Prejudice against female children: Economics and cultural explanations, and India evidence

Shows how economic theories based on parental self-interest may explain parental discrimination against daughters relative to sons. However, such theories often need to be adjusted (or even discarded) to allow for altruism of parents towards their children, and to take account of cultural influences on parental desires to have children of particular gender, and care equally for their children of different gender. The latter point is illustrated by a study of two different communities. In one situated in the Santal tribal belt I West Bengal, discrimination against daughters is found to be marked and accords (given the structure of society) with predictions of economic theories based on the pursuit of parental self-interest. By contrast, it is found that although the Knondh-dominated community in Orissa experiences similar economic conditions and social structures to the West Bengal communities, parental discrimination against daughters is almost absent. The differences seem to arise from a difference between the cultural values shared by the Kondhs in Orissa and those shared by the West Bengal community consisting of Santals and Bengali Hindus. This suggests that the applicability of economic theories of the family depends significantly on the social contexts in which they are to be applied. In this respect, both social structures and cultural values are important.

Testing for Market Power in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Industries: The Australian Grains and Oilseeds Industries

Recent empirical studies have found significant evidence of departures from competition in the input side of the Australian bread, breakfast cereal and margarine end-product markets. For example, Griffith (2000) found that firms in some parts of the processing and marketing sector exerted market power when purchasing grains and oilseeds from farmers. As noted at the time, this result accorded well with the views of previous regulatory authorities (p.358). In the mid-1990s, the Prices Surveillence Authority (PSA 1994) determined that the markets for products contained in the Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes were "not effectively competitive" (p.14). The PSA consequently maintained price surveillence on the major firms in this product group. The Griffith result is also consistent with the large number of legal judgements against firms in this sector over the past decade for price fixing or other types of non-competitive behaviour. For example, bread manufacturer George Weston was fined twice during 2000 for non-competitive conduct and the ACCC has also recently pursued and won cases against retailer Safeway in grains and oilseeds product lines.