Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

The European Union Police Mission: The Beginning of a New Future for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

The creation, reform and/or restructuring of the police in post-conflict societies remains one of the key challenges for practitioners and scholars in the contemporary fields of peace and security, particularly due to the changing nature of conflicts. Since the 1990s the world has witnessed a proliferation of international police missions, with regional organisations gradually acquiring a prominent role. This paper analyses the 2003-2005 period of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much is at stake in this mission, both in terms of the development of the EU´s external identity but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road to EU membership and sustainable peace. This paper will argue that by 2005 the balance sheet was mixed. EUPM fell short of fulfilling its overall goal of ‘Europeanising’ Bosnian police services, and of its desire to be seen as providing that additional ingredient in police matters that would set it apart from the earlier UN mission. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the Mission did not merit the harsh criticisms it was faced with. Its lack of success was not entirely the Mission’s doing. The paper focuses on three aspects: political and economic viability and sustainability, security levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and institution and capacity building. The explanatory framework used in this paper is based on the democratic policing discourse. In doing so the argument developed here will also shed light on the nature of so-called “best European practices” in police matters.

Treballadores, conflictivitat laboral i moviment obrer durant el franquisme a l'àrea de Barcelona

Dins del desenvolupament de la tesi “Treballadores, conflictivitat laboral i moviment obrer durant el franquisme a l’àrea de Barcelona”, aquesta recerca ha tractat d'omplir un buit a les investigacions sobre l'actuació de les dones contra el franquisme, interrelacionant la seva participació en protestes laborals i al moviment obrer, especialment a Comissions Obreres (CCOO). Per portar a terme la investigació, s'ha consultat documentació procedent de les organitzacions antifranquistes, de la policia i del Sindicat Vertical franquista, a part d'entrevistes a dones que van participar a la conflictivitat laboral i al moviment obrer durant el franquisme. S'ha iniciat la redacció de la tesi doctoral, que es presentarà el 2008. A partir de les fonts estudiades s'ha pogut constatar la importància de la participació de les dones a les protestes laborals entre 1946 i 1956, amb un escàs paper de les organitzacions antifranquistes. Posteriorment, la presència de dones a les protestes laborals va disminuir. A més, inicialment van estar poc presents a les CCOO. A partir de 1969 el nombre de dones militants a CCOO va augmentar, al igual que la proporció de dones implicades a la conflictivitat laboral. No obstant això, van ser escasses les dones a les estructures organitzatives de CCOO i les reivindicacions pròpies de les treballadores rarament van estar presents a les plataformes reivindicatives durant el franquisme.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.