Development of secondary palate requires strict regulation of ECM remodeling: sequential distribution of RECK, MMP-2, MMP-3, and MMP-9

We have evaluated RECK (reversion-inducing-cysteine-rich protein with Kazal motifs), MMP-2 (matrix metalloproteinase-2), MMP-3, and MMP-9 involvement during palate development in mice by using various techniques. Immunohistochemical features revealed the distribution of RECK, MMP-2, and MMP-3 in the mesenchymal tissue and in the midline epithelial seam at embryonic day 13 (E13), MMPs-2, -3, and -9 being particularly expressed at E14 and E14.5. In contrast, RECK was weakly immunostained at these times. Involvement of MMPs was validated by measuring not only their protein expression, but also their activity (zymograms). In situ hybridization signal (ISH) for RECK transcript was distributed in mesenchymal and epithelial regions within palatal shelves at all periods evaluated. Importantly, the results from ISH analysis were in accord with those obtained by real-time polymerase chain reaction. The expression of RECK was found to be temporally regulated, which suggested possible roles in palatal ontogeny. Taken together, our results clearly show that remodeling of the extracellular matrix is finely modulated during secondary palate development and occurs in a sequential manner.

Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

Jones -v- Bartlett: landlords` liability to tenants and members of their household in negligence

According to the latest available statistics, in 1997-98, of the total of seven million Australian households, two million were renting their dwelling from a State housing authority or private landlords.Therefore, the decision on the scope of landlords' liability to tenants, members of their households, and guests in the right of the tenant handed down by the High Court of Australia in November 2000 was not only of legal, but also of social and economic significance. This note will discuss the Jones v Bartlett case in the context of the traditional common law approach to landlords' liability and the ground-breaking, if flawed, case of Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris.

Quo iure? Defendants' liability to rescuers in the tort of negligence

The year 2001 marks the 80th anniversary of Cardozo J's judgment in Wagner v International Railway Co 232 NY 176 (1921). This article examines theoretical and procedural problems associated with the concept of duty of care as a foundation for the defendant's liability in negligence to altruistic rescuers, and suggests that Cardozo J's judgment did not establish the principle that defendants owe rescuers a duty of care in negligence. It is argued that subsequent judgments failed to provide the duty of care owed to rescuers under tortious negligence with proper jurisprudential foundations. Conceptual difficulties inherent in a jurisprudential principle that would provide physically injured rescuers with a legal right to a duty of care from the defendant under the tort of negligence were compounded once compensation for negligently occasioned pure emotional distress became available. This article analyses various theories of recovery for pure psychiatric injury and the classification of rescuers into primary and secondary victims. It proposes a solution in the form of a separate cause of action on the case for liability to injured rescuers, partly based on the principle of necessity that governs the Roman action for negotiorum gestio. Cases from the United States, England and Australia are used to illustrate the similarities and differences in the development of and approaches to, the law of rescue.

Unsafe leased residential premises: a landlord's liability in negligence to injured occupants

This article examines the law relating to the liability of landlords in negligence for unsafe residential premises, focusing in particular on the recent High Court decisions in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris and Jones v Bartlett. The author concludes that the High Court in Jones v Bartlett has placed sensible limitations on landlords' liability, by limiting liability to defects in the premises that were known or ought to have been revealed on a reasonable inspection by the landlord. The author points out that there are compelling policy considerations supporting the court's conclusion in that case that the landlord should not be required to arrange for the premises to be inspected by expert tradespeople.

Corporate liability for workplace deaths and injuries-reflecting on Victoria's laws in the light of the Esso Longford explosion

The purpose of this article is to consider some different legal models for the liability of corporations for the deaths and serious injuries of their employees, with particular emphasis on the law in Victoria.

Two recent developments in Victoria prompt this consideration. First, on 30 July 2001, the Victorian Supreme Court handed down its sentencing decision in the case arising from the explosion on 25 September 1998 at the Longford gas plant operated by Esso Australia Pty Ltd. The decision marked the end of the formal public consideration of a devastating event in Victorian industrial history, which began with the Royal Commission set up on 20 October 1998 to investigate the causes of an explosion in which two workers died and eight others were injured. Second, in early 2002, the Victorian Government failed in its attempt to introduce new criminal offences for corporate employers whose employees are killed or seriously injured at work. In spite of their failure to be passed by the Legislative Council in Victoria, these proposals warrant consideration. They represent a growing trend by policy makers in attempting to address more effectively the question of the liability for deaths and serious injuries of workers to employers who operate through the corporate form.

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

The high court on vicarious liability

Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) is a venerable common law doctrine which holds an employer liable for the torts of employees, regardless of the fault of the employer. An employer's liability for the torts of its employees can represent a significant financial obligation and can affect both hiring and operational decisions of businesses. Vicarious liability is a prominent theme in the background of much litigation and is often the reason for litigating the issue of whether or not a worker is an employee. Vicarious liability may also arise through other relationships, such as partnership and agency. Two recent decisions by the High Court of Australia have drawn attention to the issue of vicarious liability. These decisions illuminate the High Court's view of vicarious liability's two main streams: negligence (Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd) n2 and intentional tort (NSW v Lepore). [*2] n3

Introducing personal liability under the continuous disclosure regime : The essentials and non-essentials

Under the Federal Government's CLERP 9 legislation, expected at the time of writing to come into force in July 2004, personal liability will be introduced for the first time under the continuous disclosure regime. Individuals who are 'involved' in a failure to immediately disclose materially price sensitive information to the market will be subject to a civil penalty, in addition to the company being liable. According to the author, the introduction of personal liability per se is not contentious and indeed is a favourable change; what is questionable, however, is whether 'involvement' in a contravention is the appropriate test for imposing personal liability in relation to breaches of the continuous disclosure provisions. Based on the case law to date on the meaning of 'involved', there is particular uncertainty as to whether an individual would need to have actual knowledge that non-disclosed information is 'materially price sensitive' in order to satisfy the test of 'involved' in the context of continuous disclosure, or whether mere knowledge that the information has not been disclosed would be sufficient. This uncertainty arises due to the vague concept of 'essential matters' which the courts have developed as a test for what degree of knowledge a person needs to have in order to be 'involved'. The author argues that all the confusion as to what 'involved' means could be addressed by removing the word 'essential' from the dialogue, so that the test of 'involvement' would simply be based on whether the particular person had actual knowledge of each of the factual elements constituting the offence.

Holding the purse strings : the continuing evolution of human rights law and the potential liability of the finance industry for human rights abuses

While the responsibility of States and, in more recent times, corporations, has been thoroughly discussed in relation to human right~, a new stage of evolution may be emerging in relation to the liability of the financial backers of an enterprise that is accused of human rights abuses. This article considers the basis in international law for such emerging liability and examines some of the legal avenues used in recent domestic litigation against financial institutions. The article concludes by examining some of the relevant instruments of 'soft' international law and notes that although there is little in the way of concrete legislation or judicial precedent that would hold financial institutions responsible for the actions of those they invest in, the potential for the law to evolve in that direction is clear.

Directors' personal liability-is the proposed amendment to Section 197 acceptable when compared with Hanel v O'Neill?

On 2 June 2005, the Australian Government announced a proposal to amend s. 197 of the Corporations Act. This is to overturn the decision in Hanel v. O'Neill ("Hanel") where the South Australian Supreme Court has expanded the circumstances in which directors of trustee companies can be held personally liable for the debts under the current section 197(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The multiple interpretations presented in Hanel highlighted the uncertainty of s. 197 and this uncertainty is heightened in at least two subsequent cases. The article provides a detailed analysis of how the decision in Hanel is affecting the directors' freedom of management and suggests some precautionary measures that the directors could take as protection against creditor's actions under s. 197. The author welcomes the proposed amendment because the new section will create certainty for directors as to. the scope of their potential personal liability, but contends that the substance of the proposed s. 197 is not acceptable as there is potential for abuse by directors of certain trustee companies.