Cooperation after war: International development in Bosnia, 1995 to 1999

This paper discusses how predispositions, incentives, the number and heterogeneity of participants, and leadership (Faerman et al. 2001) jointly influenced the international effort to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina. International coalitions, task forces, and advisory groups are increasingly charged with implementing reforms following civil conflict. This requires a complex web of interorganizational relationships among NGOS, donors and host nations at both global and ‘ground’ levels. To better understand development assistance, attention must be paid to the relationships between these varied players. We find that four factors influenced relationships between policy, donor, and implementing organizations; and those strained relationships, in turn, affected development success. The paper draws on interviews, conducted in Bosnia, with 43 development professionals, observation of development meetings in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and review of related documents from international development programs.

"From Dartboards to Dashboards: The Imperative of using Data to Improve Student Achievement"

Aimee Guidera, Director of the National Data Quality Campaign, delivered the second annual Lee Gurel '48 Lecture in Education, "From Dartboards to Dashboards: The Imperative of Using Data to Improve Student Outcomes." Aimee Rogstad Guidera is the Founding Executive Director of the Data Quality Campaign. She manages a growing partnership among national organizations collaborating to improve the quality, accessibility and use of education data to improve student achievement. Working with 10 Founding Partners, Aimee launched the DQC in 2005 with the goal of every state having a robust longitudinal data system in place by 2009. The Campaign is now in the midst of its second phase focusing on State Actions to ensure effective data use. Aimee joined the National Center for Educational Accountability as Director of the Washington, DC office in 2003. During her eight previous years in various roles at the National Alliance of Business, Aimee supported the corporate community's efforts to increase achievement at all levels of learning. As NAB Vice President of Programs, she managed the Business Coalition Network, comprised of over 1,000 business led coalitions focused on improving education in communities across the country. Prior to joining the Alliance, Aimee focused on school readiness, academic standards, education goals and accountability systems while in the Center for Best Practices at the National Governors Association. She taught for the Japanese Ministry of Education in five Hiroshima high schools where she interviewed educators and studied the Japanese education system immediately after receiving her AB from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs. Aimee also holds a Masters Degree in Public Policy from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Firing Up the Crucible with Senator Lee Metcalf & Governor Forrest Anderson -- Judge Gordon Bennett in “The Crucible of Change”

During the lead-up to Montana second progressive era, Lee Metcalf and Forrest Anderson, along with others, kept the progressive flame lit in Montana. Metcalf’s political history is replete with close electoral wins because of his commitment to progressive ideals when the times were not always politically favorable for that. As State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice, Congressman and eventually as US Senator, Lee won races by as little as 55 votes because he stuck to his guns as a progressive. In Forrest Anderson’s career as a County Attorney, State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice and 12 years as MT Attorney General he was respected as a pragmatic practitioner of politics. But during that entire career leading up to his election as Governor, Forrest Anderson was also a stalwart supporter of the progressive agenda exemplified by FDR and the New Deal, which brought folks out of the Great Depression that was brought on by the bad policies of the GOP and big business. As MT’s second progressive period began in 1965, the first important election was Senator Metcalf’s successful re-election battle in 1966 with the sitting MT Governor, Tim Babcock. And the progressive express was really ignited by the election of Forrest Anderson as Governor in 1968 after 16 years of Republican Governors in MT. Gordon Bennett played a rather unique role, being a confidant of Metcalf and Anderson, both who respected his wide and varied experience, his intellect, and his roots in progressivism beginning with his formative years in the Red Corner of NE Montana. Working with Senator Metcalf and his team, including Brit Englund, Vic Reinemer, Peggy McLaughlin, Betty Davis and Jack Condon among others, Bennett helped shape the progressive message both in Washington DC and MT. Progressive labor and farm organizations, part of the progressive coalition, benefitted from Bennett’s advice and counsel and aided the Senator in his career including the huge challenge of having a sitting popular governor run against him for the Senate in 1966. Metcalf’s noted intern program produced a cadre of progressive leaders in Montana over the years. Most notably, Ron Richards transitioned from Metcalf Intern to Executive Secretary of the Montana Democratic Party (MDP) and assisted, along with Bennett, in the 1966 Metcalf-Babcock race in a big way. As Executive Secretary Richards was critical to the success of the MDP as a platform for Forrest Anderson’s general election run and win in 1968. After Forrest’s gubernatorial election, Richards became Executive Assistant (now called Chief of Staff) for Governor Anderson and also for Governor Thomas Judge. The Metcalf progressive strain, exemplified by many including Richards and Bennett, permeated Democratic politics during the second progressive era. So, too, did the coalition that supported Metcalf and his policies. The progressivism of the period of “In the Crucible of Change” was fired up by Lee Metcalf, Forrest Anderson and their supporters and coalitions, and Gordon Bennett was in the center of all of that, helping fire up the crucible, setting the stage for many policy advancements in both Washington DC and Montana. Gordon Bennett’s important role in the 1966 re-election of Senator Lee Metcalf and the 1968 election of Governor Forrest Anderson, as well as his wide experience in government and politics of that time allows him to provide us with an insider’s personal perspective of those races and other events at the beginning of the period of progressive change being documented “In the Crucible of Change,” as well as his personal insights into the larger political/policy picture of Montana. Gordon Bennett, a major and formative player “In the Crucible of Change,” was born in the far northeast town of Scobey, MT in 1922. He attended school in Scobey through the eighth grade and graduated from Helena High School. After attending Carroll College for two years, he received his BA in economics from Carleton College in Northfield, MN. During a brief stint on the east coast, his daily reading of the New York Times (“best newspaper in the world at that time … and now”) inspired him to pursue a career in journalism. He received his MA in Journalism from the University of Missouri and entered the field. As a reporter for the Great Falls Tribune under the ownership and management of the Warden Family, he observed and competed with the rigid control of Montana’s press by the Anaconda Company (the Great Falls Tribune was the only large newspaper in Montana NOT owned by ACM). Following his intellectual curiosity and his philosophical bend, he attended a number of Farm-Labor Institutes which he credits with motivating him to pursue solutions to economic and social woes through the law. In 1956, at the age of 34, he received his Juris Doctorate degree from the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Bennett’s varied career included eighteen years as a farmer, four years in the US Army during WWII (1942-46), two years as Assistant MT Attorney General (1957-59) with Forrest Anderson, three years in private practice in Glasgow (1959-61), two years as Associate Solicitor in the Department of Interior in Washington, DC (1961-62), and private law practice in Helena from 1962 to 1969. While in Helena he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Montana Supreme Court (1962) and cemented his previous relationships with Attorney General Forrest Anderson and US Senator Lee Metcalf. Bennett modestly refuses to accept the title of Campaign Manager for either Lee Metcalf (1966 re-election over the challenger, MT Republican Governor Tim Babcock) or Forrest Anderson (his 1968 election as Governor), saying that “they ran their campaigns … we were only there to help.” But he has been generally recognized as having filled that critical role in both of those critical elections. After Governor Anderson’s election in 1968, Bennett was appointed Director of the MT Unemployment Compensation Commission, a position from where he could be a close advisor and confidant of the new Governor. In 1971, Governor Anderson appointed him Judge in the most important jurisdiction in Montana, the 1st Judicial District in Helena, a position he held for seventeen years (1971-88). Upon stepping down from his judgeship, for twenty years (1988-2008) he was a law instructor, mediator and arbitrator. He currently resides in Helena with his wife, Norma Tirrell, former newspaper reporter and researcher/writer. Bennett has two adult children and four grandchildren.

Analyzing online communication from a social network point of view: questions, problems, perspectives

This programmatic paper investigates the possibilities, chances, and risks of analyzing personal and professional online communication from the point of view of interactional sociolinguistics combined with modern social network analysis (SNA). Thus, it has two complementing goals: One is the exploration of adequate, innovative concepts and methods for analyzing online communication, the other is to use online communication and its ontological and functional specificities to enrich the conceptual and methodological background of SNA. The paper is organized in two parts. It begins with an introduction to recent developments in sociolinguistic social network analysis. Here, three interesting new concepts and tools are discussed: latent versus emergent networks (Watts 1991), coalitions (Fitzmaurice 2000a, Fitzmaurice 2000b), and communities of practice (Wenger 1998

Networks of Information Exchange Under Uncertainty: The Case of Unconventional Gas Development in the United Kingdom

Modern policy-making is increasingly influenced by different types of uncertainty. Political actors are supposed to behave differently under the context of uncertainty then in “usual” decision-making processes. Actors exchange information in order to convince other actors and decision-makers, to coordinate their lobbying activities and form coalitions, and to get information and learn on the substantive issue. The literature suggests that preference similarity, social trust, perceived power and functional interdependence are particularly important drivers of information exchange. We assume that social trust as well as being connected to scientific actors is more important under uncertainty than in a setting with less uncertainty. To investigate information exchange under uncertainty analyze the case of unconventional shale gas development in the UK from 2008 till 2014. Our study will rely on statistical analyses of survey data on a diverse set of actors dealing with shale gas development and regulation in the UK.

Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy

This paper studies the relation between coalition structures in policy processes and policy change. While different factors such as policy images, learning processes, external events, or venue shopping are important to explain policy change, coalition structures within policy processes are often neglected. However, policy change happens as a result of negotiations and coordination among coalitions within policy processes. The paper analyzes how conflict, collaboration, and power relations among coalitions of actors influence policy change in an institutional context of a consensus democracy. Empirically, I rely on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to conduct a cross-sector comparison of the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. Coalition structures with low conflict and strong collaboration among coalitions as well as structures with dominant coalitions and weak collaboration both facilitate major policy change. Competing coalitions that are separated by strong conflict but still collaborate strongly produce policy outputs that are close to the status quo.

The direct-democratic challenge to evidence-based policy making: Questioning the governmental PISA narrative in Swiss school policy

The democratic deficit of evidence-based policymaking and the little attention the approach pays to values and norms have repeatedly been criticized. This article argues that direct-democratic campaigns may provide an arena for citizens and stakeholders to debate the belief systems inherent to evidence. The study is based on a narrative analysis of Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) reports, as well as of newspaper coverage and governmental information referring to PISA in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns on a variety of school policy issues. The findings show that PISA reports are discursive instruments rather than ‘objective evidence’. The reports promote a narrative of economic progress through educational evidence that is adopted without scrutiny by governmental coalitions in direct-democratic campaigns to justify school policy reforms. Yet, the dominant PISA narrative is contested in two counter-narratives, one endorsed by numerous citizens, the other by a group of experts. These counter-narratives question how PISA is used by an ‘expertocracy’ to prescribe reforms, as well as the performance ideology inherent to. Overall, these findings suggest that direct-democratic campaigns may make more transparent how evidence is produced and used according to existing belief systems. Evidence, on the other hand, may be a stimulus for democratic discourse by feeding the debate with potential policy problems and solution. Thus, direct-democratic debates may reconcile normative positions of citizens with the desire to base decisions on empirical evidence.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Strange bedfellows: The ethics and politics of medical futility in Texas

Background: Futile medical treatments are interventions that are not associated with a benefit to the patient. The definition and concept of medical futility are controversial. The Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) was passed in 1999 to address medically inappropriate interventions by allowing providers to withdraw inappropriate interventions against a surrogate decision maker's wishes following a review, attempt to transfer the patient, and 10-day waiting period. The original legislation was a negotiated compromise by players across the political spectrum. However, in recent years there has been increasing controversy regarding TADA and attempts to alter its applicability in Texas. ^ Purpose: The purpose of this project was to apply Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to gain understanding into the historical, ethical, and political basis of the initial compromise, and determine the sources of conflict that have led to increased opposition to TADA. ^ Methods: Using the ACF model, key actors within the medical futility policy debate in Texas were aggregated into coalitions based on shared beliefs. A narrative summary based analysis identified the core elements of the policy subsystem, as well as the constraints and resources of the subsystem actors. Externalities that promoted adjustments to coalition beliefs and tactics used by coalition participants were analyzed. Data sources included review of the published literature regarding medical futility, as well as analysis of published newspaper accounts and editorials regarding the medical futility issue in Texas, legislative testimony, and review of weblogs and online commentaries dealing with the issue. ^ Results: Primary coalition participants in developing compromise legislation in 1999 were the Providers and Vitalists, with Autonomists gaining a prominent role starting in 2006. Internal factors associated with the breakdown of consensus included changes to the makeup of the governing coalition and changes in individual case information available to the Vitalist coalition. Externalities related to the intertwining of the Sun Hudson case and the Terri Schiavo case generated negative publicity for the TADA from progressive and conservative viewpoints. Dissemination of information in various venues regarding contentious cases was associated with more polarization of viewpoints, and realignment of coalition alliances. ^ Conclusions: The ACF provided an outline for the initial compromise over the creation of the Texas Advance Directives Act as well as the eventual loss of consensus. The debate between the Provider, Vitalist, and Autonomist coalitions has been affected by internal policy evolution, changes in the governing coalition, and important externalities. The debate over medical futility in Texas has had much broader implications in the dispute over Health Care Reform.^

A mulher na política do Brasil

O artigo discute a desigualdade de gênero entre homens e mulheres no Brasil na ocupaçao de cargos políticos eletivos. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que utiliza os dados estatísticos do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) das eleiçoes de 2006, 2008, 2010 e 2012 para avaliar se houve um aumento real de mulheres ocupando cargos políticos eletivos com a criaçao da lei No 12.034/2009 que obrigou partidos/coligaçoes a reservar, no mínimo, 30 das vagas para candidatura femininas. Os resultados mostram apesar do Brasil em 2010 ter eleito a primeira mulher Presidenta do país, das mulheres serem a maioria da populaçao segundo o IBGE (2010) e representarem 52 do eleitorado do país conforme o TSE (2010), elas ainda sao "subrepresentadas" nos cargos políticos eletivos, ocupados por maioria masculina. Visto que a média de mulheres eleitas no Brasil é, em torno, de 10 do total, mesmo com o maior número de candidaturas femininas em decorrência da exigência Legal

A mulher na política do Brasil

O artigo discute a desigualdade de gênero entre homens e mulheres no Brasil na ocupaçao de cargos políticos eletivos. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que utiliza os dados estatísticos do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) das eleiçoes de 2006, 2008, 2010 e 2012 para avaliar se houve um aumento real de mulheres ocupando cargos políticos eletivos com a criaçao da lei No 12.034/2009 que obrigou partidos/coligaçoes a reservar, no mínimo, 30 das vagas para candidatura femininas. Os resultados mostram apesar do Brasil em 2010 ter eleito a primeira mulher Presidenta do país, das mulheres serem a maioria da populaçao segundo o IBGE (2010) e representarem 52 do eleitorado do país conforme o TSE (2010), elas ainda sao "subrepresentadas" nos cargos políticos eletivos, ocupados por maioria masculina. Visto que a média de mulheres eleitas no Brasil é, em torno, de 10 do total, mesmo com o maior número de candidaturas femininas em decorrência da exigência Legal

A mulher na política do Brasil

O artigo discute a desigualdade de gênero entre homens e mulheres no Brasil na ocupaçao de cargos políticos eletivos. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que utiliza os dados estatísticos do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) das eleiçoes de 2006, 2008, 2010 e 2012 para avaliar se houve um aumento real de mulheres ocupando cargos políticos eletivos com a criaçao da lei No 12.034/2009 que obrigou partidos/coligaçoes a reservar, no mínimo, 30 das vagas para candidatura femininas. Os resultados mostram apesar do Brasil em 2010 ter eleito a primeira mulher Presidenta do país, das mulheres serem a maioria da populaçao segundo o IBGE (2010) e representarem 52 do eleitorado do país conforme o TSE (2010), elas ainda sao "subrepresentadas" nos cargos políticos eletivos, ocupados por maioria masculina. Visto que a média de mulheres eleitas no Brasil é, em torno, de 10 do total, mesmo com o maior número de candidaturas femininas em decorrência da exigência Legal

Australia's Foreign Economic Policy: a 'State-Society Coalition' Approach and a Historical Overview

This paper aims to explain the historical development of Australia's foreign economic policy by using an analytical framework called a 'state-society coalition' approach. This approach focuses on virtual coalitions of state and society actors that share 'belief systems' and hold similar policy ideas, goals and preferences, as basic units (policy subsystems) of policy making. Major policy changes occur when a dominant coalition is replaced by another. The paper argues that, in Australia, there have been three major state-society coalitions in the foreign economic policy issue area: 'protectionists', 'trade liberalisers' and 'optional bilateralists'. The rise and fall of these coalitions resulted in distinctive shifts of Australia's foreign economic policy in the 1980s towards unilateral and multilateral liberalisation and in the late 1990s towards bilateral trade and investment arrangements.

Gestational drive and the green-bearded placenta.

A "green beard" refers to a gene, or group of genes, that is able to recognize itself in other individuals and direct benefits to these individuals. Green-beard effects have been dismissed as implausible by authors who have implicitly assumed sophisticated mechanisms of perception and complex behavioral responses. However, many simple mechanisms for genes to "recognize" themselves exist at the maternal-fetal interface of viviparous organisms. Homophilic cell adhesion molecules, for example, are able to interact with copies of themselves on other cells. Thus, the necessary components of a green-beard effect -- feature, recognition, and response -- can be different aspects of the phenotype of a single gene. Other green-beard effects could involve coalitions of genes at closely linked loci. In fact, any form of epistasis between a locus expressed in a mother and a closely linked locus expressed in the fetus has the property of "self-recognition." Green-beard effects have many formal similarities to systems of meiotic drive and, like them, can be a source of intragenomic conflict.

Ethnic Violence on Kenya's Periphery: Informal Institutions and Local Resilience in Conflict-Affected Communities

Deadly, inter-ethnic group conflict remains a threat to international security in a world where the majority of armed violence occurs not only within states but in the most ungoverned areas within states. Conflicts that occur between groups living in largely ungoverned areas often become deeply protracted and are difficult to resolve when the state is weak and harsh environmental conditions place human security increasingly under threat. However, even under these conditions, why do some local conflicts between ethnic groups escalate, whereas others do not? To analyze this puzzle, the dissertation employs comparative methods to investigate the conditions under which violence erupts or stops and armed actors choose to preserve peace. The project draws upon qualitative data derived from semi-structured interviews, focus group dialogues, and participant observation of local peace processes during field research conducted in six conflict-affected counties in Northern Kenya. Comparative analysis of fifteen conflict episodes with variable outcomes reveals the conditions under which coalitions of civic associations, including local peace committees, faith-based organizations, and councils of elders, inter alia, enhance informal institutional arrangements that contain escalation. Violence is less likely to escalate in communities where cohesive coalitions provide platforms for threat-monitoring, informal pact making, and enforcement of traditional codes of restitution. However, key scope conditions affect whether or not informal organizational structures are capable of containing escalation. In particular, symbolic acts of violence and the use of indiscriminant force by police and military actors commonly undermine local efforts to contain conflict. The dissertation contributes to the literatures on civil society and peacebuilding, demonstrating the importance of comparing processes of escalation and non-escalation and accounting for interactive effects between modes of state and non-state response to local, inter-ethnic group conflict.