910 resultados para 140205 Environment and Resource Economics
Resumo:
The authors use experimental surveys to investigate the association between individuals' knowledge of particular wildlife species and their stated willingness to allocate funds to conserve each. The nature of variations in these allocations between species (e.g., their dispersion) as participants' knowledge increases is examined. Factors influencing these changes are suggested. Willingness-to-pay allocations are found not to measure the economic value of species, but are shown to be policy relevant. The results indicate that poorly known species, e.g., in remote areas, may obtain relatively less conservation support than they deserve. (JEL Q51, Q57, Q58)
Resumo:
Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land provides a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife adds to the limitations of the private-property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with, in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders had a possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme was expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds but failed. This case and others are analysed. Despite private-property failures, the long-term survival of some wildlife species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.
Resumo:
Using a species' population to measure its conservation status, this paper explores how increased knowledge about a species' status changes the public's willingness to donate funds for its conservation. This is based on the behavioral relationship between the level of donations and a species' conservation status satisfying general mathematical properties. This level of donation increases, on average, with greater knowledge of a species' conservation status if it is endangered, but falls if it is secure. Modelling enables individuals' demand for extra information about the conservation status of species to be specified. While this model may suggest that conservation bodies could boost funds for conservation of species by exaggerating species' endangerment, such a strategy is shown to be potentially counterproductive. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
This paper reinvestigates the energy consumption-GDP growth nexus in a panel error correction model using data on 20 net energy importers and exporters from 1971 to 2002. Among the energy exporters, there was bidirectional causality between economic growth and energy consumption in the developed countries in both the short and long run, while in the developing countries energy consumption stimulates growth only in the short run. The former result is also found for energy importers and the latter result exists only for the developed countries within this category. In addition, compared to the developing countries, the developed countries' elasticity response in terms of economic growth from an increase in energy consumption is larger although its income elasticity is lower and less than unitary. Lastly. the implications for energy policy calling for a more holistic approach are discussed. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
Many developing south-east Asian governments are not capturing full rent from domestic forest logging operations. Such rent losses are commonly related to institutional failures, where informal institutions tend to dominate the control of forestry activity in spite of weakly enforced regulations. Our model is an attempt to add a new dimension to thinking about deforestation. We present a simple conceptual model, based on individual decisions rather than social or forest planning, which includes the human dynamics of participation in informal activity and the relatively slower ecological dynamics of changes in forest resources. We demonstrate how incumbent informal logging operations can be persistent, and that any spending aimed at replacing the informal institutions can only be successful if it pushes institutional settings past some threshold. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.