State-Society Relationships, Social Trust and the Development of Labour Market Policies in Italy and Sweden

The first decade of the twenty-first century may be remembered for the rebirth of consensus on labour market policy. After three decades of bitter political and ideological controversy between a neo-liberal and a traditional social democratic approach, a new model, often labelled flexicurity, has emerged. This model is promoted by numerous political organisations since it promises to put an end to the old trade-off between equality and efficiency. Several countries are embracing the flexicurity model as a blueprint for labour market reform, but others, mostly belonging to the 'Mediterranean Rim', are clearly lagging behind. Why is it so difficult for these countries to implement the flexicurity model? This paper argues that the application of a flexicurity strategy in these countries is complicated by the lack of social trust between social partners and the state as well as political economy traditions that highlight the role of labour market regulation as a source of social protection.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Status Report Of The UI Trust Fund, 2001

Status report of UI Trust Fund for Iowa Workforce Development

Status Report Of The UI Trust Fund, 2002

Status report On the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund for Iowa Workforce Development

Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust, June 30, 2001 & June 30, 2002

Other Audit Reports

Office of Treasurer of State Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust, June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report

Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust, June 30, 2003

State Agency Audit Report

Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust, June 30, 2002 & June 30, 2003

Other Audit Reports

Office of Treasurer of State Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust, Independent Auditor's Reports Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2004

State Agency Audit Report

2004 Status Report On the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund, 2004

This report evaluates the status of unemployment compensation trust fund as of December 31, 2004. The report reviews fund expenditures and fund revenue. It also discusses the fund solvency in terms of fund balance, fund balance adjusted for wage growth and months of benefits at recession levels.

Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust, Independent Auditor's Reports, Finacial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2004

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations