The ICC Debate and the EU-U.S. Struggle for Influence: The Case of the Balkan-6. ACES Working Paper No. 11, October 2007

The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was such a case. It centered on whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries - Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia - decided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia - ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate.

Banking Sector Soundness, Innovation, and Development: Emerging Europe and South Asia. ACES Working Papers, 2012

While most academic and practitioner researchers agree that a country’s commercial banking sector’s soundness is a very significant indicator of a country’s financial market health, there is considerably less agreement and substantial confusion surrounding what constitutes a healthy bank in the aftermath of 2007+ financial crisis. Global banks’ balance sheets, corporate governance, management compensation and bonuses, toxic assets, and risky behavior are all under scrutiny as academics and regulators alike are trying to quantify what are “healthy, safe and good practices” for these various elements of banking. The current need to quantify, measure, evaluate, and compare is driven by the desire to spot troubled banks, “bad and risky” behavior, and prevent real damage and contagion in the financial markets, investors, and tax payers as it did in the recent crisis. Moreover, future financial crisis has taken on a new urgency as vast amounts of capital flows (over $1 trillion) are being redirected to emerging markets. This study differs from existing methods in the literature as it entail designing, constructing, and validating a critical dimension of financial innovation in respect to the eight developing countries in the South Asia region as well as eight countries in emerging Europe at the country level for the period 2001 – 2008, with regional and systemic differentials taken into account. Preliminary findings reveal that higher stages of payment systems development have generated efficiency gains by reducing the settlement risk and improving financial intermediation; such efficiency gains are viewed as positive financial innovations and positively impact the banking soundness. Potential EU candidate countries: Albania; Montenegro; Serbia

The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

The New Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II): Less Accession, More Assistance?. EIPA Working Paper 2014/W/01

The EU enlargement engine seems to have run out of political steam. Support within the member countries for future enlargement is at all-time low, while some of the candidate countries have also seemed to put the enlargement process on the backburner. However, at least rhetorically, the EU is still committed to the enlargement process and maintains its entire enlargement tool box, such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) – one of the most important EU external financial instruments. The new IPA regulation (IPA II), adopted in March 20141, clearly reflects the fact that the enlargement process is on a holding pattern.

Restoring Order in Global Health Governance: Do Metagovernance Norms Affect Interorganizational Convergence? CES Open Forum Series #23, 2014-2015

This paper theorizes about the convergence of international organizations in global health governance, a field of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as particularly hit by institutional fragmentation. Unlike existing theories on interorganizationalism that have mainly looked to intra- and extraorganizational factors in order to explain why international organizations cooperate with each other in the first place, the paper is interested in the link between causes and systemic effects of interorganizational convergence. The paper begins by defining interorganizational convergence. It then proceeds to discuss why conventional theories on interorganizational- ism fail to explain the aggregate effects of convergence between IOs in global (health) governance which tend to worsen rather than cushion fragmentation — so-called "hypercollective action" (Severino & Ray 2010). In order to remedy this explanatory blind-spot the paper formulates an alternative sociological institutionalist theory on interorganizational convergence that makes two core theoretical propositions: first that emerging norms of metagovernance are a powerful driver behind interorganizational convergence in global health governance, and secondly that IOs are engaged in a fierce meaning-struggle over these norms which results in hypercollective action. In its empirical part, the paper’s core theoretical propositions are corroborated by analyzing discourses and practices of interorganizational convergence in global health. The empirical analysis allows drawing two far-reaching conclusions. On the one hand, interorganizational harmonization has emerged as a largely undisputed norm in global health which has been translated into ever more institutionalized forms of interorganizational cooperation. On the other, discourses and practices of interorganizational harmonization exhibit conflicts over the ordering principles according to which the policies and actions of international organizations with overlapping mandates and missions should be harmonized. In combination, these two empirical findings explain why interorganizational convergence has so far failed to strengthen the global health architecture.

Information Guide: Shqipëria. December 2014

Kjo Është një udhëzues për burimet e informacionit mbi Republikën e Shqipërisë, me lidhje (hyperlinks) për informacion brenda në ‘Burimet Europiane Online’ (ESO) dhe në faqet e interneti jasht rrjetit ESO [A guide to information sources on the Republic of Albania, with hyperlinks to information within European Sources Online and on external websites.]

Balkan Vegetation Database: historical background, current status and future perspectives

The Balkan Vegetation Database (BVD; GIVD ID: EU-00-019; http://www.givd.info/ID/EU-00- 019) is a regional database that consists of phytosociological relevés from different vegetation types from six countries on the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia). Currently, it contains 9,580 relevés, and most of them (78%) are geo-referenced. The database includes digitized relevés from the literature (79%) and unpublished data (21%). Herein we present descriptive statistics about attributive relevé information. We developed rules that regulate governance of the database, data provision, types of data availability regimes, data requests and terms of use, authorships and relationships with other databases. The database offers an extensive overview about studies on the local, regional and SE European levels including information about flora, vegetation and habitats.

Une ethnographie de la gestion de la population rom en Albanie

Cette thèse propose une ethnographie de la gestion de la population rom en Albanie, saisie sur deux périodes historiques : communisme et postcommunisme. L’analyse porte sur la façon dont divers instruments de gestion des populations en tant que techniques de pouvoir, sont mises en œuvre ; comment une population donnée devient-elle un sujet politique ? Quels sont les effets d’une telle gestion sur les populations en général et sur les populations roms en particulier ? Cette approche, une approche foucaldienne, replace ainsi au centre de l’analyse empirique les politiques, les pratiques et les discours concernant les Roms en Albanie et essaye de saisir les effets qu’ils produisent sur cette population. Cette thèse part de ces éléments pour interroger plus largement les transformations sociétales dans l’Albanie postcommuniste. Ce travail s’inscrit dans le champ de l’anthropologie politique et conjugue à la fois une anthropologie de l’État et une anthropologie de la violence. Il s’articule autour de trois parties. La première porte sur la contextualisation de cette thèse, du point de vue conceptuel, méthodologique et théorique. La deuxième partie propose une analyse des relations que l’État a entretenues avec les Roms pendant la période communiste, phase durant laquelle la population rom a été exposée à diverses mesures administratives visant sa normalisation, à travers une sédentarisation forcée et d’autres mesures coercitives. La troisième partie, précédée par un intermède sur la période de la transition, interroge la relation entre l’État, la violence, la mobilité et la gestion de la population rom en Albanie depuis la chute du communisme. L’analyse se fait à partir d’un cas spécifique, celui des familles roms déplacées et en déplacement aux alentours de Tirana ; une mobilité forcée notamment par peu d’opportunités de sortir de la précarité pour plusieurs familles roms, mais aussi une mobilité induite par les politiques, les pratiques et les discours étatiques, notamment par leur non-action. Au fur et à mesure que l’analyse des pratiques et des discours – complétée par une ethnographie des documents d’archives et dans les quartiers et les campements roms – s’approfondit pendant les deux périodes historiques, elle dévoile de nombreuses – mais différentes – contradictions et controverses au sein du dispositif, lesquelles produisent à leur tour discrimination, exclusion, violence, indifférence et abandon.