In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. We then outline an alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Emotions and Values

There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).

Perfecting Imperfect Duties via Institutionalization

Onora O’Neill’s thesis that, in a world like ours, institutionalization is a necessary condition for the existence of typical universal welfare rights—the “institutionalization thesis” for short—has often been criticized. I believe that most of these criticisms fail to appreciate that the institutionalization thesis is based on her “classical” understanding of rights, which stresses the essential duty-implying character of rights. By and large, O’Neill’s thesis stands and falls with the classical theory of rights. My suggestion is, therefore, that what is really at issue between O’Neill and at least some of her critics is the proper understanding of the concept of a right.

Autonomie der Person

Die Autonomie von Personen ist nach weit verbreiteter Auffassung ein zentraler Wert, den es zu befördern und zu erreichen, zu bewahren und zu respektieren gilt. Personen scheinen ein Recht auf Autonomie gegenüber der Einmischung anderer zu besitzen und streben Autonomie selbst als persönliches Ideal an. Umgekehrt scheint es ein beklagenswerter Verlust, wenn es ihnen an Autonomie fehlt, und dieser Mangel deutet häufig auf Unterdrückung, Entmündigung oder psychische Krankheit hin. Doch was genau macht Personen autonom und inwiefern ist Autonomie so wertvoll? Liegt es an einer bestimmten Konstellation von Einstellungen und deren Bezug zueinander, wie internalistische Ansätze behaupten? Sind es bestimmte soziale Umstände und Beziehungen, die Personen externalistischen Ansätzen zufolge als autonom charakterisieren lassen? Oder lassen sich weitere Merkmale nennen? Kurz: Gelten Personen dadurch als autonom, weil sie sich zu sich selbst in einer bestimmten Weise verhalten, oder werden sie durch ihre Lebensumstände autonom? Ausgehend von Harry G. Frankfurts klassischem Modell hierarchischer Wünsche wird in diesem Band eine repräsentative Auswahl verschiedener Konzeptionen der Autonomie vorgestellt. Sie sollen nicht nur die zeitgenössische Debatte um die Frage, was genau Personen als autonom charakterisiert, abbilden. Sie stellen darüber hinaus die wesentliche Grundlage für unser Verständnis von Autonomie in angewandten Kontexten dar, wie etwa in der angewandten Ethik oder in der politischen Philosophie und der Rechtsphilosophie.