Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Discussions in Europe on Variable Compensation in the Financial Sector. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper no. 20, February 2014

Bonuses – which are often used to mitigate principal-agent problems and to encourage employees to work harder – have increased tremendously in the financial sector during the last decade, and have often been seen as a contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008. The recent European Union (EU) action to adopt a policy that restricts bonuses paid to bankers may seem promising at first, but this does not address the real issues behind variable rewards. Compensation policies should be changed to encourage responsible risk-taking and decision-making through the implementation of broader performance metrics, forfeitable holdbacks and hybrid bonds. Furthermore, a change in organisational culture is needed to improve ethical behaviour leading to a re-balancing of stakeholders’ interests in the financial sector.

Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system. CEPS Special Report No. 136/April 2016

This paper discusses the application of the new European rules for burden-sharing and bail-in in the banking sector, in view of their ability to accommodate broader policy goals of aggregate financial stability. It finds that the Treaty principles and the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework for combating moral hazard and removing incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking by bankers. However, the application of the new rules may have become excessively attentive to the case-by-case evaluation of individual institutions, while perhaps losing sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system. Indeed, in this first phase of the banking union, while large segments of the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring and recapitalisation, the market may not be able to provide all the needed resources in the current environment of depressed profitability and low growth. Thus, a systemic market failure may be making the problem impossible to fix without resorting to temporary public support. But the risk of large write-offs of capital instruments due to burden-sharing and bail-in may represent an insurmountable obstacle to such public support as it may set in motion an investors’ flight. The paper concludes by showing that existing rules do contain the flexibility required to accommodate aggregate policy requirements in the general interest, and outlines a public support scheme for the precautionary recapitalisation of solvent banks that would be compliant with EU law.

The fiscal and economic condition of Mexico;

On t.-p.: No. 495.

Annual report - Superintendent of Banks, State of New York.

Some vols. issued with: Detailed statement.

Proceedings of the ... annual convention.

Description based on: 31st, 1921.

Liquidity,

"In a substantially abbreviated form, this paper has appeared in England in the Manchester guardian commercial."--Pref.

The Manual of statistics : stock exchange hand-book.

Description based on: 44th (1922)

Proceedings of the ... convention.

Mode of access: Internet.

A treatise on the law of bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank notes and cheques.

Includes legislation.

[Pamphlets on banks and banking law in Great Britain.

[1] Committee of Private Country Banks. Reasons against legislative interference. 1844.--[2] Drummond, Henry. Causes which lead to a bank restriction bill. 1839.--[3] Dun, John. The English bankers' grievance and its proper remedy. 1874.--[4] Greig, J.K. Bank note and banking reform. 1880.--[5] Holdsworth, A.H. A letter to a friend in Devonshire. 1818.--[6] Kinnear, George. Banks and exchange companies. 1847.--[7] A letter to the Right Hon. the Viscount Althorp on his proposed interference with the present system of country banking. 1833.--[8] LLoyds Bank Limited. Permanent staff training. 1919.--[9] [Maclean, A.W.] Additional considerations, addressed to all classes, on the necessity and equity of a national system of deposit-banking and paper currency. 1835.--[10] Nicholson, N.A. The controversy on free banking. 1868.--[11] Steele, F.E. On changes in the bank rate. [1891]--[12] Stirling, James. Practical considerations on banks and bank management. 1865.--[13] Thoughts upon the principles of banks, and the wisdom of legislative interference. 1837.--[14] Watt, Peter. The theory and practice of joint-stock banking. 1836.

Proceedings of the...annual convention ...

Latest issue consulted: 1926.

Proceedings of the annual convention.

Mode of access: Internet.

Proceedings of the ... annual meeting.

Mode of access: Internet.

Bank act of the State of California.

Description based on: 1915.