925 resultados para Antitrust legislation
Resumo:
This paper addresses the commercial leases policy issue of how to deal with small business tenants. The UK has adopted a voluntary solution to commercial lease reform by using Codes of Practice which is in contrast to the legislative approach adopted by Australia to attempt to solve its perceived problems with small business retail tenancies. The major aim of the research was to examine the perceptions of the effectiveness of the legislation in Australia and discuss any implications for the UK policy debate but the results of the research also raise questions for the Australian regime. The research used a combination of literature and legislation review and a semi structured interview survey to investigate the policy aims and objectives of Australian Federal and State Governments, identify the nature and scope of the Australian legislation and examine perceptions of effectiveness of the legislation in informing small business tenants. The situation is complicated in Australia due to leases being a State rather than Federal responsibility therefore the main fieldwork was carried out in one case study State, Victoria. The paper concludes that some aspects of the Australian system can inform the UK policy debate including mandatory information provision at the commencement of negotiations and the use of lease registrars/commissioners. However, there are a number of issues that the Australian legislation does not appear to have successfully addressed including the difficulties of legislating across partial segments of the commercial property market and the collection of data for enforcement purposes.
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A natural experiment is used to identify the causal relationship between employment protection legislation and fi rm growth. The natural experiment occurred in Sweden in 2001, when an exemption made it possible for fi rms with less than eleven employees to exclude two workers from the last-in-fi rst-out principle when dismissing personnel. The estimated average treatment effect of the reform show that the number of employees increased with 0.135 percent in fi rms with 5-9 employees relative to fi rms with 10-15 employees, which corresponds to over 5,000 additional jobs per year created by the reform. Firms with ten employees, just below the size threshold, became 3.4 percent less likely to increase their workforce to a level surpassing the threshold, indicating that the last-in- first-out rule prevented these firms from growing. Thus, employment protection legislation seems to act as a growth barrier for small fi rms.
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This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.
Resumo:
Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.
Resumo:
This paper studies the increase in the rate of informal workers in the Brazilian economy that occurred between 1985 and 1999. We develop an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We calibrate it to match some features of the Brazilian economy for 1985. We conduct a policy experiment which reproduces the 1988 constitution reforms that increased the retirement benefits and labor costs in the formal sector. We show that these reforms can explain the increase in informal labor. Then, we conduct a policy experiment and analyze its impact on the Brazilian economy.
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Incluye Bibliografía
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Includes bibliography