealand’s Christchurch Cathedral which anyone with responsibility for heritage-listed buildings should study carefully, for implications in relation to their own circumstances. A number of cases summarised in this Almanac are working their way through the appeals process and care should be taken with their application. In addition, some of the cases are from jurisdictions outside Australia, and readers should exercise caution when considering the implications of these cases for Australian law. LEGISLATION The Almanac includes a review of major statutory amendments during 2013, which are relevant to the nonprofit sector in all Australian jurisdictions. Special thanks must go to Nathan MacDonald and the JusticeConnect team for providing legislative updates for Victoria. SPECIAL ISSUES DURING 2013 A number of legal practitioners have contributed articles on significant legal issues facing nonprofit organisations: charitable trusts giving to government entities (Alice Macdougall); workplace bullying (Tim Longwill); and privacy (James Tan and Nina Brewer). WORLD ROUND-UP Major developments from the UK and Ireland (Kerry O’Halloran), Canada (Peter Broder), New Zealand (Michael Gousmett and Susan Barker) and Jamaica (Frances Hannah) are all summarised in a review of a significant part of the common law charity jurisdictions. WHAT DOES 2014 HOLD The final section moves from looking in the rear view mirror to peering out the front windscreen to discern the reform agenda. The view from the windscreen in 2013 was of considerable reform traffic at the Commonwealth level jostling for a place in the parliamentary agenda. This year is quite different with a smaller number of vehicles ahead, but the potential for significant impact.
Resumo:
In Carroll v Coomber [2006] QDC 146 the plainliff was injured in a motor vehicle accident on September 7, 2003. Liability was admitted and it remained to assess the plaintiff's damages. In light of the date of the accident, the damages were to be assessed under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (the act) and the Civil Liability Regulations.
Resumo:
The article revises established principles relating to the awarding of damages to the date of judgment and discusses decisions in the High Court and in the Supreme Court of Queensland which have caused significant changes to the manner of assessments of interest. Its purpose is to provide for practitioners involved in personal injuries litigation in Queensland a current set of guidelines as to the manner in which the wide discretion to award interest may be expected to be exercised.
Resumo:
The article provides an overview of the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Workcover Queensland Act 1996 (Access to damages), and of the matters which, consequent on these provisions, practitioners must evaluate when advising an injured worker contemplating the commencement of a common law action for damages.
Resumo:
Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.
Resumo:
When, in 1977, the Australian electorate provided a double majority to effect a change of section 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution requiring judges of the High Court of Australia to retire at the age of 70 years old, I doubt we understood the continuing capacity of these esteemed members of the judiciary. For the opportunity to sit and talk with Ian Callinan AC who, in compliance with that amendment, retired from the High Court in September 2007, I needed to wait until he returned from The Hague where he was sitting as a Judge ad hoc on the International Court of Justice. Although a native of Casino, New South Wales, Mr Callinan is regarded as a Queenslander. Indeed, he grew up in Brisbane, finished high school at Brisbane Grammar and graduated in law at The University of Queensland. Appointed in 1978 as a Queen’s Counsel, Mr Callinan enjoyed this period of his legal career and we discussed an aspect of the Christopher Skase case, which reinforced my belief that Mr Callinan is an incredibly skilful advocate. On 14 September 1998, ABC Four Corners broadcasted the views of some prominent Australians on the appointment of Mr Callinan to the High Court. In assessing the type of person Mr Callinan is, Tony Morris QC said: “Ian Callinan isn't a coward”, while former Commonwealth Attorney-General, Michael Lavarch, said: “He was regarded as an absolutely outstanding criminal lawyer within the Queensland legal profession, I mean really a top-notch advocate”. I was not interested in raising any of the controversial issues that Mr Callinan has encountered as an advocate in high profile matters. I wanted to know how he felt about his time on the High Court, what his thoughts are on the operation of the High Court, the IP cases he decided, the real life issues that he feels impact on counsel who are appearing before the High Court and the people he regarded as role models. During our conversation, Mr Callinan laughed often and when he did his eyes lit up, revealing his passion for life. He is an incredibly genuine Australian who loved his time as a barrister, enjoyed his role on the High Court, enjoys his current job as mediator, loves writing novels, has a great desire for continual improvement in the quality of legal education and legal advocacy and sees a need for change in IP law. When I asked: “So, what might the future hold for you?”, he laughed and said: “Well, at my age I don’t have a long horizon time”. I said: “Just enjoy the journey?”, to which Mr Callinan responded: “Exactly”.