Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

The determinants of university patenting: Do incentives matter?

In recent years various studies have examined the factors that may explain academic patents. Existing analyses have also underlined the substantial differences to be found in European countries in the institutional framework that defines property rights for academic patents. The objective of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature on the factors explaining academic patents and to determine whether the incentives that universities offer researchers contribute towards explaining the differences in academic patenting activity. The results of the econometric analysis for the Spanish universities point towards the conclusion that the principal factor determining the patents is funding of R&D while royalty incentives to researchers do not appear to be significant.

Activation of HTLV-I transcription in the presence of Tax is independent of the acetylation of CREB-2 (ATF-4).

We have previously demonstrated that the bZIP transcription factor CREB-2, also called ATF-4, trans-activates, in association with the viral protein Tax, the human T-cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) promoter. In this study, we have examined whether CREB-2 acetylation affects transcriptional activation mediated by Tax. We present evidence that CREB-2 is acetylated in vitro and in vivo. CREB-2 is acetylated in two regions: the basic domain of the bZIP (from amino acid residue 270 to 300) and the short basic domain (from 342 to 351) located downstream from the bZIP. We also demonstrate that CREB-2 is acetylated by p300/CBP but not by p/CAF. Moreover, replacement of lysine by arginine in the basic domains decreases the trans-activating capacity of CREB-2. However, in the presence of Tax, the HTLV-I transcription remains fully activated by these CREB-2 mutants. Although we cannot totally exclude that the mutations could also affect CREB-2 structure and activity independent of acetylation, our results suggest that activation of the viral promoter in the presence of Tax is independent of the CREB-2 acetylation.

Effects of different Incentives on Attrition and Fieldwork Effort in Telephone Household Panel Surveys

Little is known about sample behavior and fieldwork effects of different incentives introduced in a household panel survey. This is especially true for telephone surveys. In a randomized experiment, the Swiss Household Panel implemented one prepaid and two promised nonmonetary incentives in the range of 10 to 15 Swiss Francs (7-10 e), plus a no incentive control group. The aim of the paper is to compare effects of these incentives especially on cooperation, but also on sample selection and fieldwork effort, separated by the household and the subsequent individual level. We find small positive cooperation effects of the prepaid incentive on both the household and the individual level especially in larger households. Sample composition is affected to a very minor extent. Finally, incentives tend to save fieldwork time and partially the number of contacts needed on the individual level.

Is the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital?: The reasoned opinion of the EU Commission IP/10/513

The aim of my speech is answering to the question if the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax is incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital. We are going to pay special attention to the European Commission’s request to Spain to change its Inheritance and Gift Tax provisions for Non-Residents or Assets held abroad. In order to answer to the question mentioned above five points will be explained. At first place I am going to describe the infrengement procedure established in the Article 258 that the EU Commission can follow when a Member State doesn’t comply with Community Law. At second place, we are going to explain what is the content of the EU Commission delivered on 5th of may 2010 regarding the spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax. Then, we will analise what establishes the Community Law regarding the freedom of workers and capital and how they are understood by the EU Court of Justice in similar cases. Finally, we are going to provide possible amendments that Spain could undertake.

Jurisdictional immunity in tax haven countries

El següent projecte conté informació sobre què són els paradisos fiscals, els seus avantatges, i on s'ubiquen. També s'analitza el procés que algú ha de seguir per anar a un paradís fiscal i avalua com la gent rica i les grans empreses operen els seus negocis a través dels paradisos fiscals i prenen avantatge d'ells reduint les seves obligacions fiscals de manera significativa. El projecte també considera la qüestió del secret bancari, que ha estat un gran conflicte entre els països en els darrers anys.

Longer-term impacts of mentoring, educational services, and incentives to learn: evidence from a randomized trial in the United States

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long-term educational and employment impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards with the objective to improve high-school graduation and postsecondary schooling enrollment. The short-term hefty beneficial average impacts quickly faded away. Heterogeneity matters. While encouraging results are found for younger youth, and when the program is implemented in relatively small communities of 9th graders; detrimental longlived outcomes are found for males, and when case managers are partially compensated by incentive payments and students receive more regular reminders of incentives.

Mentoring, educational services, and economic incentives longer-term evidence on risky behaviors from a randomized trial

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long- term impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards to attend program activities, complete high-school and enroll in post-secondary education on youths' engagement in risky behaviors, such as substance abuse, criminal activity, and teenage childbearing. Outcomes were measured at three different points in time, when youths were in their late-teens, and when they were in their early- and their latetwenties. Overall the program was unsuccessful at reducing risky behaviors. Heterogeneity matters in that perverse effects are concentrated among certain subgroups, such as males, older youths, and youths from sites where youths received higher amount of stipends. We claim that this evidence is consistent with different models of youths' behavioral response to economic incentives. In addition, beneficial effects found in those sites in which QOP youths represented a large fraction of the entering class of 9th graders provides hope for these type of programs when operated in small communities and supports the hypothesis of peer effects.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain. The Role of the Courts

Overview of the Tax Coordination of the Regions in Spain from the point of view of the role of the Courts in developing the present system

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain - Role of the Courts

Análisis de la jurisprudencia constitucional española sobre la distribución de competencias tributarias entre los distintos niveles de gobierno.

Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

Proposed Sugar Sweetened Drinks Tax: Health Impact Assessment

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) was requested by the Department of Health (RoI) to undertake a Health Impact Assessment (HIA) of a proposed tax on sugar sweetened drinks (SSDs) in 2012. The public health priority for this proposal was to consider the potential of such a tax to address the problem of overweight and obesity in Ireland. The HIA was overseen by the Special Action Group on Obesity (SAGO) and guided by a steering group. The HIA process involved a population profile, a stakeholder consultation event and a literature review. This information, paralleled by a modelling exercise undertaken by Dr. Mike Rayner and his team in the University of Oxford was presented to the steering group to inform their conclusions.